This paper investigates between-voter interactions in a social network model of turnout. It shows that if 1) there is a small probability that voters imitate the behavior of one of their acquaintances, and 2) individuals are closely connected to others in a population (the “smallworld” effect), then a single voting decision may affect dozens of other voters in a “turnout cascade. ” If people tend to be ideologically similar to other people they are connected to, then these turnout cascades will produce net favorable results for their favorite candidate. By changing more than one vote with one’s own turnout decision, the turnout incentive is thus substantially larger than previously thought. We analyze conditions that are favorable to turnout cascades and show that the effect is consistent with real social network data from Huckfeldt and Sprague’s South Bend and Indianapolis-St. Louis election surveys. We also suggest that turnout cascades may help explain over-reporting of turnout and the ubiquitous belief in a duty to vote. I thank Robert Bates, Lars-Erik Cederman, Eric Dickson, Paul E. Johnson, Orit Kedar, Gary King, Ferran Martinez I Coma, and Ken Shepsle for valuable feedback on earlier drafts. How does the turnout decision of a single person affect an election? Decision-theoretic models of voting show that the probability of one vote being “pivotal ” in a large electorate is extremely small (Tullock

Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s). Papers may only be downloaded for personal use only.

The intellectual stakes at issue in this symposium are very high: Donald P. Green,

In many states candidates must meet certain requirements in order to be listed on the ballot. Such requirements include filing fees and minimum number of collected signatures. Incumbents have incentives to use these requirements to shield themselves from competition and to reduce entry of challengers. To date, there is very little evidence regarding whether such requirements have negative consequences for candidate competition in elections and challenger entry into electoral races. This paper examines the impact of filing fees and signature requirements on the number of candidates in state races by analyzing state lower house elections in 1998 and 2000. The findings show that higher filing fees reduce the number of major party candidates and the number of minor party candidates. Filing fees more easily dissuade minor party candidates to run for office than major party candidates. More stringent signature requirements reduce the number of major party candidates in elections. I would like to thank the Mercatus Center for financial support and Jon Klick for helpful Incumbent politicians prefer less competition to more competition in much the same way

Abstract not found

When political scientists present empirical results, they are much more likely to use tables than graphs, despite the fact that graphs greatly increases the clarity of presentation and makes it easier for a reader to understand the data being used and to draw clear and correct inferences. Using a sample of leading journals, we document this tendency and suggest reasons why researchers prefer tables. We argue that the extra work required in producing graphs is rewarded by greatly enhanced presentation and communication of empirical results. We illustrate their benefits by turning several published tables into graphs, including tables that present descriptive data and regression results. We show that regression graphs emphasize point estimates and confidence intervals and that they can successfully present the results of regression models. A move away from tables towards graphs would improve the discipline’s communicative output and make empirical findings more accessible to every type of audience.

This paper presents a handful of Bayesian tools one can use to model heterogeneous event counts.

Objective. We reexamine the issue of phenotypic discrimination against Mexicans in the U.S. labor market, originally studied by Telles and Murguía (1990) and later by Bohara and Davila (1992). We also seek to explain this topic with respect to the Puerto Rican and Cuban populations in the United States. Methods. Instead of using household income as a dependent variable, we use occupational ranking scores computed by Hauser and Warren (1996) in combination with data from the 1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS). The occupational rankings more accurately reflect the level of labor market discrimination faced by individuals. Furthermore, the use of the more recent LNPS allows us to update the work of previous scholars and extend the analysis to two previously unexamined Latino groups— Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Results. Our findings indicate that darker-skinned Mexicans and Cubans face significantly lower occupational prestige scores than their lighter-skinned counterparts even when controlling for factors that influence performance in the labor market. However, we find no conclusive evidence that skin-color differences impact occupational prestige scores for Puerto Ricans. Conclusions. Using earlier data, some scholars found evidence for difference in labor market performance among Mexican Americans as a function of phenotypic variations among Mexican Americans. Today, dark-skinned Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans continue to face higher levels of discrimination in the labor market, whereas dark-skinned Puerto Ricans do not, which may indicate regional differences across the three groups that need to be controlled for.

Many studies suggest that either partisan governments, labor market centralization, or central bank independence affect unemployment, but none consider the full range of interactions among these institutions. I offer a fully interactive model of unemployment and test it using quarterly data from fifteen industrialized democracies over 24 years. Confiming earlier work, I find central bank independence (CBI) and wage bargaining centralization interactively determine unemployment, with CBI having the greatest benefit in moderately centralized labor markets. Adding partisan governments to this strategic interaction, I find that unemployment is subject to permanent, labor-market-contingent partisan cycles in which the left always lowers unemployment. Both theory and evidence show larger cycles in moderately centralized economies with hawkish monetary authorities, suggesting left-wing government and monetary non-accommodation are complementary in this case. One size does not fit all, though: I find no benefit from CBI in centralized economies, and a substantial unemployment cost in decentralized labor markets.

JOB MARKET PAPER This paper identifies the effect of corporate networks on firms ’ financial investment and executive pay decisions. Corporate networks arise through board interlocks, which provide a frequent and important channel for non-market interactions amongst firms. Using panel data for all publicly traded companies in India I estimate peer effects in firm policies, defining each firm’s reference group as the set of all other firms with whom it shares one or more directors. Identification of dynamic network peer effects, which derive from endogenous associations, is achieved by exploiting natural breaks in network evolution that exogenously change the composition of peers. These breaks occur as a result of local network shocks – death or retirement of shared directors – that are stochastic and external to the network formation process. I find significant network peer effects that are positively associated with firms ’ investment strategy and executive compensation. I also explore heterogeneity in peer effects by distinguishing between network peers who belong to the same industry from those that do not, and find a greater effect of across-industry network peers.