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Binary Aggregation with Integrity Constraints
- PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
"... Binary aggregation studies problems in which individuals express yes/no choices over a number of possibly correlated issues, and these individual choices need to be aggregated into a collective choice. We show how several classical frameworks of Social Choice Theory, particularly preference and judg ..."
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Cited by 12 (6 self)
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Binary aggregation studies problems in which individuals express yes/no choices over a number of possibly correlated issues, and these individual choices need to be aggregated into a collective choice. We show how several classical frameworks of Social Choice Theory, particularly preference and judgment aggregation, can be viewed as binary aggregation problems by designing an appropriate set of integrity constraints for each specific setting. We explore the generality of this framework, showing that it makes available useful techniques both to prove theoretical results, such as a new impossibility theorem in preference aggregation, and to analyse practical problems, such as the characterisation of safe agendas in judgment aggregation in a syntactic way. The framework also allows us to formulate a general definition of paradox that is independent of the domain under consideration, which gives rise to the study of the class of aggregation procedures of generalised dictatorships.
Lifting Rationality Assumptions in Binary Aggregation
, 2010
"... We consider problems where several individuals each need to make a yes/no choice regarding a number of issues and these choices then need to be aggregated into a collective choice. Depending on the application at hand, different combinations of yes/no may be considered rational. We can describe such ..."
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Cited by 7 (6 self)
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We consider problems where several individuals each need to make a yes/no choice regarding a number of issues and these choices then need to be aggregated into a collective choice. Depending on the application at hand, different combinations of yes/no may be considered rational. We can describe such rationality assumptions in terms of a propositional formula. The question then arises whether or not a given aggregation procedure will lift the rationality assumptions from the individual to the collective level, i.e., whether the collective choice will be rational whenever all individual choices are. To address this question, for each of a number of simple fragments of the language of propositional logic, we provide an axiomatic characterisation of the class of aggregation procedures that will lift all rationality assumptions expressible in that fragment.
Aggregating Dependency Graphs into Voting Agendas in Multi-Issue Elections
- PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
"... Many collective decision making problems have a combinatorial structure: the agents involved must decide on multiple issues and their preferences over one issue may depend on the choices adopted for some of the others. Voting is an attractive method for making collective decisions, but conducting a ..."
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Cited by 6 (4 self)
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Many collective decision making problems have a combinatorial structure: the agents involved must decide on multiple issues and their preferences over one issue may depend on the choices adopted for some of the others. Voting is an attractive method for making collective decisions, but conducting a multi-issue election is challenging. On the one hand, requiring agents to vote by expressing their preferences over all combinations of issues is computationally infeasible; on the other, decomposing the problem into several elections on smaller sets of issues can lead to paradoxical outcomes. Any pragmatic method for running a multi-issue election will have to balance these two concerns. We identify and analyse the problem of generating an agenda for a given election, specifying which issues to vote on together in local elections and in which order to schedule those local elections.
Fair division under ordinal preferences: Computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- In Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
, 2010
"... Abstract We study the problem of fairly dividing a set of goods amongst a group of agents, when those agents have preferences that are ordinal relations over alternative bundles of goods (rather than utility functions) and when our knowledge of those preferences is incomplete. The incompleteness of ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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Abstract We study the problem of fairly dividing a set of goods amongst a group of agents, when those agents have preferences that are ordinal relations over alternative bundles of goods (rather than utility functions) and when our knowledge of those preferences is incomplete. The incompleteness of the preferences stems from the fact that each agent reports their preferences by means of an expression of bounded size in a compact preference representation language. Specifically, we assume that each agent only provides a ranking of individual goods (rather than of bundles). In this context, we consider the algorithmic problem of deciding whether there exists an allocation that is possibly (or necessarily) envy-free, given the incomplete preference information available, if in addition some mild economic efficiency criteria need to be satisfied. We provide simple characterisations, giving rise to simple algorithms, for some instances of the problem, and computational complexity results, establishing the intractability of the problem, for others.
Lifting Integrity Constraints in Binary Aggregation
, 2013
"... We consider problems in which several individuals each need to make a yes/no choice regarding a number of issues and these choices then need to be aggregated into a collective choice. Depending on the application at hand, different combinations of yes/no may be considered rational. We describe ratio ..."
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Cited by 4 (2 self)
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We consider problems in which several individuals each need to make a yes/no choice regarding a number of issues and these choices then need to be aggregated into a collective choice. Depending on the application at hand, different combinations of yes/no may be considered rational. We describe rationality assumptions as integrity constraints using a simple propositional language and we explore the question of whether or not a given aggregation procedure will lift a given integrity constraint from the individual to the collective level, i.e., whether the collective choice will be rational whenever all individual choices are.
Searching for fair joint gains in agent-based negotiation
- In Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume
, 2009
"... Searching for fair joint gains in agent-based negotiation ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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Searching for fair joint gains in agent-based negotiation
Communication Technologies
"... In multi-issue negotiations, autonomous agents can act cooperatively to benefit from mutually preferred agreements. However, empirical evidence suggests that they often fail to search for joint gains and end up with inefficient results. To address this problem, this paper proposes a novel mediated n ..."
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In multi-issue negotiations, autonomous agents can act cooperatively to benefit from mutually preferred agreements. However, empirical evidence suggests that they often fail to search for joint gains and end up with inefficient results. To address this problem, this paper proposes a novel mediated negotiation procedure to support the negotiation agents in reaching an efficient and fair agreement in bilateral multiissue negotiation. At each stage of negotiation, the mediator searches for the compromise direction based on a new E-DD (Equal Directional Derivative) approach and computes the new tentative agreement. The numerical analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that the proposed approach not only guarantees Pareto efficiency, but also produces fairer improvements for two negotiating agents compared with other existing methods.
Beyond theory and data in preference modeling: Bringing humans into the loop
- In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT
, 2015
"... Abstract. Many mathematical frameworks aim at modeling human preferences, employing a number of methods including utility functions, qualitative preference statements, constraint optimization, and logic for-malisms. The choice of one model over another is usually based on the assumption that it can ..."
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Cited by 3 (3 self)
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Abstract. Many mathematical frameworks aim at modeling human preferences, employing a number of methods including utility functions, qualitative preference statements, constraint optimization, and logic for-malisms. The choice of one model over another is usually based on the assumption that it can accurately describe the preferences of humans or other subjects/processes in the considered setting and is computa-tionally tractable. Verification of these preference models often leverages some form of real life or domain specific data; demonstrating the models can predict the series of choices observed in the past. We argue that this is not enough: to evaluate a preference model, humans must be brought into the loop. Human experiments in controlled environments are needed to avoid common pitfalls associated with exclusively using prior data in-cluding introducing bias in the attempt to clean the data, mistaking correlation for causality, or testing data in a context that is different from the one where the data were produced. Human experiments need to be done carefully and we advocate a multi-disciplinary research en-vironment that includes experimental psychologists and AI researchers. We argue that experiments should be used to validate models. We detail the design of an experiment in order to highlight some of the signif-icant computational, conceptual, ethical, mathematical, psychological, and statistical hurdles to testing whether decision makers ’ preferences are consistent with a particular mathematical model of preferences. 1
The Common Structure of Paradoxes in Aggregation Theory
"... In this paper we analyse some of the classical paradoxes in Social Choice Theory (namely, the Condorcet paradox, the discursive dilemma, the Ostrogorski paradox and the multiple election paradox) using a general framework for the study of aggregation problems called binary aggregation with integrity ..."
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Cited by 2 (2 self)
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In this paper we analyse some of the classical paradoxes in Social Choice Theory (namely, the Condorcet paradox, the discursive dilemma, the Ostrogorski paradox and the multiple election paradox) using a general framework for the study of aggregation problems called binary aggregation with integrity constraints. We provide a definition of paradox that is general enough to account for the four cases mentioned, and identify a common structure in the syntactic properties of the rationality assumptions that lie behind such paradoxes. We generalise this observation by providing a full characterisation of the set of rationality assumptions on which the majority rule does not generate a paradox. 1
