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Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation
 Journal of Prediction Markets
, 2002
"... In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 72 (5 self)
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In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals.
The Elicitation of Probabilities A Review of the Statistical Literature
, 2005
"... “We live in an uncertain world, and probability risk assessment deals as directly with that fact as anything we do. Uncertainty arises partly because we are fallible. ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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“We live in an uncertain world, and probability risk assessment deals as directly with that fact as anything we do. Uncertainty arises partly because we are fallible.
Eliciting Objective Probabilities via Lottery Insurance Games
 Computational Mathematics Laboratory, Rice University
, 1993
"... Since utilities and probabilities jointly determine choices, eventdependent utilities complicate the elicitation of subjective event probabilities. However, for the usual purpose of obtaining the information embodied in agent beliefs, it is su#cient to elicit objective probabilities, i.e., proba ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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Since utilities and probabilities jointly determine choices, eventdependent utilities complicate the elicitation of subjective event probabilities. However, for the usual purpose of obtaining the information embodied in agent beliefs, it is su#cient to elicit objective probabilities, i.e., probabilities obtained by updating a known common prior with that agent's further information. Bayesians who play a Nash equilibrium of a certain insurance game before they obtain relevant information will afterward act regarding lottery ticket payments as if they had eventindependent riskneutral utility and a known common prior. Proper scoring rules paid in lottery tickets can then elicit objective probabilities.
Probability Elicitation for Agents with Arbitrary Risk Preferences
, 2009
"... A principal solicits an agent for his probability assessment of a random event and offers compensations for the service provided. The agent is probabilistically sophisticated with AnscombeAumann preferences. The principal does not have precise information on the agent’s preferences. He only knows t ..."
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A principal solicits an agent for his probability assessment of a random event and offers compensations for the service provided. The agent is probabilistically sophisticated with AnscombeAumann preferences. The principal does not have precise information on the agent’s preferences. He only knows they belong do some general class. I consider two such classes. One class represents individuals who strictly prefer larger monetary payoffs. The other class represents individuals who, in addition, are averse to risk. Karni (2009) introduces an elegant mechanism that induces truthful reports from any agent represented by any of these classes. The main result of this paper is a simple characterization of all such (strictly) incentive compatible mechanisms, for each of the two classes being considered. I apply the result to the two mechanisms most commonly encountered: Those whose prospects are deterministic, and those whose prospects take the form of lottery tickets. I show that the first type can only elicit which of the event or its complement is most likely, while the second type comprises the only mechanisms incentive compatible among those that randomize payoffs over at most two values.