I study the impact of social networks on private equity …rms’choice of …nancial advisors. In a unique dataset I observe all individuals who have been involved in acquisitions and their changes of occupation from …nancial advisors to private equity professionals. I …nd that the social networks arising from these labor market movements a¤ect private equity …rms’choice of …nancial advisors as well as the sourcing of deals from sell-side advisors. The likelihood that a …nancial advisor is mandated to advise is increased if the private equity professionals responsible for the deal have previously worked for that …nancial advisor. Evidence of dealsourcing is manifested through that the probabilities for a private equity …rm to i) participate in an auction and ii) win an auction are increased if the …nancial advisor of the selling party is a former employer of the professionals at the private equity …rm.

Access to management and the inform ark larger immediate price impacts when the analyst's firm has a conference-hosting relation with the company. The effect increases with hosting frequency and is strongest in the days following the conference. Conference-hosting brokers also issue more informative, lies on superior sts interact with pany headquar-r-hosted investor re of these costly ut the extent to s analysts with FD), enacted in 2000, requires that management disclose material infor-ment. Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2012) survey the

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Using hand-collected data on divisional managers at S&P 1500 firms, we study how changes in one divisional manager’s compensation affect the compensation of other divisional managers inside the same conglomerate. An increase in a manager’s pay driven by an industry shock generates large positive intra-firm spillovers on the pay of other divisional managers. These spillovers operate only within firm boundaries and are non-existent for the same industry pairs in standalone firms. The intra-firm spillovers are stronger when managers share social networks, suggesting that informal interactions facilitate peer effects. The intra-firm convergence in executive pay is associated with weaker governance and lower firm value. Overall, we provide evidence on corporate socialism in executive pay.

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Abstract. How do traders decide which stocks to analyze each period? This paper models traders ’ attention allocation problem, proposes that they use coincidences among the ten stocks with the highest and lowest past returns as a heuristic solution, derives postcoincidence comovement as a testable empirical implication of this hypothesis, and then documents this effect in monthly US stock market data. I study a discrete-time, infinitehorizon economy where stocks display a large number of attributes and realize attributespecific cash flow shocks. Because of the sheer number of attributes, traders cannot look up and then check every single attribute-specific cluster of firms for a shock each period. As a heuristic solution, I demonstrate that a coincidence among the ten stocks with the highest or lowest past returns (e.g., Apple and Dell realizing top ten returns from October to December 2005) is a noisy signal for both the existence and location of an attribute-specific shock. Then, I characterize asset prices when traders only update their beliefs about an attribute after observing a coincidence. If traders adopt this attention allocation rule, I show that stock returns will display post-coincidence comovement (e.g., the returns of all computer hardware stocks will rise in January 2006) as a testable empirical implication. Supporting