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17
The Impact of Competition on Prices with Numerous Firms ∗
, 2013
"... We use extreme value theory (EVT) to develop insights about price theory. Our analysis reveals “detail-independent ” equilibrium properties that characterize a large family of models. We derive a formula relating equilibrium prices to the level of competition. When the number of firms is large, mark ..."
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We use extreme value theory (EVT) to develop insights about price theory. Our analysis reveals “detail-independent ” equilibrium properties that characterize a large family of models. We derive a formula relating equilibrium prices to the level of competition. When the number of firms is large, markups are proportional to 1 � ¡ � � 0 £ � −1 (1 − 1��) ¤ ¢, where � is the random utility noise distribution and � is the number of firms. This implies prices are pinned down by the tail properties of the noise distribution and that prices are independent of many other institutional details. The elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms is shown to be the EVT tail exponent of the distribution for preference shocks and in most leading cases is relatively insensitive to the number of firms. For example, for the Gaussian case asymptotic markups are proportional to 1 � √ ln �, implying a zero asymptotic elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms. Thus competition only exerts weak pressure on prices. We also study applications of the model, including endogenizing the level of noise.
De-industrialization and entrepreneurship under monopolistic competition
"... This article offers a new mechanism to explain de-industrialization in response to a price increase of the manufactured good. In our trade model, one sector (agricul-ture) is perfectly competitive whilst the other (manufacturing) is monopolistically competitive. Both industries use skilled and unski ..."
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This article offers a new mechanism to explain de-industrialization in response to a price increase of the manufactured good. In our trade model, one sector (agricul-ture) is perfectly competitive whilst the other (manufacturing) is monopolistically competitive. Both industries use skilled and unskilled labour as inputs. Entry into manufacturing requires a fixed cost in terms of skilled labour only. A rise in the mar-ket price for the differentiated goods raises both marginal revenue and the price of skilled labour, which affects the marginal cost of production and the entry cost. When short-run profits increase so that new manufacturing firms enter, fewer skilled workers are available for production purposes. This in turn may then lead to a de-cline in total manufacturing output. Our theoretical mechanism is jointly consistent with recent empirical observations on premature de-industrialization characterizing several Latin American and Asian countries and productive diversification as observed in various developing economies.
Previous versions of this paper were circulated as “Why Is There No AIDS Vaccine ” among other
, 2015
"... Dan Wood for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for the medical expertise of Scott Lee, who directed the effort to code risk heterogeneity for diseases in our sample. We are especially indebted to the editors and referees for extensive suggestions which substantially improved the paper. ..."
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Dan Wood for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for the medical expertise of Scott Lee, who directed the effort to code risk heterogeneity for diseases in our sample. We are especially indebted to the editors and referees for extensive suggestions which substantially improved the paper. Snyder gratefully acknowledges funding for research assistants provided by the Dartmouth College Presidential Scholars Program. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.
Toward a theory of monopolistic competition *
"... Abstract We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being exible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. The basic tool we use to study the market outcome is the elasticity of substitution at a symmetric consumption patte ..."
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Abstract We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being exible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. The basic tool we use to study the market outcome is the elasticity of substitution at a symmetric consumption pattern, which depends on both the per capita consumption and the total mass of varieties. We impose intuitive conditions on this function to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a free-entry equilibrium. Comparative statics with respect to population size, GDP per capita and productivity shock are characterized through necessary and sucient conditions. Finally, we show how our approach can be generalized to the case of a multisector economy and extended to cope with heterogeneous rms and consumers.
IFS Working Paper W16/21 Choice in the presence of experts: the role of general practitioners in patients' hospital choice Choice in the Presence of Experts: The Role of General Practitioners in Patients' Hospital Choice *
"... Abstract This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients' hospital choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected by a general practitioner (GP). It proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both, patient and GP level optimization, and it ..."
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Abstract This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients' hospital choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected by a general practitioner (GP). It proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both, patient and GP level optimization, and it discusses identification. The empirical analysis demonstrates biases and inconsistencies that arise when strategic pre-selection is not properly taken into account. We find that patients defer to GPs when assessing hospital quality and focus on tangible attributes, like hospital amenities; and that GPs, in turn, as patients' agents present choice options based on quality, but as agents of health authorities also consider their financial implications.
Tax Pass-Through in Gasoline and Diesel Fuel: The 2003 Washington State Nickel Funding Package Increase BUREAU OF ECONOMICS FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20580 1 Tax Pass-Through in Gasoline and Diesel Fuel: The 2003 Washington State Nickel Fund
"... Abstract: This paper considers a previously unexamined increase in excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel that were part of Washington State's Nickel Funding Package of 2003. We fail to reject full pass-through of the amount of the tax increase to retail prices in both products. We find no s ..."
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Abstract: This paper considers a previously unexamined increase in excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel that were part of Washington State's Nickel Funding Package of 2003. We fail to reject full pass-through of the amount of the tax increase to retail prices in both products. We find no significant sensitivity of retail pass-through to station locations relative to state borders, or to retail competitive conditions as measured by local station density. The expansion of hypermarkets in Washington State during the period was a confounding factor that limited precision in estimating tax pass-through effects. JEL Classifications: L1, L41, L71
Optimal Percentage Fees *
"... Abstract Revenue seeking intermediaries and governments around the globe charge fees as a function of the transaction price. In a setup with few buyers, one seller and two-sided private and independent information about valuations, we derive the fee structure that maximizes a weighted average of re ..."
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Abstract Revenue seeking intermediaries and governments around the globe charge fees as a function of the transaction price. In a setup with few buyers, one seller and two-sided private and independent information about valuations, we derive the fee structure that maximizes a weighted average of revenue and seller welfare. In increasingly thin markets, such optimal fees converge to linear fees. The optimal fee decreases with the weight on welfare and with the elasticity of supply, but may increase with the elasticity of demand. We test the model's empirical predictions using data from the Boston condominium market in the 1990s and use the estimate to perform counterfactual analysis. We find that percentage fees achieve 99 percent of what can be obtained under the optimal Bayesian mechanism.
VATT WORKING PAPERS
"... Papers 49 More haircut after VAT cut? On the effi ciency of service sector consumption taxes ..."
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Papers 49 More haircut after VAT cut? On the effi ciency of service sector consumption taxes
Capturing Rents from Natural Resource Abundance: Private Royalties from U.S. Onshore Oil & Gas Production
, 2015
"... Senior authorship is shared. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not ..."
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Senior authorship is shared. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not