International peacebuilding can improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. Although peacebuilding strategies must be designed to address particular conflicts, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the local roots of hostility; the local capacities for change; and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. One can conceive of these as the three dimensions of a triangle, whose area is the political spaceor effective capacityfor building peace. We test these propositions with an extensive data set of 124 post-World War Two civil wars and find that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference. UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending the violence. Our study provides broad guidelines to design the appropriate peacebuilding strategy, given the mix of hostility, local capacities, and international capacities.

Abstract—This paper uses three years of individual-level data to analyze the determinants of individual preferences over immigration policy in the United States. We have two main empirical results. First, less-skilled workers are signi � cantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant in � ows into the United States. Our � nding suggests that, over the time horizons that are relevant to individuals when evaluating immigration policy, individuals think that the U.S. economy absorbs immigrant in � ows at least partly by changing wages. Second, we � nd no evidence that the relationship between skills and immigration opinions is stronger in high-immigration communities. I.

This work attempts to refocus the discussion about strategic voting from its narrow focus on single-member district systems. It provides several contribution to the literature on strategic voting, ticket-splitting and on electoral systems. My first contribution is to allow the electoral institutions to vary, thereby opening up the possibility to provide di#erent incentives to operate at the same time for the same voter. I o#er a theory that particular institutions not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. In mixed electoral systems strategic voting has two facets. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote strategy or a coalition insurance strategy. My second contribution is to provide evidence that people vary in their proclivity to vote strategically, as determined by various motivational factors as well as their capability to comprehend the strategic implications that are o#ered by particular electoral rules. Evidence supporting these contributions is stemming from an appropriate choice-model using individual-level data from the 1998 German National Election Study.

Objective. We reexamine the issue of phenotypic discrimination against Mexicans in the U.S. labor market, originally studied by Telles and Murguía (1990) and later by Bohara and Davila (1992). We also seek to explain this topic with respect to the Puerto Rican and Cuban populations in the United States. Methods. Instead of using household income as a dependent variable, we use occupational ranking scores computed by Hauser and Warren (1996) in combination with data from the 1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS). The occupational rankings more accurately reflect the level of labor market discrimination faced by individuals. Furthermore, the use of the more recent LNPS allows us to update the work of previous scholars and extend the analysis to two previously unexamined Latino groups— Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Results. Our findings indicate that darker-skinned Mexicans and Cubans face significantly lower occupational prestige scores than their lighter-skinned counterparts even when controlling for factors that influence performance in the labor market. However, we find no conclusive evidence that skin-color differences impact occupational prestige scores for Puerto Ricans. Conclusions. Using earlier data, some scholars found evidence for difference in labor market performance among Mexican Americans as a function of phenotypic variations among Mexican Americans. Today, dark-skinned Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans continue to face higher levels of discrimination in the labor market, whereas dark-skinned Puerto Ricans do not, which may indicate regional differences across the three groups that need to be controlled for.

*We are grateful to many people who have helped us locate, collect, or code the data and who have provided thoughtful comments on previous versions of the paper. In particular, we would

This paper examines the relationship between attitudes on potential uses of

Central bank independence and fixed exchange rates are alternative monetary commitment mechanisms that differ in terms of transparency. While central bank independence is an opaque commitment technology that is difficult to monitor, a commitment to an exchange rate peg is easily observed: either the peg is sustained or it collapses. Political systems also vary in terms of transparency. I argue that the transparency of the monetary commitment mechanism and the transparency of the political system are substitutes. In nations where the political process is transparent (democracies), central bank independence can effectively resolve the time inconsistency problem and produce low inflation because even obscure transgressions against the central bank are likely to be detected by interested agents and exploited by the political opposition. In nations where political decision-making is opaque and unconstrained (autocracies), governments must look to a commitment technology that is more transparent and constrained (fixed exchange rates) than the government itself. The transparency of the monetary commitment substitutes for the transparency of the political system to engender low inflation expectations. I test the "substitution" argument empirically and find that (1) central bank independence is effective in limiting inflation, but only in democracies, and (2) autocracies are much more likely to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes than democracies, controlling for other factors. 1 1.

their helpful comments on previous drafts.

While the US steel industry has been in distress for decades, the “steel crisis ” of 1999-2001 was particularly acute. More than 30 steel producing and steel processing firms fell into bankruptcy between 1997 and 2001, and most of the failures occurred after President Bush took office. 1 During his presidential campaign, Bush promised steelworkers that he would not 1. For a list of bankruptcies, see USWA (2002). neglect them. As the crisis worsened, the steel industry and the United Steel Workers of America (USWA) pressed the Bush administration to make good on its campaign promise.

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