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72
Incentivecompatible interdomain routing
 Proc. of the 7th Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’06), 2006
, 2006
"... The routing of traffic between Internet domains, or Autonomous Systems (ASes), a task known as interdomain routing, is currently handled by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [17]. Using BGP, autonomous systems can apply semantically rich routing policies to choose interdomain routes in a distributed ..."
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Cited by 28 (11 self)
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The routing of traffic between Internet domains, or Autonomous Systems (ASes), a task known as interdomain routing, is currently handled by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [17]. Using BGP, autonomous systems can apply semantically rich routing policies to choose interdomain routes in a distributed fashion. This expressiveness in routingpolicy choice supports domains ’ autonomy in network operations and in business decisions, but it comes at a price: The interaction of locally defined routing policies can lead to unexpected global anomalies, including route oscillations or overall protocol divergence (see, e.g., [20]). Networking researchers have addressed this problem by devising constraints on policies that guarantee BGP convergence without unduly limiting expressiveness and autonomy (see, e.g., [7, 8]). In addition to taking this engineering or “protocoldesign ” approach, researchers have approached interdomain routing from an economic or “mechanismdesign ” point of view. It is known that lowestcostpath (LCP) routing can be implemented in a truthful, BGPcompatible manner [3] but that several other natural classes of routing policies cannot [2, 5]. In this paper, we present a natural class of interdomainrouting policies that is more realistic than LCP routing and admits incentivecompatible, BGPcompatible implementation. We also present several positive steps toward a general theory of incentivecompatible interdomain routing.
Algorithmic mechanism design for load balancing in distributed systems
 IEEE TRANS. SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS
, 2004
"... Computational grids are promising nextgeneration computing platforms for largescale problems in science and engineering. Grids are largescale computing systems composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) owned by self interested agents or organizations. These agent ..."
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Cited by 28 (3 self)
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Computational grids are promising nextgeneration computing platforms for largescale problems in science and engineering. Grids are largescale computing systems composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) owned by self interested agents or organizations. These agents may manipulate the resource allocation algorithm in their own benefit, and their selfish behavior may lead to severe performance degradation and poor efficiency. In this paper, we investigate the problem of designing protocols for resource allocation involving selfish agents. Solving this kind of problems is the object of mechanism design theory. Using this theory, we design a truthful mechanism for solving the static load balancing problem in heterogeneous distributed systems. We prove that using the optimal allocation algorithm the output function admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying voluntary participation. We derive a protocol that implements our mechanism and present experiments to show its effectiveness.
Firstprice path auctions
 In Proc. 7th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce
, 2005
"... We study firstprice auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A firstprice auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their bid amount; the designer has flexibility in specifying remaining details. We assume edges are independent agents with fixed ..."
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Cited by 27 (2 self)
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We study firstprice auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A firstprice auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their bid amount; the designer has flexibility in specifying remaining details. We assume edges are independent agents with fixed capacities and costs, and their objective is to maximize their profit. We characterize all strong ¤Nash equilibria of a firstprice auction, and show that the total payment is never significantly more than, and often less than, the well known dominant strategy VickreyClarkGroves mechanism. We then present a randomized version of the firstprice auction for which the equilibrium condition can be relaxed to ¤Nash equilibrium. We next consider a model in which the amount of demand is uncertain, but its probability distribution is known. For this model, we show that a simple ex ante firstprice auction may not have any ¤Nash equilibria. We then present a modified mechanism with ¥parameter bids which does have an ¤Nash equilibrium. For a randomized version of this ¥parameter mechanism we characterize the set of all ¤Nash equilibria and prove a bound on the total payment in any ¤Nash equilibrium.
On the Difficulty of Some Shortest Path Problems
, 2003
"... We prove superlinear lower bounds for some shortest path problems in directed graphs, where no such bounds were previously known. The central problem in our study is the replacement paths problem: Given a directed graph G with nonnegative edge weights, and a shortest path P = {e_1, e_2, ..., e_p} ..."
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Cited by 26 (8 self)
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We prove superlinear lower bounds for some shortest path problems in directed graphs, where no such bounds were previously known. The central problem in our study is the replacement paths problem: Given a directed graph G with nonnegative edge weights, and a shortest path P = {e_1, e_2, ..., e_p} between two nodes s and t, compute the shortest path distances from s to t in each of the p graphs obtained from G by deleting one of the edges e_i. We show that the replacement paths problem requires Ω(m√n) time in the worst case whenever m = O(n√n). This also establishes a similar...
True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments In Graphs
 In Proceeding of 7th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
, 2004
"... We address the problem of buying an inexpensive path in a graph in which edges are owned by selfish agents. We show that it is possible to lower the expected payments of the VCG mechanism by deleting a subset of edges of the underlying graph; however, it is NPhard to determine what is the best su ..."
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Cited by 19 (3 self)
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We address the problem of buying an inexpensive path in a graph in which edges are owned by selfish agents. We show that it is possible to lower the expected payments of the VCG mechanism by deleting a subset of edges of the underlying graph; however, it is NPhard to determine what is the best subset of edges to delete, or even whether a given graph can benefit from edge deletion.
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
 In PODC
, 2004
"... We study a generic task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a directed graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. Each edge has an associated cost that is privately known to its owner. Let s and t be two distinguished nodes in G. Given a distribution on the edge cos ..."
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Cited by 18 (1 self)
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We study a generic task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a directed graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. Each edge has an associated cost that is privately known to its owner. Let s and t be two distinguished nodes in G. Given a distribution on the edge costs, the goal is to design a mechanism (protocol) which acquires a cheap st path. We first prove that the class of generalized VCG mechanisms has certain monotonicity properties. We exploit this observation to obtain, under an independence assumption, expected payments which are significantly better than the worst case bounds of [4, 7]. We then investigate whether these payments can be improved when there is a competition among paths. Surprisingly, we give evidence to the fact that typically such competition hardly helps incentive compatible mechanisms. In particular, we show this for the celebrated VCG mechanism. We then construct a novel general protocol combining the advantages of incentive compatible and nonincentive compatible mechanisms. Under reasonable assumptions on the agents we show that the overpayment of our mechanism is very small. Finally, we demonstrate that many task allocation problems can be reduced to shortest paths. 1
Generalized Knapsack Solvers for MultiUnit Combinatorial Auctions: Analysis and Application to Computational Resource Allocation
 In Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
, 2004
"... The problem of allocating discrete computational resources motivates interest in general multiunit combinatorial exchanges. This paper considers the problem of computing optimal (surplusmaximizing) allocations, assuming unrestricted quasilinear preferences. We present a solver whose pseudopol ..."
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Cited by 17 (3 self)
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The problem of allocating discrete computational resources motivates interest in general multiunit combinatorial exchanges. This paper considers the problem of computing optimal (surplusmaximizing) allocations, assuming unrestricted quasilinear preferences. We present a solver whose pseudopolynomial time and memory requirements are linear in three of four natural measures of problem size: number of agents, length of bids, and units of each resource. In applications where the number of resource types is inherently a small constant, e.g., computational resource allocation, such a solver offers advantages over more elaborate approaches developed for highdimensional problems.
Finding the k Shortest Simple Paths: A New Algorithm and its Implementation
"... We describe a new algorithm to enumerate the k shortest simple (loopless) paths in a directed graph and report on its implementation. Our algorithm is based on a replacement paths algorithm proposed recently by Hershberger and Suri [7], and can yield a factor #(n) improvement for this problem. But t ..."
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Cited by 16 (1 self)
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We describe a new algorithm to enumerate the k shortest simple (loopless) paths in a directed graph and report on its implementation. Our algorithm is based on a replacement paths algorithm proposed recently by Hershberger and Suri [7], and can yield a factor #(n) improvement for this problem. But there is a caveat: the fast replacement paths subroutine is known to fail for some directed graphs. However, the failure is easily detected, and so our k shortest paths algorithm optimistically uses the fast subroutine, then switches to a slower but correct algorithm if a failure is detected. Thus the algorithm achieves its #(n) speed advantage only when the optimism is justified. Our empirical results show that the replacement paths failure is a rare phenomenon, and the new algorithm outperforms the current best algorithms; the improvement can be substantial in large graphs. For instance, on GIS map data with about 5000 nodes and 12000 edges, our algorithm is 48 times faster. In synthetic graphs modeling wireless ad hoc networks, our algorithm is about 20 times faster.
A nearlinear time algorithm for computing replacement paths in planar directed graphs
 In Proc. 19th annual ACMSIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
, 2008
"... Let G = (V (G), E(G)) be a weighted directed graph and let P be a shortest path from s to t in G. In the replacement paths problem we are required to compute for every edge e in P, the length of a shortest path from s to t that avoids e. The fastest known algorithm for solving the problem in weighte ..."
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Cited by 12 (1 self)
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Let G = (V (G), E(G)) be a weighted directed graph and let P be a shortest path from s to t in G. In the replacement paths problem we are required to compute for every edge e in P, the length of a shortest path from s to t that avoids e. The fastest known algorithm for solving the problem in weighted directed graphs is the trivial one: each edge in P is removed from the graph in its turn and the distance from s to t in the modified graph is computed. The running time of this algorithm is O � mn + n2 log n � , where n = V (G)  and m = E(G). The replacement paths problem is strongly motivated by two different applications. First, the fastest algorithm to compute the k simple shortest paths from s to t in directed graphs [21, 13] repeatedly computes the replacement paths from s to t. Its running time is O(kn(m + n log n)). Second, the computation of Vickrey pricing of edges in distributed networks can be reduced to the replacement paths problem. An open question raised by Nisan and Ronen [16] asks whether it is possible to compute the Vickrey pricing faster than the trivial algorithm described in the previous paragraph. In this paper we present a nearlinear time algorithm for computing replacement paths in
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design
, 2003
"... Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributedcomputational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. ..."
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Cited by 12 (2 self)
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Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributedcomputational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. We also touch upon several issues important to DAMD in general, including approximation, compatibility with existing protocols, and hardness that results from the interplay of incentives and distributed computation.