Everyday inductive inferences are often guided by rich background knowledge. Formal models of induction should aim to incorporate this knowledge, and should explain how different kinds of knowledge lead to the distinctive patterns of reasoning found in different inductive contexts. We present a Bayesian framework that attempts to meet both goals and describe four applications of the framework: a taxonomic model, a spatial model, a threshold model, and a causal model. Each model makes probabilistic inferences about the extensions of novel properties, but the priors for the four models are defined over different kinds of structures that capture different relationships between the categories in a domain. Our framework therefore shows how statistical inference can operate over structured background knowledge, and we argue that this interaction between structure and statistics is critical for explaining the power and flexibility of human reasoning.

If a person doesn’t give something to me, I won’t give anything to that person. If I’m sitting eating, and someone like that comes by, I say, “Uhn, uhn. I’m not going to give any of this to you. When you have food, the things you do with it make me unhappy. If you even once in a while gave me something nice, I would surely give some of this to you.” Nisa from Nisa: The Life and Words of a!Kung Woman, Shostak, 1981, p. 89 Instead of keeping things, [!Kung] use them as gifts to express generosity and friendly intent, and to put people under obligation to make return tokens of friendship....In reciprocating, one does not give the same object back again but something of comparable value. Eland fat is a very highly valued gift...Toma said that when he had eland fat to give, he took shrewd note of certain objects he might like to have and gave their owners especially generous gifts of fat. Marshall, 1976, pp. 366–369

There has been a conceptual revolution in the biological sciences over the past several decades. Evidence from genetics, embryology, and developmental biology has converged to offer a more epigenetic, contingent, and dynamic view of how organisms develop. Despite these advances, arguments for the heuristic value of a gene-centered, predeterministic approach to the study of human behavior and development have become increasingly evident in the psychological sciences during this time. In this article, the authors review recent advances in genetics, embryology, and developmental biology that have transformed contemporary developmental and evolutionary theory and explore how these advances challenge gene-centered explanations of human behavior that ignore the complex, highly coordinated system of regulatory dynamics involved in development and evolution. The prestige of success enjoyed by the gene theory might become a hindrance to the understanding of development by directing our attention solely to the genome....Already we have theories that refer the processes of development to genic action and regard the whole performance as no more than the realization of the potencies of the genes. Such theories are altogether too one-sided. (Harrison, 1937, p. 370) There is growing consensus in popular culture that by understanding genes and the mutual interactions of the proteins derived from them it is possible to understand all of life, including human nature. Psychology is no stranger to this perspective. As most psychologists are aware, a blend of ethology and sociobiology known as evolutionary psychology has gained increasing attention and recognition over the past several decades. Arguments for the heuristic value of a gene-centered, evolutionary approach to the study of human behavior have become increasingly evident in mainstream psychology journals (i.e., Buss, 1995; Buss & Schmitt,

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Organisms inherit a set of environmental regularities as well as genes, and these two inheritances repeatedly encounter each other across generations. This repetition drives natural selection to coordinate the interplay of stably replicated genes with stably persisting environmental regularities, so that this web of interactions produces the reliable development of a functionally organized design. Selection is the only known counterweight to the tendency of physical systems to lose rather than grow functional organization. This means that the individually unique and unpredictable factors in the web of developmental interactions are a disordering threat to normal development. Selection built anti-entropic mechanisms into organisms to orchestrate transactions with environments so that they have some chance of being organization-building and reproduction-enhancing rather than disordering. Evolutionary psychology was founded on a new theory of development that encompasses, reformulates, and (we believe) logically reconciles other views such as nativism, environmentalism, interactionism, developmental systems theory, and others. Readers who want to understand what evolutionary psychologists actually think about development need to consult the original sources (see, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, 1992) rather than relying on critics ’ misconceptions. Below, we address several confusions. Deficiencies in Basic Biology Because developmental systems theorists are psychologists rather than a more interdisciplinarily inclusive team, it is not surprising that they also provide questionable characterizations of fields outside of psychology, such as genetics, developmental biology, and evolutionary biology (e.g., Lickliter & Honeycutt,

This paper outlines a model theory of deontic reasoning. It proposes that social norms form the basic concept on which deontic inferences operate. The theory unifies and extends current deontic approaches. Empirical findings from the deontic selection task will be presented which support the theory.

Abstract: “Ought ” cannot be derived from “is, ” so why should facts about human nature be of interest to business ethicists? In this article, we discuss why the nature of human nature is relevant to anyone wishing to create a more just and humane workplace and society. We begin by presenting evolutionary psychology as a research framework, and then present three examples of research that illuminate various evolved cognitive programs. The first involves the cognitive foundations of trade, including a neurocognitive mechanism specialized for a form of moral reasoning: cheater detection. The second involves the moral sentiments triggered by participating in collective actions, which are relevant to organizational behavior. The third involves the evolved programs whereby our minds socially construct groups, and how these can be harnessed to reduce racism and foster true diversity in the workplace. In each case, we discuss how what has been learned about these evolved programs might inform the

Knauff: How our brains reason logically 2 The intention of this article is to create a link between cognitive brain research and formal logic. As the paper is aimed at a highly interdisciplinary readership, I have cut down the physiological/anatomical and logical/technical treatments to a minimum. The work covers three fundamental sorts of logical inferences: reasoning in the propositional calculus, i.e. inferences with the conditional “if…then”, reasoning in the predicate calculus, i.e. inferences based on quantifiers such as “all ” some”, “none”, and reasoning with n-place relations. Studies with brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging experiments indicate that such logical inferences are implemented in overlapping but different bilateral cortical networks, including parts of the fronto-temporal cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and the visual cortices. I argue that these findings show that we do not use a single deterministic strategy for solving logical reasoning problems. Sometimes the way we reason is logically analogous to the proofs of formal

Evolutionary psychology is an attempt to unify the psychological, social, and behavioral sciences theoretically and empirically within a single, mutually consistent, seamless scientific framework. The core of this enterprise is the integration of principles and findings drawn from evolutionary biology, cognitive science, anthropology, economics, and neuroscience with psychology in order to produce highresolution maps of human nature. By “human nature, ” evolutionary psychologists mean the evolved, reliably developing, species-typical computational architecture of the human mind, together with the physical structures and processes (in the brain, in development, and in genetics) that give rise to this informationprocessing architecture. For evolutionary psychologists, all forms of knowledge about brains and behavior are relevant, but the pivotal step is using these facts to form accurate models of the information-processing structure of psychological mechanisms.

Abstract: Strong adaptationists explore complex organic design as task-specific adaptations to ancestral environments. This strategy seems best when there is evidence of homology. Weak adaptationists don’t assume that complex organic (including cognitive and linguistic) functioning necessarily or primarily represents task-specific adaptation. This approach to cognition resembles physicists ’ attempts to deductively explain the most facts with fewest hypotheses. For certain domain-specific competencies (folkbiology) strong adaptationism is useful but not necessary to research. With group-level belief systems (religion) strong adaptationism degenerates into spurious notions of social function and cultural selection. In other cases (language, especially universal grammar) weak adaptationism’s ‘minimalist ’ approach seems productive. 1.