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140
Prediction Markets
 J. Economic Perspectives
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Cited by 150 (1 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
A utility framework for boundedloss market makers
 In Proceedings of the 23rd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
, 2007
"... We introduce a class of utilitybased market makers that always accept orders at their riskneutral prices. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such market makers to have bounded loss. We prove that hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility market makers are equivalent to weighted pseu ..."
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Cited by 70 (26 self)
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We introduce a class of utilitybased market makers that always accept orders at their riskneutral prices. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such market makers to have bounded loss. We prove that hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility market makers are equivalent to weighted pseudospherical scoring rule market makers. In particular, Hanson’s logarithmic scoring rule market maker corresponds to a negative exponential utility market maker in our framework. We describe a third equivalent formulation based on maintaining a cost function that seems most natural for implementation purposes, and we illustrate how to translate among the three equivalent formulations. We examine the tradeoff between the market’s liquidity and the market maker’s worstcase loss. For a fixed bound on worstcase loss, some market makers exhibit greater liquidity near uniform prices and some exhibit greater liquidity near extreme prices, but no market maker can exhibit uniformly greater liquidity in all regimes. For a fixed minimum liquidity level, we give the lower bound of market maker’s worstcase loss under some regularity conditions. 1
What's inside the cloud? an architectural map of the cloud landscape
 in CLOUD '09: Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing
, 2009
"... We propose an integrated Cloud computing stack architecture to serve as a reference point for future mashups and comparative studies. We also show how the existing Cloud landscape maps into this architecture and identify an infrastructure gap that we plan to address in future work. 1. ..."
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Cited by 64 (1 self)
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We propose an integrated Cloud computing stack architecture to serve as a reference point for future mashups and comparative studies. We also show how the existing Cloud landscape maps into this architecture and identify an infrastructure gap that we plan to address in future work. 1.
Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election
 Journal of Public Economics
, 2005
"... Thanks to Forrest Nelson at the Iowa Electronic Market for providing data used in this study. Thanks also to Gregory Besharov and Howard Rosenthal for helpful comments and to participants at the Public Choice Society, Econometric Society, and the Harvard University public economics seminar. The view ..."
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Cited by 54 (1 self)
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Thanks to Forrest Nelson at the Iowa Electronic Market for providing data used in this study. Thanks also to Gregory Besharov and Howard Rosenthal for helpful comments and to participants at the Public Choice Society, Econometric Society, and the Harvard University public economics seminar. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker
 ALGORITHMICA
, 2008
"... We study the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with market scoring rule (MSR) market makers. One attractive feature of MSR is that it is myopically incentive compatible: it is optimal for traders to report their true beliefs about the likelihood of an event outcome provided that ..."
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Cited by 35 (17 self)
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We study the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with market scoring rule (MSR) market makers. One attractive feature of MSR is that it is myopically incentive compatible: it is optimal for traders to report their true beliefs about the likelihood of an event outcome provided that they ignore the impact of their reports on the profit they might garner from future trades. In this paper, we analyze nonmyopic strategies and examine what information structures lead to truthful betting by traders. Specifically, we analyze the behavior of riskneutral traders with incomplete information playing in a dynamic game. We consider finitestage and infinitestage game models. For each model, we study the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) with two different information structures: conditionally independent signals and (unconditionally) independent signals. In the finitestage model, when signals of traders are independent conditional on the state of the world, truthful betting is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Moreover, it is the unique Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE) of the game. In contrast, when signals of traders are unconditionally independent, truthful betting
Betting on permutations
 In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
, 2007
"... We consider a permutation betting scenario, where people wager on the final ordering of n candidates: for example, the outcome of a horse race. We examine the auctioneer problem of risklessly matching up wagers or, equivalently, finding arbitrage opportunities among the proposed wagers. Requiring bi ..."
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Cited by 32 (21 self)
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We consider a permutation betting scenario, where people wager on the final ordering of n candidates: for example, the outcome of a horse race. We examine the auctioneer problem of risklessly matching up wagers or, equivalently, finding arbitrage opportunities among the proposed wagers. Requiring bidders to explicitly list the orderings that they’d like to bet on is both unnatural and intractable, because the number of orderings is n! and the number of subsets of orderings is 2 n!. We propose two expressive betting languages that seem natural for bidders, and examine the computational complexity of the auctioneer problem in each case. Subset betting allows traders to bet either that a candidate will end up ranked among some subset of positions in the final ordering, for example, “horse A will finish in positions 4, 9, or 1321”, or that a position will be taken by some subset of candidates, for example “horse A, B, or D will finish in position 2”. For subset betting, we show that the auctioneer problem can be solved in polynomial time if orders are divisible. Pair betting allows traders to bet on whether one candidate will end up ranked higher than another candidate, for example “horse A will beat horse B”. We prove that the auctioneer problem becomes NPhard for pair betting. We identify a sufficient condition for the existence of a pair betting match that can be verified in polynomial time. We also show that a natural greedy algorithm gives a poor approximation for indivisible orders.
A Practical LiquiditySensitive Automated Market Maker
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EC
, 2010
"... Current automated market makers over binary events suffer from two problems that make them impractical. First, they are unable to adapt to liquidity, so trades cause prices to move the same amount in both thick and thin markets. Second, under normal circumstances, the market maker runs at a deficit. ..."
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Cited by 30 (6 self)
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Current automated market makers over binary events suffer from two problems that make them impractical. First, they are unable to adapt to liquidity, so trades cause prices to move the same amount in both thick and thin markets. Second, under normal circumstances, the market maker runs at a deficit. In this paper, we construct a market maker that is both sensitive to liquidity and can run at a profit. Our market maker has bounded loss for any initial level of liquidity and, as the initial level of liquidity approaches zero, worstcase loss approaches zero. For any level of initial liquidity we can establish a boundary in market state space such that, if the market terminates within that boundary, the market maker books a profit regardless of the realized outcome. Furthermore, we provide guidance as to how our market maker can be implemented over very large event spaces through a novel costfunctionbased sampling method.
2002) “Suckers are born but markets are made: Individual rationality, arbitrage and market efficiency on an electronic futures market,” mimeo
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Pricing combinatorial markets for tournaments
 In Proc. of STOC
, 2008
"... In a prediction market, agents trade assets whose value is tied to a future event, for example the outcome of the next presidential election. Asset prices determine a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes. Typically, the outcome space is small, allowing agents to directly trade ..."
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Cited by 25 (18 self)
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In a prediction market, agents trade assets whose value is tied to a future event, for example the outcome of the next presidential election. Asset prices determine a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes. Typically, the outcome space is small, allowing agents to directly trade in each outcome, and allowing a market maker to explicitly update asset prices. Combinatorial markets, in contrast, work to estimate a full joint distribution of dependent observations, in which case the outcome space grows exponentially. In this paper, we consider the problem of pricing combinatorial markets for singleelimination tournaments. With n competing teams, the outcome space is of size 2 n−1. We show that the general pricing problem for tournaments is #Phard. We derive a polynomialtime algorithm for a restricted betting language based on a Bayesian network representation of the probability distribution. The language is fairly natural in the context of tournaments, allowing for example bets of the form “team i wins game k”. We believe that our betting language is the first for combinatorial market makers that is both useful and tractable. We briefly discuss a heuristic approximation technique for the general case.
An OptimizationBased Framework for Automated MarketMaking
 EC'11
, 2011
"... We propose a general framework for the design of securities markets over combinatorial or infinite state or outcome spaces. The framework enables the design of computationally efficient markets tailored to an arbitrary, yet relatively small, space of securities with bounded payoff. We prove that any ..."
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Cited by 23 (11 self)
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We propose a general framework for the design of securities markets over combinatorial or infinite state or outcome spaces. The framework enables the design of computationally efficient markets tailored to an arbitrary, yet relatively small, space of securities with bounded payoff. We prove that any market satisfying a set of intuitive conditions must price securities via a convex cost function, which is constructed via conjugate duality. Rather than deal with an exponentially large or infinite outcome space directly, our framework only requires optimization over a convex hull. By reducing the problem of automated market making to convex optimization, where many efficient algorithms exist, we arrive at a range of new polynomialtime pricing mechanisms for various problems. We demonstrate the advantages of this framework with the design of some particular markets. We also show that by relaxing the convex hull we can gain computational tractability without compromising the market institution’s bounded budget.