Mental accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities. Making use of research on this topic over the past decade, this paper summarizes the current state of our knowledge about how people engage in mental accounting activities. Three components of mental accounting receive the most attention. This first captures how outcomes are perceived and experienced, and how decisions are made and subsequently evaluated. The accounting system provides the inputs to be both ex ante and ex post cost-benefit analyses. A second component of mental accounting involves the assignment of activities to specific accounts. Both the sources and uses of funds are labeled in real as well as in mental accounting systems. Expenditures are grouped into categories (housing, food, etc.) and spending is sometimes constrained by implicit or explicit budgets. The third component of mental accounting concerns the frequency with which accounts are evaluated and 'choice bracketing'. Accounts can be balanced daily,

Motivated by the behavior of asset prices, trading volume and price volatility during historical episodes of asset price bubbles, we present a continuous time equilibrium model where overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. With short-sale constraints, an asset owner has an option to sell the asset to other overconfident agents when they have more optimistic beliefs. As in Harrison and Kreps (1978), this re-sale option has a recursive structure, that is, a buyer of the asset gets the option to resell it. Agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay even more. This causes a significant bubble component in asset prices even when small differences of beliefs are sufficient to generate a trade. In equilibrium, large bubbles are accompanied by large trading volume and high price volatility. Our model has an explicit solution, which allows for several comparative statics exercises. Our analysis shows that while Tobin’s tax can substantially reduce speculative trading when transaction costs are small, it has only a limited impact on the size of the bubble or on price volatility. We also give an example where the price of a subsidiary is larger than its parent firm. This paper was previously circulated under the title “Overconfidence, Short-Sale Constraints and Bubbles.”

It is well established that the realized returns of ‘growth ’ stocks have been low relative to other stocks. We show that this phenomenon is explained by a large and asymmetric response to negative earnings surprises for growth stocks. After controlling for this effect, there is no longer evidence of a stock return differential between growth stocks and other stocks. Our evidence is consistent with investors having naively optimistic expectations about the prospects of growth stocks (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and

We survey 401 financial executives, and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional 20, to determine the key factors that drive decisions related to reported earnings and voluntary disclosure. The majority of firms view earnings, especially EPS, as the key metric for outsiders, even more so than cash flows. Because of the severe market reaction to missing an earnings target, we find that firms are willing to sacrifice economic value in order to meet a short-run earnings target. The preference for smooth earnings is so strong that 78 % of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in exchange for smooth earnings. We find that 55 % of managers would avoid initiating a very positive NPV project if it meant falling short of the current quarter’s consensus earnings. Missing an earnings target or reporting volatile earnings is thought to reduce the predictability of earnings, which in turn reduces stock price because investors and analysts hate uncertainty. We also find that managers make voluntary disclosures to reduce information risk associated with their stock but try to avoid setting a disclosure precedent that will be difficult to maintain. In general, management’s views provide support for stock price motivations for earnings management and voluntary disclosure, but provide only modest evidence in support of other

comments on this paper. The capable computer assistance provided by Ashok Natarajan is appreciated.

of the process) for helpful comments. 1 Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations. This book consists of representative recent articles in behavioral economics. 1 This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the approach and methods of behavioral economics, and to some of its major findings, applications, and promising new directions. It also seeks to fill some unavoidable gaps in the chapters ’ coverage of topics. What Behavioral Economics Tries To Do At the core of behavioral economics is the conviction that increasing the realism of the psychological underpinnings of economic analysis will improve economics on its own terms--generating theoretical insights, making better predictions of field phenomena, and suggesting better policy. This conviction does not imply a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach to economics based on utility maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency. The neoclassical approach is useful because it provides economists with a theoretical framework that can be applied to almost any form of economic (and even non-economic) behavior, and it makes refutable predictions. Many of these predictions are tested in the chapters of this book, and rejections of those predictions suggest new theories. Most of the papers modify one or two assumptions in standard theory in the direction of greater psychological realism. Often these departures are not radical at all because they relax simplifying assumptions that are not central to the economic approach. For example, there is nothing in core neoclassical theory that specifies that people should not care about fairness, that they should weight risky outcomes in a linear fashion, or that they must discount the future exponentially at a constant rate. 2 Other assumptions simply acknowledge human limits on 1 Since it is a book of advances, many of the seminal articles which influenced those collected here are not included, but are noted below and are widely reprinted elsewhere.

This paper examines the evolution of the corporate profit base and the relationship between book income and tax income for U.S. corporations over last two decades. The paper demonstrates that this relationship has broken down over the 1990s and has broken down in a manner that is consistent with increased sheltering activity. The paper traces the growing discrepancy between book and tax income associated with differential treatments of depreciation, the reporting of foreign source income, and, in particular, the changing nature of employee compensation. For the largest public companies, proceeds from option exercises equaled 27 percent of operating cash flow from 1996 to 2000 and these deductions appear to be fully utilized thereby creating the largest distinction between book and tax income. While the differential treatment of these items has historically accounted fully for the discrepancy between book and tax income, the paper demonstrates that book and tax income have diverged markedly for reasons not associated with these items during the late 1990s. In 1998, more than half of the difference between tax and book income- approximately $154.4 billion or 33.7 percent of tax income- cannot be accounted for by these factors. This paper proceeds to develop and test a model of costly sheltering and

Abstract not found

This paper examines the effects of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of the firm following the IPO. I conduct three independent sets of tests examining effectively how governance and monitoring might differ for venture- and non-venture-backed firms. First, I find that venture-backed firms have lower earnings management, as measured by the level of their discretionary accounting accruals, than similar nonventure-backed firms. Second, venture-backed firms experience a significantly higher wealth effect upon the announcement of the adoption of a shareholder rights agreement (poison pill) than non-venture-backed

Abstract. Prior research has documented a ‘‘kink’ ’ in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this ‘‘kink.’ ’ Overall, we are unable to confirm that boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. We investigate and discuss a number of alternative explanations for the kink.