We describe an operating system architecture that securely multiplexes machine resources while permitting an unprecedented degree of application-specific customization of traditional operating system abstractions. By abstracting physical hardware resources, traditional operating systems have significantly limited the performance, flexibility, and functionality of applications. The exokernel architecture removes these limitations by allowing untrusted software to implement traditional operating system abstractions entirely at application-level. We have implemented a prototype exokernel-based system that includes Aegis, an exokernel, and ExOS, an untrusted application-level operating system. Aegis defines the low-level interface to machine resources. Applications can allocate and use machine resources, efficiently handle events, and participate in resource revocation. Measurements show that most primitive Aegis operations are 10–100 times faster than Ultrix,a mature monolithic UNIX operating system. ExOS implements processes, virtual memory, and inter-process communication abstractions entirely within a library. Measurements show that ExOS’s application-level virtual memory and IPC primitives are 5–50 times faster than Ultrix’s primitives. These results demonstrate that the exokernel operating system design is practical and offers an excellent combination of performance and flexibility. 1

We present a flexible architecture for trusted computing, called Terra, that allows applications with a wide range of security requirements to run simultaneously on commodity hardware. Applications on Terra enjoy the semantics of running on a separate, dedicated, tamper-resistant hardware platform, while retaining the ability to run side-by-side with normal applications on a generalpurpose computing platform. Terra achieves this synthesis by use of a trusted virtual machine monitor (TVMM) that partitions a tamper-resistant hardware platform into multiple, isolated virtual machines (VM), providing the appearance of multiple boxes on a single, general-purpose platform. To each VM, the TVMM provides the semantics of either an “open box, ” i.e. a general-purpose hardware platform like today’s PCs and workstations, or a “closed box, ” an opaque special-purpose platform that protects the privacy and integrity of its contents like today’s game consoles and cellular phones. The software stack in each VM can be tailored from the hardware interface up to meet the security requirements of its application(s). The hardware and TVMM can act as a trusted party to allow closed-box VMs to cryptographically identify the software they run, i.e. what is in the box, to remote parties. We explore the strengths and limitations of this architecture by describing our prototype implementation and several applications that we developed for it.

drivers remain a significant cause of system failures. In Windows XP, for example, drivers account for 85 % of recently reported failures. This article describes Nooks, a reliability subsystem that seeks to greatly enhance operating system (OS) reliability by isolating the OS from driver failures. The Nooks approach is practical: rather than guaranteeing complete fault tolerance through a new (and incompatible) OS or driver architecture, our goal is to prevent the vast majority of driver-caused crashes with little or no change to the existing driver and system code. Nooks isolates drivers within lightweight protection domains inside the kernel address space, where hardware and software prevent them from corrupting the kernel. Nooks also tracks a driver’s use of kernel resources to facilitate automatic cleanup during recovery. To prove the viability of our approach, we implemented Nooks in the Linux operating system and used it to fault-isolate several device drivers. Our results show that Nooks offers a substantial increase in the reliability of operating systems, catching and quickly recovering from many faults that would otherwise crash the system. Under a wide range and number of fault conditions, we show that Nooks recovers automatically from 99 % of the faults that otherwise cause Linux to crash.

The exokernel operating system architecture safely gives untrusted software efficient control over hardware and software resources by separating management from protection. This paper describes an exokernel system that allows specialized applications to achieve high performance without sacrificing the performance of unmodified UNIX programs. It evaluates the exokernel architecture by measuring end-to-end application performance on Xok, an exokernel for Intel x86-based computers, and by comparing Xok’s performance to the performance of two widely-used 4.4BSD UNIX systems (Free-BSD and OpenBSD). The results show that common unmodified UNIX applications can enjoy the benefits of exokernels: applications either perform comparably on Xok/ExOS and the BSD UNIXes, or perform significantly better. In addition, the results show that customized applications can benefit substantially from control over their resources (e.g., a factor of eight for a Web server). This paper also describes insights about the exokernel approach gained through building three different exokernel systems, and presents novel approaches to resource multiplexing. 1

This paper describes a novel approach to providing modular and extensible operating system functionality and encapsulated environments based on a synthesis of microkernel and virtual machine concepts. We have developed a software-based virtualizable architecture called Fluke that allows recursive virtual machines (virtual machines running on other virtual machines) to be implemented efficiently by a microkernel running on generic hardware. A complete virtual machine interface is provided at each level; efficiency derives from needing to implement only new functionality at each level. This infrastructure allows common OS functionality, such as process management, demand paging, fault tolerance, and debugging support, to be provided by cleanly modularized, independent, stackable virtual machine monitors, implemented as user processes. It can also provide uncommon or unique OS features, including the above features specialized for particular applications ’ needs, virtual machines transparently distributed cross-node, or security monitors that allow arbitrary untrusted binaries to be executed safely. Our prototype implementation of this model indicates that it is practical to modularize operating systems this way. Some types of virtual machine layers impose almost no overhead at all, while others impose some overhead (typically 0–35%), but only on certain classes of applications.

First-generation µ-kernels have a reputation for being too slow and lacking sufficient flexibility. To determine whether L4, a lean second-generation µ-kernel, has overcome these limitations, we have repeated several earlier experiments and conducted some novel ones. Moreover, we ported the Linux operating system to run on top of the L4 µ-kernel and compared the resulting system with both Linux running native, and MkLinux, a Linux version that executes on top of a firstgeneration Mach-derived µ-kernel. For L 4 Linux, the AIM benchmarks report a maximum throughput which is only 5% lower than that of native Linux. The corresponding penalty is 5 times higher for a co-located in-kernel version of MkLinux, and 7 times higher for a userlevel version of MkLinux. These numbers demonstrate both that it is possible to implement a high-performance conventional operating system personality above a µ-kernel, and that the performance of the µ-kernel is crucial to achieve this. Further experiments...

This paper presents a new mechanism that enables applications to run correctly when device drivers fail. Because device drivers are the principal failing component in most systems, reducing driver-induced failures greatly improves overall reliability. Earlier work has shown that an operating system can survive driver failures [33], but the applications that depend on them cannot. Thus, while operating system reliability was greatly improved, application reliability generally was not. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new operating system mechanism called a shadow driver. A shadow driver monitors device drivers and transparently recovers from driver failures. Moreover, it assumes the role of the failed driver during recovery. In this way, applications using the failed driver, as well as the kernel itself, continue to function as expected. We implemented shadow drivers for the Linux operating system and tested them on over a dozen device drivers. Our results show that applications and the OS can indeed survive the failure of a variety of device drivers. Moreover, shadow drivers impose minimal performance overhead. Lastly, they can be introduced with only modest changes to the OS kernel and with no changes at all to existing device drivers. 1

Asbestos, a new prototype operating system, provides novel labeling and isolation mechanisms that help contain the effects of exploitable software flaws. Applications can express a wide range of policies with Asbestos’s kernel-enforced label mechanism, including controls on inter-process communication and systemwide information flow. A new event process abstraction provides lightweight, isolated contexts within a single process, allowing the same process to act on behalf of multiple users while preventing it from leaking any single user’s data to any other user. A Web server that uses Asbestos labels to isolate user data requires about 1.5 memory pages per user, demonstrating that additional security can come at an acceptable cost.

The Xen virtual machine monitor allows multiple operating systems to execute concurrently on commodity x86 hardware, providing a solution for server consolidation and utility computing. In our initial design, Xen itself contained device-driver code and provided safe shared virtual device access. In this paper we present our new Safe Hardware Interface, an isolation architecture used within the latest release of Xen which allows unmodified device drivers to be shared across isolated operating system instances, while protecting individual OSs, and the system as a whole, from driver failure. 1

Mondrian memory protection (MMP) is a fine-grained protection scheme that allows multiple protection domains to flexibly share memory and export protected services. In contrast to earlier pagebased systems, MMP allows arbitrary permissions control at the granularity of individual words. We use a compressed permissions table to reduce space overheads and employ two levels of permissions caching to reduce run-time overheads. The protection tables in our implementation add less than 9% overhead to the memory space used by the application. Accessing the protection tables adds less than 8% additional memory references to the accesses made by the application. Although it can be layered on top of demandpaged virtual memory, MMP is also well-suited to embedded systems with a single physical address space. We extend MMP to support segment translation which allows a memory segment to appear at another location in the address space. We use this translation to implement zero-copy networking underneath the standard read system call interface, where packet payload fragments are connected together by the translation system to avoid data copying. This saves 52% of the memory references used by a traditional copying network stack.