• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart
  • DMCA
  • Donate

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations
Advanced Search Include Citations | Disambiguate

Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: ∗ Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition

by E. Glen Weyl, Michal Fabinger
Add To MetaCart

Tools

Sorted by:
Results 1 - 10 of 17
Next 10 →

The Impact of Competition on Prices with Numerous Firms ∗

by Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson, Deyuan Li, Hongyi Li, Sidney Resnick, Casper G. Vries , 2013
"... We use extreme value theory (EVT) to develop insights about price theory. Our analysis reveals “detail-independent ” equilibrium properties that characterize a large family of models. We derive a formula relating equilibrium prices to the level of competition. When the number of firms is large, mark ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
We use extreme value theory (EVT) to develop insights about price theory. Our analysis reveals “detail-independent ” equilibrium properties that characterize a large family of models. We derive a formula relating equilibrium prices to the level of competition. When the number of firms is large, markups are proportional to 1 � ¡ � � 0 £ � −1 (1 − 1��) ¤ ¢, where � is the random utility noise distribution and � is the number of firms. This implies prices are pinned down by the tail properties of the noise distribution and that prices are independent of many other institutional details. The elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms is shown to be the EVT tail exponent of the distribution for preference shocks and in most leading cases is relatively insensitive to the number of firms. For example, for the Gaussian case asymptotic markups are proportional to 1 � √ ln �, implying a zero asymptotic elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms. Thus competition only exerts weak pressure on prices. We also study applications of the model, including endogenizing the level of noise.

De-industrialization and entrepreneurship under monopolistic competition

by G. Schweinberger, Jens Suedekuma
"... This article offers a new mechanism to explain de-industrialization in response to a price increase of the manufactured good. In our trade model, one sector (agricul-ture) is perfectly competitive whilst the other (manufacturing) is monopolistically competitive. Both industries use skilled and unski ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
This article offers a new mechanism to explain de-industrialization in response to a price increase of the manufactured good. In our trade model, one sector (agricul-ture) is perfectly competitive whilst the other (manufacturing) is monopolistically competitive. Both industries use skilled and unskilled labour as inputs. Entry into manufacturing requires a fixed cost in terms of skilled labour only. A rise in the mar-ket price for the differentiated goods raises both marginal revenue and the price of skilled labour, which affects the marginal cost of production and the entry cost. When short-run profits increase so that new manufacturing firms enter, fewer skilled workers are available for production purposes. This in turn may then lead to a de-cline in total manufacturing output. Our theoretical mechanism is jointly consistent with recent empirical observations on premature de-industrialization characterizing several Latin American and Asian countries and productive diversification as observed in various developing economies.

Preventives Versus Treatments

by Michael Kremer, Christopher M. Snyder , 2015
"... ce pte d M an us cri pt ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
ce pte d M an us cri pt

Previous versions of this paper were circulated as “Why Is There No AIDS Vaccine ” among other

by Michael Kremer, Christopher Snyder, Emmanuelle Auriol, Chris Avery, David Blanchflower, Bryan Boulier, Ryan Bubb, Jim Dana, Esther Duflo, Glenn Ellison, Amy Finkelstein, Jerry Green, Jon Hamilton, Jason Hartline, Corinne Langinier, Scott Lee, David Malueg, David Mcadams, Scott Pauls, Robert Porter, Michael Schwarz, Andrew Segal, Lars Stole, Heidi Williams, Hongkai Zhang, Jon Zinman , 2015
"... Dan Wood for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for the medical expertise of Scott Lee, who directed the effort to code risk heterogeneity for diseases in our sample. We are especially indebted to the editors and referees for extensive suggestions which substantially improved the paper. ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Dan Wood for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for the medical expertise of Scott Lee, who directed the effort to code risk heterogeneity for diseases in our sample. We are especially indebted to the editors and referees for extensive suggestions which substantially improved the paper. Snyder gratefully acknowledges funding for research assistants provided by the Dartmouth College Presidential Scholars Program. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

Toward a theory of monopolistic competition *

by Mathieu Parenti , Philip Ushchev , Jacques-François Thisse
"... Abstract We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being exible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. The basic tool we use to study the market outcome is the elasticity of substitution at a symmetric consumption patte ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being exible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. The basic tool we use to study the market outcome is the elasticity of substitution at a symmetric consumption pattern, which depends on both the per capita consumption and the total mass of varieties. We impose intuitive conditions on this function to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a free-entry equilibrium. Comparative statics with respect to population size, GDP per capita and productivity shock are characterized through necessary and sucient conditions. Finally, we show how our approach can be generalized to the case of a multisector economy and extended to cope with heterogeneous rms and consumers.

IFS Working Paper W16/21 Choice in the presence of experts: the role of general practitioners in patients' hospital choice Choice in the Presence of Experts: The Role of General Practitioners in Patients' Hospital Choice *

by Walter Beckert , Kate Collyer , Walter Beckert , Kate Collyer , Penelope Goldberg , Rachel Griffith , Sandeep Kapur , Elaine Kelly , Chris Pike , Carol Propper , Ron Smith , Marcos Vera-Hernandez
"... Abstract This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients' hospital choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected by a general practitioner (GP). It proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both, patient and GP level optimization, and it ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients' hospital choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected by a general practitioner (GP). It proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both, patient and GP level optimization, and it discusses identification. The empirical analysis demonstrates biases and inconsistencies that arise when strategic pre-selection is not properly taken into account. We find that patients defer to GPs when assessing hospital quality and focus on tangible attributes, like hospital amenities; and that GPs, in turn, as patients' agents present choice options based on quality, but as agents of health authorities also consider their financial implications.

Tax Pass-Through in Gasoline and Diesel Fuel: The 2003 Washington State Nickel Funding Package Increase BUREAU OF ECONOMICS FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20580 1 Tax Pass-Through in Gasoline and Diesel Fuel: The 2003 Washington State Nickel Fund

by Louis Silvia , Christopher T Taylor , Louis Silvia , Christopher T Taylor
"... Abstract: This paper considers a previously unexamined increase in excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel that were part of Washington State's Nickel Funding Package of 2003. We fail to reject full pass-through of the amount of the tax increase to retail prices in both products. We find no s ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract: This paper considers a previously unexamined increase in excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel that were part of Washington State's Nickel Funding Package of 2003. We fail to reject full pass-through of the amount of the tax increase to retail prices in both products. We find no significant sensitivity of retail pass-through to station locations relative to state borders, or to retail competitive conditions as measured by local station density. The expansion of hypermarkets in Washington State during the period was a confounding factor that limited precision in estimating tax pass-through effects. JEL Classifications: L1, L41, L71
(Show Context)

Citation Context

...dustry and the 2003 tax change. Section IV outlines our conceptual framework and describes the data. Section V presents our empirical findings. Section VI offers concluding discussion. 3 II. Literature on Tax Pass-Through Gasoline Taxes Tax pass-through is the rate of price increase to consumers per unit of tax imposed. Under perfect competition, the pass-through has an upper bound of one and is determined by the relative elasticities of supply and demand. In models of less than perfect competition, passthrough rates also depend on the curvature of demand and degree of market competitiveness (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). Four recent studies examine pass-through of state gasoline taxes. Using monthly, state level data for the 48 mainland states and the District of Columbia between 1989 and 1997, Chouinard and Perloff (2004) estimate a reduced form model with a variety of demand and cost shifters and with state and seasonal fixed effects. They find that consumers bear most of the taxes, but that consumer incidence is smaller in larger states. They attribute incidence differences to varying state-level supply elasticities. In their model, state-level supply elasticities, which reflect wholesalers’ abilities to ...

Optimal Percentage Fees *

by Simon Loertscher , Andras Niedermayer
"... Abstract Revenue seeking intermediaries and governments around the globe charge fees as a function of the transaction price. In a setup with few buyers, one seller and two-sided private and independent information about valuations, we derive the fee structure that maximizes a weighted average of re ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract Revenue seeking intermediaries and governments around the globe charge fees as a function of the transaction price. In a setup with few buyers, one seller and two-sided private and independent information about valuations, we derive the fee structure that maximizes a weighted average of revenue and seller welfare. In increasingly thin markets, such optimal fees converge to linear fees. The optimal fee decreases with the weight on welfare and with the elasticity of supply, but may increase with the elasticity of demand. We test the model's empirical predictions using data from the Boston condominium market in the 1990s and use the estimate to perform counterfactual analysis. We find that percentage fees achieve 99 percent of what can be obtained under the optimal Bayesian mechanism.
(Show Context)

Citation Context

...ency of the most common words in a larger text and the sizes of the largest cities in most countries. 7Similar observations in related contexts were made by Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008). 8As we explain in detail in the main text, important concepts like the curvature of the direct demand function, the curvature of the indirect demand function, the pass-through rate, and the markup/quantity weighted average pass-through, which are due to the contributions by Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983), Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010), Bulow and Klemperer (2012), and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) cannot account for these effects. 1 INTRODUCTION 6 Our model makes a number of empirical predictions. We show that the underlying distributions in our model are non-parametrically identifiable and use the data set of Genesove and Mayer (2001) on the condominium market in Boston in the 1990s to estimate the distributions of the seller’s and buyers’ valuations (which can be interpreted as supply and demand functions). Assuming that the percentage fee was chosen to maximize a weighted average of the intermediary’s and the seller’s profit, we can back out which weight is consistent with the 6% fe...

VATT WORKING PAPERS

by Tuomas Kosonen
"... Papers 49 More haircut after VAT cut? On the effi ciency of service sector consumption taxes ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Papers 49 More haircut after VAT cut? On the effi ciency of service sector consumption taxes

Capturing Rents from Natural Resource Abundance: Private Royalties from U.S. Onshore Oil & Gas Production

by Jason P. Brown, Timothy Fitzgerald, Jeremy G. Weber, Jason P. Brown, Timothy Fitzgerald, Jeremy G. Weber , 2015
"... Senior authorship is shared. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Senior authorship is shared. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not
Powered by: Apache Solr
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit and Index Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2019 The Pennsylvania State University