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Software Verification and System Assurance (2009)

by John Rushby
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Reasoning about the Reliability Of Diverse Two-Channel Systems In which One Channel is “Possibly Perfect”

by Bev Littlewood, John Rushby , 2009
"... should appear on the left and odd-numbered pages on the right when opened as a doublepage This report refines and extends an earlier paper by the first author [25]. It considers the problem of reasoning about the reliability of fault-tolerant systems with two “channels” (i.e., components) of which o ..."
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should appear on the left and odd-numbered pages on the right when opened as a doublepage This report refines and extends an earlier paper by the first author [25]. It considers the problem of reasoning about the reliability of fault-tolerant systems with two “channels” (i.e., components) of which one, A, because it is conventionally engineered and presumed to contain faults, supports only a claim of reliability, while the other, B, by virtue of extreme simplicity and extensive analysis, supports a plausible claim of “perfection.” We begin with the case where either channel can bring the system to a safe state. The reasoning about system probability of failure on demand (pfd) is divided into two steps. The first concerns aleatory uncertainty about (i) whether channel A will fail on a randomly selected demand and (ii) whether channel B is imperfect. It is shown that, conditional upon knowing pA (the probability that A fails on a randomly selected demand) and pB (the probability that channel B is imperfect), a conservative bound on the probability that the system fails on a randomly selected demand is simply pA × pB. That is, there is conditional independence between the events “A fails ” and “B is imperfect. ” The second

Formalism in Safety Cases Appears in Making Systems Safer: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Safety-Critical

by John Rushby
"... Abstract Suitable formalisms could allow the arguments of a safety case to be checked mechanically. We examine some of the issues in doing so. 1 ..."
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Abstract Suitable formalisms could allow the arguments of a safety case to be checked mechanically. We examine some of the issues in doing so. 1

the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database

by Alwyn Goodloe, Lee Pike
"... science. The NASA scientific and technical ..."
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science. The NASA scientific and technical

Verification (RV 2011). Runtime Verification for Ultra-Critical Systems

by Lee Pike, Sebastian Niller, Nis Wegmann
"... Abstract. Runtime verification (RV) is a natural fit for ultra-critical systems, where correctness is imperative. In ultra-critical systems, even if the software is fault-free, because of the inherent unreliability of commodity hardware and the adversity of operational environments, processing units ..."
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Abstract. Runtime verification (RV) is a natural fit for ultra-critical systems, where correctness is imperative. In ultra-critical systems, even if the software is fault-free, because of the inherent unreliability of commodity hardware and the adversity of operational environments, processing units (and their hosted software) are replicated, and fault-tolerant algorithms are used to compare the outputs. We investigate both software monitoring in distributed fault-tolerant systems, as well as implementing fault-tolerance mechanisms using RV techniques. We describe the Copilot language and compiler, specifically designed for generating monitors for distributed, hard real-time systems, and we describe a case study in a Byzantine fault-tolerant airspeed sensor system. 1

Copilot: Monitoring Embedded Systems Final Report ∗

by Lee Pike, Nis Wegmann, Sebastian Niller, Alwyn Goodloe , 2011
"... Runtime verification (RV) is a natural fit for ultra-critical systems, where correctness is imperative. In ultra-critical systems, even if the software is fault-free, because of the inherent unreliability of commodity hardware and the adversity of operational environments, processing units (and thei ..."
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Runtime verification (RV) is a natural fit for ultra-critical systems, where correctness is imperative. In ultra-critical systems, even if the software is fault-free, because of the inherent unreliability of commodity hardware and the adversity of operational environments, processing units (and their hosted software) are replicated, and fault-tolerant algorithms are used to compare the outputs. We investigate both software monitoring in distributed fault-tolerant systems, as well as implementing fault-tolerance mechanisms using RV techniques. We describe the Copilot language and compiler, specifically designed for generating monitors for distributed, hard real-time systems. We also describe two case-studies in which we generated Copilot monitors in avionics systems.
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