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Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation
 Journal of Prediction Markets
, 2002
"... In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. ..."
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Cited by 72 (5 self)
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In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals.
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The PeerPrediction Method
 Management Science
, 2005
"... informs ® doi 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0379 ..."
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, ANN ARBOR
, 2006
"... Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and the potential gains that can be obtained from lying. Sidepayment schemes (monetary rewards for submitted feedback) can make ..."
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Cited by 31 (9 self)
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Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and the potential gains that can be obtained from lying. Sidepayment schemes (monetary rewards for submitted feedback) can make truthtelling rational based on the correlation between the reports of different buyers. In this paper we use the idea of automated mechanism design to construct the payments that minimize the budget required by an incentivecompatible reputation mechanism. Such payment schemes are defined by a linear optimization problem that can be solved efficiently in realistic settings. Furthermore, we investigate two directions for further lowering the cost of incentivecompatibility: using several reference reports to construct the sidepayments, and filtering out reports that are probably false.
Collusionresistant, Incentivecompatible Feedback Payments
, 2007
"... Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Selfinterested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the potential gains obtained from lying. Feedback payment schemes (monetary rewards for submitted feedback) can make truthtelling rational based on th ..."
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Cited by 10 (2 self)
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Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Selfinterested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the potential gains obtained from lying. Feedback payment schemes (monetary rewards for submitted feedback) can make truthtelling rational based on the correlation between the reports of different buyers. In this paper we investigate incentivecompatible payment mechanisms that are also resistant to collusion: groups of agents cannot collude on a lying strategy without suffering monetary losses. We analyze several scenarios, where, for example, some or all of the agents collude. For each scenario we investigate both existential and implementation problems. Throughout the paper we use automated mechanism design to compute the best possible mechanism for a given setting.
Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls
 In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. EC ’08. ACM
, 2008
"... Prediction markets efficiently extract and aggregate the private information held by individuals about events and facts that can be publicly verified. However, facts such as the effects of raising or lowering interest rates can never be publicly verified, since only one option will be implemented. O ..."
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Cited by 10 (0 self)
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Prediction markets efficiently extract and aggregate the private information held by individuals about events and facts that can be publicly verified. However, facts such as the effects of raising or lowering interest rates can never be publicly verified, since only one option will be implemented. Online opinion polls can still be used to extract and aggregate private information about such questions. This paper addresses incentives for truthful reporting in online opinion polls. The challenge lies in designing reward schemes that do not require apriori knowledge of the participants ’ beliefs. We survey existing solutions, analyze their practicality and propose a new mechanism that extracts accurate information from rational participants.
Mechanisms for making crowds truthful
 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
, 2009
"... We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, selfinterested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, selfinterested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea of what quality they can expect. However, (i) providing such feedback is costly, and (ii) there are many motivations for providing incorrect feedback. Both problems can be addressed by reward schemes which (i) cover the cost of obtaining and reporting feedback, and (ii) maximize the expected reward of a rational agent who reports truthfully. We address the design of such incentivecompatible rewards for feedback generated in environments with pure adverse selection. Here, the correlation between the true knowledge of an agent and her beliefs regarding the likelihoods of reports of other agents can be exploited to make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we extend existing methods for designing incentivecompatible rewards by also considering collusion. We analyze different scenarios, where, for example, some or all of the agents collude. For each scenario we investigate whether a collusionresistant, incentivecompatible reward scheme exists, and use automated mechanism design to specify an algorithm for deriving an efficient reward mechanism. 1.
Elicitation and evaluation of statistical forecasts
, 2010
"... This paper studies mechanisms for eliciting and evaluating statistical forecasts. Nature draws a state at random from a given state space, according to some distribution p. Prior to Nature’s move, a forecaster, who knows p, provides a prediction for a given statistic of p. The mechanism defines the ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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This paper studies mechanisms for eliciting and evaluating statistical forecasts. Nature draws a state at random from a given state space, according to some distribution p. Prior to Nature’s move, a forecaster, who knows p, provides a prediction for a given statistic of p. The mechanism defines the forecaster’s payoff as a function of the prediction and the subsequently realized state. When the statistic is continuous with a continuum of values, the payoffs that provide strict incentives to the forecaster exist if and only if the statistic partitions the set of distributions into convex subsets. When the underlying state space is finite, and the statistic takes values in a finite set, these payoffs exist if and only if the partition forms a linear crosssection of a Voronoi diagram—that is, if the partition forms a power diagram—a stronger condition than convexity. In both cases, the payoffs can be fully characterized essentially as weighted averages of base functions. Preliminary versions appear in the proceedings of the 9 th and 10 th ACM Conference on Electronic
The Elicitation of Probabilities A Review of the Statistical Literature
, 2005
"... “We live in an uncertain world, and probability risk assessment deals as directly with that fact as anything we do. Uncertainty arises partly because we are fallible. ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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“We live in an uncertain world, and probability risk assessment deals as directly with that fact as anything we do. Uncertainty arises partly because we are fallible.
Eliciting Objective Probabilities via Lottery Insurance Games
 Computational Mathematics Laboratory, Rice University
, 1993
"... Since utilities and probabilities jointly determine choices, eventdependent utilities complicate the elicitation of subjective event probabilities. However, for the usual purpose of obtaining the information embodied in agent beliefs, it is su#cient to elicit objective probabilities, i.e., proba ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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Since utilities and probabilities jointly determine choices, eventdependent utilities complicate the elicitation of subjective event probabilities. However, for the usual purpose of obtaining the information embodied in agent beliefs, it is su#cient to elicit objective probabilities, i.e., probabilities obtained by updating a known common prior with that agent's further information. Bayesians who play a Nash equilibrium of a certain insurance game before they obtain relevant information will afterward act regarding lottery ticket payments as if they had eventindependent riskneutral utility and a known common prior. Proper scoring rules paid in lottery tickets can then elicit objective probabilities.