A real is called recursively enumerable if it is the limit of a recursive, increasing, converging sequence of rationals. Following Solovay [23] and Chaitin [10] we say that an r.e. real dominates an r.e. real if from a good approximation of from below one can compute a good approximation of from below. We shall study this relation and characterize it in terms of relations between r.e. sets. Solovay's [23]-like numbers are the maximal r.e. real numbers with respect to this order. They are random r.e. real numbers. The halting probability ofa universal self-delimiting Turing machine (Chaitin's Ω number, [9]) is also a random r.e. real. Solovay showed that any Chaitin Ω number is-like. In this paper we show that the converse implication is true as well: any Ω-like real in the unit interval is the halting probability of a universal self-delimiting Turing machine.

A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every e#ectively realizable physical system can be defined by Turing Machines (`Thesis P'); in this formulation the Thesis appears an empirical, more than a logico-mathematical, proposition. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (`hypercomputation'): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. These models depend on infinite computation, explicitly or implicitly, and appear physically implausible; moreover, even if infinite computation were realizable, the Halting Problem would not be a#ected. Therefore, Thesis P is not essentially di#erent from the standard Church-Turing Thesis.

The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Testfpassing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.

Alonzo Church's mathematical work on computability and undecidability is well-known indeed, and we seem to have an excellent understanding of the context in which it arose. The approach Church took to the underlying conceptual issues, by contrast, is less well understood. Why, for example, was "Church's Thesis" put forward publicly only in April 1935, when it had been formulated already in February/March 1934? Why did Church choose to formulate it then in terms of G odel's general recursiveness, not his own #-definability as he had done in 1934? A number of letters were exchanged between Church and Paul Bernays during the period from December 1934 to August 1937; they throw light on critical developments in Princeton during that period and reveal novel aspects of Church's distinctive contribution to the analysis of the informal notion of e#ective calculability. In particular, they allow me to give informed, though still tentative answers to the questions I raised; the char...

We define and study a new notion called k-immunity that lies between immunity and hyperimmunity in strength. Our interest in k-immunity is justified by the result that # # does not k-tt reduce to a k-immune set, which improves a previous result by Kobzev [7, 13]. We apply the result to show that # # does not btt-reduce to MIN, the set of minimal programs. Other applications include the set of Kolmogorov random strings, and retraceable and regressive sets. We also give a new characterization of e#ectively simple sets and show that simple sets are not btt-cuppable. Keywords: Computability, Recursion Theory, bounded reducibilities, minimal programs, immunity, k-immune, regressive, retraceable, e#ectively simple, cuppable. 1 Introduction There seems to be a large gap between immunity and hyperimmunity (h-immunity) that is waiting to be filled. What happens, one wonders if the disjoint strong arrays that try to witness that a set is not h-immune are subjected to additional conditions...

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there laws of randomness? These old and deep philosophical questions still stir controversy today. Some scholars have suggested that our difficulty in dealing with notions of randomness could be gauged by the comparatively late development of probability theory, which had a

What is the computational notion of "implementation"? It is not individuation, instantiation, reduction, or supervenience. It is, I suggest, semantic interpretation. This document is Technical Report 97-15 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Department of Computer Science) and Technical Report 97-5 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Center for Cognitive Science). 1 INTRODUCTION Consider the relationships among algorithms, computer programs, and the computers that execute them. An algorithm is (roughly) a procedure for computing a function (for more details, see Soare 1996; Rapaport, forthcoming). A program is a more specific and detailed textual expression of an algorithm, expressed in a programming language. Often, it is said that the program "implements" the algorithm. A computer process is an algorithm being executed (see Rapaport 1988, 1995; Smith 1997). It is a physical device (a computer) behaving in a certain way ; the way is described (or specified) by the program, and the physical device running the ...

The varieties of mathematical basis for formalizing linguistic theories are more diverse than is commonly realized. For example, the later work of Zellig Harris might well suggest a formalization in terms of CATE-

The Abstract State Machine Thesis asserts that every classical algorithm is behaviorally equivalent to an abstract state machine. This thesis has been shown to follow from three natural postulates about algorithmic computation. Here, we prove that augmenting those postulates with an additional requirement regarding basic operations implies Church’s Thesis, namely, that the only numeric functions that can be calculated by effective means are the recursive ones (which are the same, extensionally, as the Turing-computable numeric functions). In particular, this gives a natural axiomatization of Church’s Thesis, as Gödel and others suggested may be possible.