this paper we reconsider the foundations of modal logic, following MartinL of's methodology of distinguishing judgments from propositions [ML85]. We give constructive meaning explanations for necessity (2) and possibility (3). This exercise yields a simple and uniform system of natural deduction for intuitionistic modal logic which does not exhibit anomalies found in other proposals. We also give a new presentation of lax logic [FM97] and find that it is already contained in modal logic, using the decomposition of the lax modality fl A as

Possible world semantics underlies many of the applications of modal logic in computer science and philosophy. The standard theory arises from interpreting the semantic definitions in the ordinary meta-theory of informal classical mathematics. If, however, the same semantic definitions are interpreted in an intuitionistic metatheory then the induced modal logics no longer satisfy certain intuitionistically invalid principles. This thesis investigates the intuitionistic modal logics that arise in this way. Natural deduction systems for various intuitionistic modal logics are presented. From one point of view, these systems are self-justifying in that a possible world interpretation of the modalities can be read off directly from the inference rules. A technical justification is given by the faithfulness of translations into intuitionistic first-order logic. It is also established that, in many cases, the natural deduction systems induce well-known intuitionistic modal logics, previously given by Hilbertstyle axiomatizations. The main benefit of the natural deduction systems over axiomatizations is their

In 1933 G odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G odel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves G odel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and #-calculus.

Moggi's computational lambda calculus is a metalanguage for denotational semantics which arose from the observation that many different notions of computation have the categorical structure of a strong monad on a cartesian closed category. In this paper we show that the computational lambda calculus also arises naturally as the term calculus corresponding (by the Curry-Howard correspondence) to a novel intuitionistic modal propositional logic. We give natural deduction, sequent calculus and Hilbert-style presentations of this logic and prove a strong normalisation result. 1 Introduction The computational lambda calculus was introduced by Moggi as a metalanguage for denotational semantics which more faithfully models real programming language features such as non-termination, differing evaluation strategies, non-determinism and side-effects than does the ordinary simply typed lambda calculus [17, 18]. The starting point for Moggi's work is an explicit semantic distinction between compu...

We investigate the development of theories of types and computability via realizability.

We consider two systems of constructive modal logic which are computationally motivated. Their modalities admit several computational interpretations and are used to capture intensional features such as notions of computation, constraints, concurrency, etc. Both systems have so far been studied mainly from type-theoretic and category-theoretic perspectives, but Kripke models for similar systems were studied independently. Here we bring these threads together and prove duality results which show how to relate Kripke models to algebraic models and these in turn to the appropriate categorical models for these logics.

. In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4---our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4, not in the framework of Kripke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models but also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability. 1. Introduction Modal logics are traditionally extensions of classical logic with new operators, or modalities, whose operation is intensional. Modal logics are most commonly justified by the provision of an intuitive semantics based upon `possible worlds', an idea originally due to Kripke. Kripke also provided a possible worlds semantics for intuitionistic logic, and so it is natural to consider intuitionistic logic extended with intensional modalities...

This paper proposes and studies a typed λ-calculus for classical linear logic. I shall give an explanation of a multiple-conclusion formulation for classical logic due to Parigot and compare it to more traditional treatments by Prawitz and others. I shall use Parigot's method to devise a natural deduction formulation of classical linear logic. This formulation is compared in detail to the sequent calculus formulation. In an appendix I shall also demonstrate a somewhat hidden connexion with the paradigm of control operators for functional languages which gives a new computational interpretation of Parigot's techniques.

We consider two systems of constructive modal logic which are computationally motivated. Their modalities admit several computational interpretations and are used to capture intensional features such as notions of computation, constraints, concurrency design, etc. Both systems have so far been studied mainly from a type-theoretic and category-theoretic perspectives, but Kripke models for similar systems were studied independently. Here we bring these threads together and prove duality results which show how to relate Kripke models to algebraic models and these in turn to the appropriate categorical models for these logics.

It is shown that the modal logic S4, simple -calculus and modal -calculus admit a realization in a very simple propositional logical system LP , which has an exact provability semantics. In LP both modality and -terms become objects of the same nature, namely, proof polynomials. The provability interpretation of modal -terms presented here may be regarded as a system-independent generalization of the Curry-Howard isomorphism of proofs and -terms. 1 Introduction The Logic of Proofs (LP , see Section 2) is a system in the propositional language with an extra basic proposition t : F for "t is a proof of F ". LP is supplied with a formal provability semantics, completeness theorems and decidability algorithms ([3], [4], [5]). In this paper it is shown that LP naturally encompasses -calculi corresponding to intuitionistic and modal logics, and combinatory logic. In addition, LP is strictly more expressive because it admits arbitrary combinations of ":" and propositional connectives. The id...