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Articles Designing Markets for Prediction
"... � We survey the literature on prediction mechanisms, including prediction markets and peer prediction systems. We pay particular attention to the design process, highlighting the objectives and properties that are important in the design of good prediction mechanisms. Mechanism design has been descr ..."
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� We survey the literature on prediction mechanisms, including prediction markets and peer prediction systems. We pay particular attention to the design process, highlighting the objectives and properties that are important in the design of good prediction mechanisms. Mechanism design has been described as “inverse game theory. ” Whereas game theorists ask what outcome results from a game, mechanism designers ask what game produces a desired outcome. In this sense, game theorists act like scientists and mechanism designers like engineers. In this article, we survey a number of mechanisms created to elicit predictions, many newly proposed within the last decade. We focus on the engineering questions: How do they work and why? What factors and goals are most important in their
Comparing Prediction Market Structures, With an Application to Market Making
, 1009
"... Ensuring sufficient liquidity is one of the key challenges for designers of prediction markets. Various market making algorithms have been proposed in the literature and deployed in practice, but there has been little effort to evaluate their benefits and disadvantages in a systematic manner. We int ..."
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Ensuring sufficient liquidity is one of the key challenges for designers of prediction markets. Various market making algorithms have been proposed in the literature and deployed in practice, but there has been little effort to evaluate their benefits and disadvantages in a systematic manner. We introduce a novel experimental design for comparing market structures in live trading that ensures fair comparison between two different microstructures with the same trading population. Participants trade on outcomes related to a twodimensional random walk that they observe on their computer screens. They can simultaneously trade in two markets, corresponding to the independent horizontal and vertical random walks. We use this experimental design to compare the popular inventorybased logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) market maker and a new information based Bayesian market maker (BMM). Our experiments reveal that BMM can offer significant benefits in terms of price stability and expected loss when controlling for liquidity; the caveat is that, unlike LMSR, BMM does not guarantee bounded loss. Our investigation also elucidates some general properties of market makers in prediction markets. In particular, there is an inherent tradeoff between adaptability to market shocks and convergence during market equilibrium. 1
Instructor rating markets
 In Proc. of the Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications
, 2011
"... We describe the design of Instructor Rating Markets in which students trade on the ratings that will be received by instructors, with new ratings revealed every two weeks. The markets provide useful dynamic feedback to instructors on the progress of their class, while at the same time enabling the c ..."
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We describe the design of Instructor Rating Markets in which students trade on the ratings that will be received by instructors, with new ratings revealed every two weeks. The markets provide useful dynamic feedback to instructors on the progress of their class, while at the same time enabling the controlled study of prediction markets where traders can affect the outcomes they are trading on. More than 200 students across the Rensselaer campus participated in markets for ten classes in the Fall 2010 semester. We show that market prices convey useful information on future instructor ratings and contain significantly more information than do past ratings. The bulk of useful information contained in the price of a particular class is provided by students who are in that class, showing that the markets are serving to disseminate insider information. At the same time, we find little evidence of attempted manipulation of the liquidating dividends by raters. The markets are also a laboratory for comparing different microstructures and the resulting price dynamics, and we show how they can be used to compare market making algorithms. 1
Composition of Markets with Conflicting Incentives
"... We study information revelation in scoring rule and prediction market mechanisms in settings in which traders have conflicting incentives due to opportunities to profit from the market operator’s subsequent actions. In our canonical model, an agent Alice is offered an incentivecompatible scoring ru ..."
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We study information revelation in scoring rule and prediction market mechanisms in settings in which traders have conflicting incentives due to opportunities to profit from the market operator’s subsequent actions. In our canonical model, an agent Alice is offered an incentivecompatible scoring rule to reveal her beliefs about a future event, but can also profit from misleading another trader Bob about her information and then making money off Bob’s error in a subsequent market. We show that, in any weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this sequence of two markets, Alice and Bob earn payoffs that are consistent with a minimax strategy of a related game. We can then characterize the equilibria in terms of an information channel: the outcome of the first scoring rule is as if Alice had only observed a noisy version of her initial signal, with the degree of noise indicating the adverse effect of the second market on the first. We provide a partial constructive characterization of when this channel will be noiseless. We show that our results on the canonical model yield insights into other settings of information extraction with conflicting incentives.
Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory
"... Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive compatibility considerations are commonly studied in mechanism ..."
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Cited by 3 (2 self)
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Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive compatibility considerations are commonly studied in mechanism design. While this relation between prediction markets and mechanism design is well understood at a high level, the models used in prediction markets tend to be somewhat different from those used in mechanism design. This paper considers a model for prediction markets that fits more straightforwardly into the mechanism design framework. We consider a number of mechanisms within this model, all based on proper scoring rules. We discuss basic properties of these mechanisms, such as incentive compatibility. We also draw connections between some of these mechanisms and cooperative game theory. Finally, we speculate how one might build a practical prediction market based on some of these ideas. 1
Aggregation and Manipulation in Prediction Markets: Effects of Trading Mechanism and Information Distribution
"... [Extended Abstract] ∗ ..."
TurkServer: Enabling Synchronous and Longitudinal Online Experiments
, 2012
"... With the proliferation of online labor markets and other human computation platforms, online experiments have become a lowcost and scalable way to empirically test hypotheses and mechanisms in both human computation and social science. Yet, despite the potential in designing more powerful and expre ..."
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With the proliferation of online labor markets and other human computation platforms, online experiments have become a lowcost and scalable way to empirically test hypotheses and mechanisms in both human computation and social science. Yet, despite the potential in designing more powerful and expressive online experiments using multiple subjects, researchers still face many technical and logistical difficulties. We see synchronous and longitudinal experiments involving realtime interaction between participants as a dualuse paradigm for both human computation and social science, and present TurkServer, a platform that facilitates these types of experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our work has the potential to make more fruitful online experiments accessible to researchers in many different fields.
Rational Proofs
"... We study a new type of proof system, where an unbounded prover and a polynomial time verifier interact, on inputs a string x and a function f, so that the Verifier may learn f(x). The novelty of our setting is that there no longer are “good” or “malicious ” provers, but only rational ones. In essenc ..."
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Cited by 2 (2 self)
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We study a new type of proof system, where an unbounded prover and a polynomial time verifier interact, on inputs a string x and a function f, so that the Verifier may learn f(x). The novelty of our setting is that there no longer are “good” or “malicious ” provers, but only rational ones. In essence, the Verifier has a budget c and gives the Prover a reward r ∈ [0, c] determined by the transcript of their interaction; the prover wishes to maximize his expected reward; and his reward is maximized only if he the verifier correctly learns f(x). Rational proof systems are as powerful as their classical counterparts for polynomially many rounds of interaction, but are much more powerful when we only allow a constant number of rounds. Indeed, we prove that if f ∈ #P, then f is computable by a oneround rational MerlinArthur game, where, on input x, Merlin’s single message actually consists of sending just the value f(x). Further, we prove that CH, the counting hierarchy, coincides with the class of languages computable by a constantround rational MerlinArthur game. Our results rely on a basic and crucial connection between rational proof systems and proper scoring rules, a tool developed to elicit truthful information from experts.
A Bayesian market maker
 In ACM EC
, 2012
"... Ensuring sufficient liquidity is one of the key challenges for designers of prediction markets. Variants of the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) have emerged as the standard. LMSR market makers are lossmaking in general and need to be subsidized. Proposed variants, including liquidity sensiti ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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Ensuring sufficient liquidity is one of the key challenges for designers of prediction markets. Variants of the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) have emerged as the standard. LMSR market makers are lossmaking in general and need to be subsidized. Proposed variants, including liquidity sensitive market makers, suffer from an inability to react rapidly to jumps in population beliefs. In this paper we propose a Bayesian Market Maker for binary outcome (or continuous 01) markets that learns from the informational content of trades. By sacrificing the guarantee of bounded loss, the Bayesian Market Maker can simultaneously offer: (1) significantly lower expected loss at the same level of liquidity, and, (2) rapid convergence when there is a jump in the underlying true value of the security. We present extensive evaluations of the algorithm in experiments with intelligent trading agents and in human subject experiments. Our investigation also elucidates some general properties of market makers in prediction markets. In particular, there is an inherent tradeoff between adaptability to market shocks and convergence during market equilibrium.
Pay by the Bit: An InformationTheoretic Metric for Collective Human Judgment
"... We consider the problem of evaluating the performance of human contributors for tasks involving answering a series of questions, each of which has a single correct answer. The answers may not be known a priori. We assert that the measure of a contributor’s judgments is the amount by which having the ..."
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We consider the problem of evaluating the performance of human contributors for tasks involving answering a series of questions, each of which has a single correct answer. The answers may not be known a priori. We assert that the measure of a contributor’s judgments is the amount by which having these judgments decreases the entropy of our discovering the answer. This quantity is the pointwise mutual information between the judgments and the answer. The expected value of this metric is the mutual information between the contributor and the answer prior, which can be computed using only the prior and the conditional probabilities of the contributor’s judgments given a correct answer, without knowing the answers themselves. We also propose using multivariable information measures, such as conditional mutual information, to measure the interactions between contributors ’ judgments. These metrics have a variety of applications. They can be used as a basis for contributor performance evaluation and incentives. They can be used to measure the efficiency of the judgment collection process. If the collection process allows assignment of contributors to questions, they can also be used to optimize this scheduling.