Results 1  10
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271
NonInteractive Verifiable Computing: Outsourcing Computation to Untrusted Workers
, 2009
"... Verifiable Computation enables a computationally weak client to “outsource ” the computation of a function F on various inputs x1,...,xk to one or more workers. The workers return the result of the function evaluation, e.g., yi = F(xi), as well as a proof that the computation of F was carried out co ..."
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Cited by 102 (8 self)
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Verifiable Computation enables a computationally weak client to “outsource ” the computation of a function F on various inputs x1,...,xk to one or more workers. The workers return the result of the function evaluation, e.g., yi = F(xi), as well as a proof that the computation of F was carried out correctly on the given value xi. The verification of the proof should require substantially less computational effort than computing F(xi) from scratch. We present a protocol that allows the worker to return a computationallysound, noninteractive proof that can be verified in O(m) time, where m is the bitlength of the output of F. The protocol requires a onetime preprocessing stage by the client which takes O(C) time, where C is the smallest Boolean circuit computing F. Our scheme also provides input and output privacy for the client, meaning that the workers do not learn any information about the xi or yi values. 1
Fully homomorphic encryption with relatively small key and ciphertext sizes
 In Public Key Cryptography — PKC ’10, Springer LNCS 6056
, 2010
"... Abstract. We present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme which has both relatively small key and ciphertext size. Our construction follows that of Gentry by producing a fully homomorphic scheme from a “somewhat ” homomorphic scheme. For the somewhat homomorphic scheme the public and private keys c ..."
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Cited by 56 (6 self)
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Abstract. We present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme which has both relatively small key and ciphertext size. Our construction follows that of Gentry by producing a fully homomorphic scheme from a “somewhat ” homomorphic scheme. For the somewhat homomorphic scheme the public and private keys consist of two large integers (one of which is shared by both the public and private key) and the ciphertext consists of one large integer. As such, our scheme has smaller message expansion and key size than Gentry’s original scheme. In addition, our proposal allows efficient fully homomorphic encryption over any field of characteristic two. 1
V.: Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers
, 2010
"... We construct a simple fully homomorphic encryption scheme, using only elementary modular arithmetic. We use Gentry’s technique to construct fully homomorphic scheme from a “bootstrappable” somewhat homomorphic scheme. However, instead of using ideal lattices over a polynomial ring, our bootstrappabl ..."
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Cited by 55 (6 self)
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We construct a simple fully homomorphic encryption scheme, using only elementary modular arithmetic. We use Gentry’s technique to construct fully homomorphic scheme from a “bootstrappable” somewhat homomorphic scheme. However, instead of using ideal lattices over a polynomial ring, our bootstrappable encryption scheme merely uses addition and multiplication over the integers. The main appeal of our scheme is the conceptual simplicity. We reduce the security of our scheme to finding an approximate integer gcd – i.e., given a list of integers that are nearmultiples of a hidden integer, output that hidden integer. We investigate the hardness of this task, building on earlier work of HowgraveGraham. 1
Implementing Gentry’s fullyhomomorphic encryption scheme
 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
"... We describe a working implementation of a variant of Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme (STOC 2009), similar to the variant used in an earlier implementation effort by Smart and Vercauteren (PKC 2010). Smart and Vercauteren implemented the underlying “somewhat homomorphic ” scheme, but wer ..."
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Cited by 53 (0 self)
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We describe a working implementation of a variant of Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme (STOC 2009), similar to the variant used in an earlier implementation effort by Smart and Vercauteren (PKC 2010). Smart and Vercauteren implemented the underlying “somewhat homomorphic ” scheme, but were not able to implement the bootstrapping functionality that is needed to get the complete scheme to work. We show a number of optimizations that allow us to implement all aspects of the scheme, including the bootstrapping functionality. Our main optimization is a keygeneration method for the underlying somewhat homomorphic encryption, that does not require full polynomial inversion. This reduces the asymptotic complexity from Õ(n2.5) to Õ(n1.5) when working with dimensionn lattices (and practically reducing the time from many hours/days to a few seconds/minutes). Other optimizations include a batching technique for encryption, a careful analysis of the degree of the decryption polynomial, and some space/time tradeoffs for the fullyhomomorphic scheme. We tested our implementation with lattices of several dimensions, corresponding to several security levels. From a “toy ” setting in dimension 512, to “small, ” “medium, ” and “large” settings in dimensions 2048, 8192, and 32768, respectively. The publickey size ranges in size from 70 Megabytes for the “small ” setting to 2.3 Gigabytes for the “large ” setting. The time to run one bootstrapping operation (on a 1CPU 64bit machine with large memory) ranges from 30 seconds for the “small ” setting to 30 minutes for the “large ” setting. 1
Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption from (Standard
 LWE, FOCS 2011, IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE
, 2011
"... We present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is based solely on the (standard) learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Applying known results on LWE, the security of our scheme is based on the worstcase hardness of “short vector problems ” on arbitrary lattices. Our construction improves on ..."
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Cited by 47 (3 self)
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We present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is based solely on the (standard) learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Applying known results on LWE, the security of our scheme is based on the worstcase hardness of “short vector problems ” on arbitrary lattices. Our construction improves on previous works in two aspects: 1. We show that “somewhat homomorphic ” encryption can be based on LWE, using a new relinearization technique. In contrast, all previous schemes relied on complexity assumptions related to ideals in various rings. 2. We deviate from the “squashing paradigm ” used in all previous works. We introduce a new dimensionmodulus reduction technique, which shortens the ciphertexts and reduces the decryption complexity of our scheme, without introducing additional assumptions. Our scheme has very short ciphertexts and we therefore use it to construct an asymptotically efficient LWEbased singleserver private information retrieval (PIR) protocol. The communication complexity of our protocol (in the publickey model) is k · polylog(k) + log DB  bits per singlebit query (here, k is a security parameter). ∗ nd
On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings
 In Proc. of EUROCRYPT, volume 6110 of LNCS
, 2010
"... The “learning with errors ” (LWE) problem is to distinguish random linear equations, which have been perturbed by a small amount of noise, from truly uniform ones. The problem has been shown to be as hard as worstcase lattice problems, and in recent years it has served as the foundation for a pleth ..."
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Cited by 39 (7 self)
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The “learning with errors ” (LWE) problem is to distinguish random linear equations, which have been perturbed by a small amount of noise, from truly uniform ones. The problem has been shown to be as hard as worstcase lattice problems, and in recent years it has served as the foundation for a plethora of cryptographic applications. Unfortunately, these applications are rather inefficient due to an inherent quadratic overhead in the use of LWE. A main open question was whether LWE and its applications could be made truly efficient by exploiting extra algebraic structure, as was done for latticebased hash functions (and related primitives). We resolve this question in the affirmative by introducing an algebraic variant of LWE called ringLWE, and proving that it too enjoys very strong hardness guarantees. Specifically, we show that the ringLWE distribution is pseudorandom, assuming that worstcase problems on ideal lattices are hard for polynomialtime quantum algorithms. Applications include the first truly practical latticebased publickey cryptosystem with an efficient security reduction; moreover, many of the other applications of LWE can be made much more efficient through the use of ringLWE. 1
TASTY: Tool for Automating Secure TwopartY computations
 In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS’10
"... Secure twoparty computation allows two untrusting parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their respective private inputs while revealing no information beyond the outcome. Existing cryptographic compilers can automatically generate secure computation protocols from highlevel specifica ..."
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Cited by 36 (3 self)
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Secure twoparty computation allows two untrusting parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their respective private inputs while revealing no information beyond the outcome. Existing cryptographic compilers can automatically generate secure computation protocols from highlevel specifications, but are often limited in their use and efficiency of generated protocols as they are based on either garbled circuits or (additively) homomorphic encryption only. In this paper we present TASTY, a novel tool for automating, i.e., describing, generating, executing, benchmarking, and comparing, efficient secure twoparty computation protocols. TASTY is a new compiler that can generate protocols based on homomorphic encryption and efficient garbled circuits as well as combinations of both, which often yields the most efficient protocols available today. The user provides a highlevel description of the computations to be performed on encrypted data in a domainspecific language. This is automatically transformed into a protocol. TASTY provides most recent techniques and optimizations for practical secure twoparty computation with low online latency. Moreover, it allows to efficiently evaluate circuits generated by the wellknown Fairplay compiler. We use TASTY to compare protocols for secure multiplication based on homomorphic encryption with those based on garbled circuits and highly efficient Karatsuba multiplication. Further, we show how TASTY improves the online latency for securely evaluating the AES functionality by an order of magnitude compared to previous software implementations. TASTY allows to automatically generate efficient secure protocols for many privacypreserving applications where we consider the use cases for private set intersection and face recognition protocols.
Improved delegation of computation using fully homomorphic encryption
 CRYPTO 2010, LNCS 6223
, 2010
"... Following Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno (Cryptology ePrint Archive 2009/547), we use fully homomorphic encryption to design improved schemes for delegating computation. In such schemes, a delegator outsources the computation of a function F on many, dynamically chosen inputs xi to a worker in such a wa ..."
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Cited by 34 (2 self)
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Following Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno (Cryptology ePrint Archive 2009/547), we use fully homomorphic encryption to design improved schemes for delegating computation. In such schemes, a delegator outsources the computation of a function F on many, dynamically chosen inputs xi to a worker in such a way that it is infeasible for the worker to make the delegator accept a result other than F (xi). The “online stage ” of the Gennaro et al. scheme is very efficient: the parties exchange two messages, the delegator runs in time poly(log T), and the worker runs in time poly(T), where T is the time complexity of F. However, the “offline stage ” (which depends on the function F but not the inputs to be delegated) is inefficient: the delegator runs in time poly(T) and generates a public key of length poly(T) that needs to be accessed by the worker during the online stage. Our first construction eliminates the large public key from the Gennaro et al. scheme. The delegator still invests poly(T) time in the offline stage, but does not need to communicate or publish anything. Our second construction reduces the work of the delegator in the offline stage to poly(log T) at the price of a 4message (offline) interaction with a poly(T)time worker
Computing arbitrary functions of encrypted data
 Commun. ACM
, 2010
"... Suppose that you want to delegate the ability to process your data, without giving away access to it. We show that this separation is possible: we describe a “fully homomorphic” encryption scheme that keeps data private, but that allows a worker that does not have the secret decryption key to comput ..."
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Cited by 33 (0 self)
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Suppose that you want to delegate the ability to process your data, without giving away access to it. We show that this separation is possible: we describe a “fully homomorphic” encryption scheme that keeps data private, but that allows a worker that does not have the secret decryption key to compute any (still encrypted) result of the data, even when the function of the data is very complex. In short, a third party can perform complicated processing of data without being able to see it. Among other things, this helps make cloud computing compatible with privacy. 1.