Abstract.- Can general relativistic computers break the Turing barrier?- Are there final limits to human knowledge?- Limitative results versus human creativity (paradigm shifts).- Gödel’s logical results in comparison/combination with Gödel’s relativistic results.- Can Hilbert’s programme be carried through after all? 1 Aims, perspective The Physical Church-Turing Thesis, PhCT, is the conjecture that whatever physical computing device (in the broader sense) or physical thought experiment will be designed by any future civilization, it will always be simulatable by a Turing machine. The PhCT was formulated and generally accepted in the 1930’s. At that time a general consensus was reached declaring PhCT valid, and indeed in the succeeding decades the PhCT was an extremely useful and valuable maxim in elaborating the foundations of theoretical computer science, logic, foundation of mathematics and related areas. But since PhCT is partly a physical conjecture, we emphasize that this consensus of the 1930’s was based on the physical worldview of the 1930’s. Moreover, many thinkers considered PhCT as being based on

In dealing with emergent phenomena, a common task is to identify useful descriptions of them in terms of the underlying atomic processes, and to extract enough computational content from these descriptions to enable predictions to be made. Generally, the underlying atomic processes are quite well understood, and (with important exceptions) captured by mathematics from which it is relatively easy to extract algorithmic content. A widespread view is that the difficulty in describing transitions from algorithmic activity to the emergence associated with chaotic situations is a simple case of complexity outstripping computational resources and human ingenuity. Or, on the other hand, that phenomena transcending the standard Turing model of computation, if they exist, must necessarily lie outside the domain of classical computability theory. In this talk we suggest that much of the current confusion arises from conceptual gaps and the lack of a suitably fundamental model within which to situate emergence. We examine the potential for placing emergent relations in a familiar context based on Turing’s 1939 model for interactive computation over structures described in terms of reals. The explanatory power of this model is explored, formalising informal descriptions in terms of mathematical definability and invariance, and relating a range of basic scientific puzzles to results and intractable problems in computability theory. In this talk

Abstract. Looking at very recent developments in spacetime theory, we can wonder whether these results exhibit features of hypercomputation that traditionally seemed impossible or absurd. Namely, we describe a physical device in relativistic spacetime which can compute a non-Turing computable task, e.g. which can decide the halting problem of Turing machines or decide whether ZF set theory is consistent (more precisely, can decide the theorems of ZF). Starting from this, we will discuss the impact of recent breakthrough results of relativity theory, black hole physics and cosmology to well established foundational issues of computability theory as well as to logic. We find that the unexpected, revolutionary results in the mentioned branches of science force us to reconsider the status of the physical Church Thesis and to consider it as being seriously challenged. We will outline the consequences of all this for the foundation of mathematics (e.g. to Hilbert’s programme). Observational, empirical evidence will be quoted to show that the statements above do not require any assumption of some physical universe outside of our own one: in our specific physical universe there seem to exist regions of spacetime supporting potential non-Turing computations. Additionally, new “engineering ” ideas will be outlined for solving the so-called blue-shift problem of GR-computing. Connections with related talks at the Physics and Computation meeting, e.g. those of Jerome Durand-Lose, Mark Hogarth and Martin Ziegler, will be indicated. 1

Abstract. Computability concerns information with a causal – typically algorithmic – structure. As such, it provides a schematic analysis of many naturally occurring situations. We look at ways in which computabilitytheoretic structure emerges in natural contexts. We will look at how algorithmic structure does not just emerge mathematically from information, but how that emergent structure can model the emergence of very basic aspects of the real world. The adequacy of the classical Turing model of computation — as first presented in [18] — is in question in many contexts. There is widespread doubt concerning the reducibility to this model of a broad spectrum of real-world processes and natural phenomena, from basic quantum mechanics to aspects of evolutionary development, or human mental activity. In 1939 Turing [19] described an extended model providing mathematical form to the algorithmic content of structures which are presented in terms of real numbers. Most scientific laws with a computational content can be framed

Abstract. We discuss the impact of very recent developments of spacetime theory, black hole physics, and cosmology to well established foundational issues of computability theory and logic. Namely, we describe a physical device in relativistic spacetime which can compute a non-Turing computable task, e.g. which can decide the halting problem of Turing machines or whether ZF set theory is consistent or not. Connections with foundation of mathematics and foundation of spacetime theory will be discussed. 1