this paper I put forward a new approach to understanding the origins of some of the key ingredients in a syntactic system. I show, using a computational model, that compositional syntax is an inevitable outcome of the dynamics of observationally learned communication systems. In a simulated population of individuals, language develops from a simple idiosyncratic vocabulary with little expressive power, to a compositional system with high expressivity, nouns and verbs, and word order expressing meaning distinctions.

The Nature-Nurture controversy has been with us since it was first outlined by Plato and Aristotle. Nobody likes it anymore. All reasonable scholars today agree that genes and environment interact to determine complex cognitive outcomes. So why does the controversy persist? First, it persists because it has practical implications that cannot be postponed (i.e., what can we do to avoid bad outcomes and insure better ones?), a state of emergency that sometimes tempts scholars to stake out claims they cannot defend. Second, the controversy persists because we lack a precise, testable theory of the process by which genes and environment interact. In the absence of a better theory, innateness is often confused with (1) domain specificity (Outcome X is so peculiar that it must be innate), (2) species specificity (we are the only species who do X, so X must lie in the human genome), (3) localization (Outcome X is mediated by a particular part of the brain, so X must be innate), and (4) learnability (we cannot figure out how X could be learned, so X must be innate). We believe that an explicit and plausible theory of interaction is now around the corner, and that many of the classic maneuvers to defend or attack innateness will soon disappear. In the interim, some serious errors can be avoided if we keep these confounded issues apart. That is the major goal of this paper, i.e., not to attack innateness but to clarify what

The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a "mirror system" active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 and Broca's area are homologous brain regions. This grounded the mirror system hypothesis of Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) which offers the mirror system for grasping as a key neural "missing link" between the abilities of our nonhuman ancestors of 20 million years ago and modern human language, with manual gestures rather than a system for vocal communication providing the initial seed for this evolutionary process. The present article, however, goes "beyond the mirror" to offer hypotheses on evolutionary changes within and outside the mirror systems which may have occurred to equip Homo sapiens with a language-ready brain. Crucial to the early stages of this progression is the mirror system for grasping and its extension to permit imitation. Imitation is seen as evolving via a so-called simple system such as that found in chimpanzees (which allows imitation of complex "object-oriented" sequences but only as the result of extensive practice) to a so-called complex system found in humans (which allows rapid imitation even of complex sequences, under appropriate conditions) which supports pantomime. This is hypothesized to have provided the substrate for the development of protosign, a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures, which then provides the scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech (which thus owes little to nonhuman vocalizations), with protosign and protospeech then developing in an expanding spiral. It is argued that these stages involve biological evolution of both brain and body. By contrast, it is argued that the progression from protosign and protospeech to languages with full-blown syntax and compositional semantics was a historical phenomenon in the development of Homo sapiens, involving few if any further biological changes.

We examine the question of which aspects of language are uniquely human and uniquely linguistic in light of recent arguments by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch that the only such aspect is syntactic recursion, the rest of language being either specific to humans but not to language (e.g., words and concepts) or not specific to humans (e.g., speech perception). We find this argument problematic. It ignores the many aspects of grammar that are not recursive, such as phonology, morphology, case, and agreement. It is inconsistent with the anatomy and neural control of the human vocal tract. And it is weakened by experiments showing that speech perception cannot be reduced to primate audition, that word learning cannot be reduced to fact learning, and that at least one gene involved in speech and language was evolutionarily selected in the human lineage but is not specific to recursion. The recursion-only claim, we suggest, is motivated by Chomsky’s recent approach to syntax, the Minimalist Program, which de-emphasizes the same aspects of language. The approach, however, is sufficiently problematic that it cannot be used to support claims about evolution. We contest other arguments from Chomsky that language is not an adaptation, namely that it is “perfect, ” nonredundant, unusable in any partial form, and badly designed for communication. The hypothesis that language is a complex adaptation for communication which evolved piecemeal avoids all these problems.

The term “aphasia ” refers to acute or chronic impairment of language, an acquired condition that is most often associated with damage to the left side of the brain, usually due to trauma or stroke. We have known about the link between left-hemisphere damage and language loss for more than a century (Goodglass, 1993). For almost as long, we have also known that the lesion/symptom correlations observed in adults do not appear to hold for very young children (Basser, 1962; Lenneberg, 1967). In fact, in the absence of other complications, infants with congenital damage to one side of the brain (left or right) usually go on to acquire language abilities that are well within the normal range (Eisele & Aram, 1995; Feldman, Holland, & Janosky, 1992; Vargha-Khadem, Isaacs, & Muter,

It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is frequently suggested to be rooted in a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but arbitrary, principles of language structure (a universal grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes. The resulting puzzle concerning the origin of UG we call the logical problem of language evolution. Because the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a “moving target ” both over time and across different human populations, and hence cannot provide a stable environment to which UG genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the original motivation for UG—the mesh between learners and languages—arises because language has been shaped to fit the human brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent “organism, ” which evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages are themselves undergoing severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases, independent of language. We illustrate how this framework can integrate evidence from different literatures and methodologies to explain core linguistic phenomena, including binding constraints, word order universals, and diachronic language change. 1.

The two broad cases, data- and content-based applications, differ substantially in the fact that data case applications are abstracted first before they cross any system boundary while for content cases it is the system itself which has to map application content into some data-based technology.

Abstract not found

Aphasia (defined as the loss or impairment of language abilities following acquired brain injury) is strongly associated with damage to the left hemisphere in adults. This well-known finding has led to the hypothesis that the left hemisphere is innately specialized for language, and may be the site of a specific "language organ". However, for over a century we have known that young children with left-hemisphere damage (LHD) do not suffer from aphasia, and in most studies do not differ significantly from children with right-hemisphere damage (RHD). This result provides strong evidence for plasticity, i.e., brain reorganization in response to experience, and constitutes a serious challenge to the language organ hypothesis. This chapter reviews the history of research on language outcomes in children vs. adults with unilateral brain injury, addressing some discrepancies in the literature to date, including methodological confounds that may be responsible for those discrepancies. It also reviews recent prospective studies of children with unilateral injury as they pass through the first stages of language development. Prospective studies have demonstrated specific correlations between lesion site and profiles of language delay, but they look quite different from lesionsymptom correlations in adults, and gradually disappear across the course of language development. The classic pattern of brain organization for language observed in normal adults may be the product rather than the cause of language learning, emerging out of regional biases in information processing that are relevant for language, but only indirectly related to language itself. If those

This study was designed to test the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis (Bley-Vroman, 1988), which states that, whereas children are known to learn language almost completely through (implicit)domain-specific mechanisms, adults have largely lost the ability to learn a language without reflecting on its structure and have to use alternative mechanisms, drawing especially on their problem-solving capacities, to learn a second language. The hypothesis implies that only adults with a high level of verbal analytical ability will reach near-native competence in their second language, but that this ability will not be a significant predictor of success for childhood second language acquisition. A study with 57 adult Hungarian-speaking immigrants confirmed the hypothesis in the sense that very few adult immigrants scored within the range of child arrivals on a grammaticality judgment test, and that the few who did had high levels of verbal analytical ability; this ability was not a significant predictor for