Introduction. 2. The agency theory: a probabilistic version outlined. 3. Metaphysics confused with epistemology? 4. Unavoidable circularity? 5. Unmanipulable causes? 6. Unacceptable anthropocentricity? 1 INTRODUCTION In this paper we defend the view that the ordinary notions of cause and effect have a direct and essential connection with our ability to intervene in the world as agents. 1 This is a well known but rather unpopular philosophical approach to causation, often called the manipulability theory. In the interests of brevity and accuracy, we prefer to call it the agency theory. 2 Thus the central thesis of an agency account of causation is something like this: an event A is a cause of a distinct event B just in case bringing about the occurrence of A would be an effective means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence o

This paper is a revision of parts of my dissertation (von Fintel 1994). For helpful discussion and comments, I am particularly indebted to Angelika Kratzer, Barbara Partee, Irene Heim, Roger Schwarzschild, Arnim von Stechow, Susanne Tunstall, the members of the Spring 1994 semantics seminar at MIT, the audience at SALT 4 (University of Rochester, May 6, 1994), and the audiences at a colloquium and a workshop at the University of Rochester, February 3, 1995. I also thank Henritte de Swart for her critique of my dissertation (de Swart 1995)

Philosophical theories summarized here include regularity and necessity theories from Hume to the present; manipulability theory; the theory of powerful particulars; causation as connected changes within a defined state of affairs; departures from "normal " events or from some standard for compar-ison; causation as a transfer of something between objects; and causal propagation and production. Issues found in this literature and of relevance for psychology include whether actual causal relations can be perceived or known; what sorts of things people believe can be causes; different levels of causal analysis; the distinction between the causal relation itself and cues to causal relations; causal frames or fields; internal and external causes; and understanding of causation in different realms of the world, such as the natural and artificial realms. A full theory of causal inference by laypeople should address all of these issues. The main purpose of this article is to survey philosophical theories of causation in a manner intended to be suitable for psychologists interested in causation. The article has two sec-tions: The first presents brief summaries of philosophical theo-ries of causation from Aristotle to the present. In the second, issues found in the philosophical literature are used to suggest new approaches to the study of causation in psychology. Philosophical Theories of Causation Several psychologists have written about selected philosophi-cal theories of causation (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Einhorn &

computation. In preparation. Address for correspondence:

ABSTRACT: In today’s schools there are often competing accounts of natural phenomena, especially when schools are located in multicultural communities. There are also competing claims about what counts as science. This article examines the definition of science put forward from multicultural perspectives in contrast to a universalist perspective on science; that is, the Standard Account. The article argues that good science explanations will always be universal even if indigenous knowledge is incorporated as scientific knowledge. What works best is still of interest to most, and although one may hate to use the word hegemony, Western science would co-opt and dominate indigenous knowledge if it were incorporated as science. Therefore, indigenous knowledge is better off as a different kind of knowledge that can be valued for its own merits, play a vital role in science education, and maintain a position of independence from which it can critique the practices of science

Paper presented at the Harvard Faculty Seminar on Experiments in Education.

Questo lavoro è stato condotto nell'ambito dell'attività del gruppo di ricerca

Values give business operations the possibility of meaning, and a contextual basis for their evaluation. Business values have undergone significant changes since WW II, especially during the most recent decade. In the first half of the 20 Century business activities were organized into discrete functional camps, via 18 Century conceptions like division of labor, and 20 Century principles of scientific management. Meaning, on the other hand, was generally absent from the segmented functions that were created, coordinated and given their context by management. Design, engineering, production, distribution, marketing, sales, and accounting each had their own rule systems and whatever meaning they had was restricted to the self-referential. The value that seemed to matter most was Adam Smith's 1776 notion as advanced in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, that each individual acted, and should act, so as to do the best for themselves. Added to this was Babbages' 1836 work in On The Economy of Machines, which built on Smiths' thesis, and where the highest value was granted to valuing the rules. Dilemmas, arising from separated operations, that failed to relate to other operations, or operations set up to do the wrong, were not the concern of functionaries. Questions of integration were the prerogative of management.

IN ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE the libertarian viewpoint, particularly in its anarchic variety, one is faced with a variety of problems. Some problems are theoretical and are well treated in the comprehensive literature; 1 other problems, however, are practical or rhetorical and, while the theoretical problems (and their solution) are intrinsically the more important, it is vital that the practical/rhetorical problems be overcome if the

I discuss the relationship between the two forms of expressivism defended by Robert Brandom, on one hand, and philosophers in the Humean tradition, such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard, on the other. I identify three apparent points of difference between the two programs, but argue that all three are superficial. Both projects benefit from the insights of the other, and the combination is in a natural sense a global expressivism. 1 Locating expressivism Where in contemporary philosophy should one expect to encounter expressivists? It would be easy for a visitor to get the impression that the genus has a narrow range, confined to meta-ethics. For example, the usually authoritative Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 1 defines “Expressivism ” as a “[t]erm used for those theories of ethical discourse that contrast ethical sentences with expressions of belief. ” (Blackburn, 1994, p. 127, emphasis added) Similarly, Wikipedia also focusses exclusively on the metaethical cases: 2 Expressivism in meta-ethics is a theory about the meaning of moral language. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms – for example, “It is wrong to torture an innocent human being ” – are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as “wrong ” “good, ” or “just” do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. (Wikipedia, accessed 22.4.2010) This blinkered conception of expressivism is doubly misleading, in my view, for it manages to turn blind eyes simultaneously in two quite different directions. To one side, it ignores a range of views in the same tradition as meta-ethical expressivism, but about quite different topics. To the other side – more understandably, perhaps, but in