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1,099
Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1997
"... This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individua ..."
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Cited by 167 (24 self)
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This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rationality is adopted where computation resources are costly. It is not worthwhile solving the problems optimally: solution quality is decisiontheoretically traded o against computation cost. A normative, application and protocolindependent theory of coalitions among boundedrational agents is devised. The optimal coalition structure and its stability are signi cantly a ected by the agents ' algorithms ' performance pro les and the cost of computation. This relationship is rst analyzed theoretically. Then a domain classi cation including rational and boundedrational agents is introduced. Experimental results are presented in vehicle routing with real data from ve dispatch centers. This problem is NPcomplete and the instances are so large thatwith current technologyany agent's rationality is bounded by computational complexity. 1
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
 In USENIX workshop on Electronic Commerce
, 1995
"... The field of economic mechanism design has been an active area of research in economics for at least 20 years. This field uses the tools of economics and game theory to design "rules of interaction " for economic transactions that will, in principle, yield some desired outcome. In this pap ..."
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Cited by 160 (1 self)
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The field of economic mechanism design has been an active area of research in economics for at least 20 years. This field uses the tools of economics and game theory to design "rules of interaction " for economic transactions that will, in principle, yield some desired outcome. In this paper I provide an overview of this subject for an audience interested in applications to electronic commerce and discuss some special problems that arise in this context.
Ad hocVCG: A truthful and costefficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents
, 2003
"... We introduce a gametheoretic setting for routing in a mobile ad hoc network that consists of greedy, selfish agents who accept payments for forwarding data for other agents if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. In this setting, we propose Ad hocVCG, a reactive r ..."
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Cited by 156 (5 self)
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We introduce a gametheoretic setting for routing in a mobile ad hoc network that consists of greedy, selfish agents who accept payments for forwarding data for other agents if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. In this setting, we propose Ad hocVCG, a reactive routing protocol that achieves the design objectives of truthfulness (i.e., it is in the agents ’ best interest to reveal their true costs for forwarding data) and costefficiency (i.e., it guarantees that routing is done along the most costefficient path) in a gametheoretic sense by paying to the intermediate nodes a premium over their actual costs for forwarding data packets. We show that the total overpayment (i.e., the sum of all premiums paid) is relatively small by giving a theoretical upper bound and by providing experimental evidence. Our routing protocol implements a variation of the wellknown mechanism by Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves in a mobile network setting. Finally, we analyze a very natural routing protocol that is an adaptation of the Packet Purse Model [8] with auctions in our setting and show that, unfortunately, it does not achieve costefficiency or truthfulness
Tsitsiklis. Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game
 Mathematics of Operations Research
"... We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as long as users do not anticipate the effect of their actions on ..."
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Cited by 144 (10 self)
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We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as long as users do not anticipate the effect of their actions on prices, a simple proportional pricing mechanism can maximize the sum of users’ utilities minus the cost (called aggregate surplus). Continuing previous efforts to quantify the effects of selfish behavior in network pricing mechanisms, we consider the possibility that users anticipate the effect of their actions on link prices. Under the assumption that the links’ marginal cost functions are convex, we establish existence of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium is no worse than a factor of 4 √ 2 − 5 times the optimal aggregate surplus; thus, the efficiency loss when users are selfish is no more than approximately 34%. The current Internet is used by a widely heterogeneous population of users; not only are different types of traffic sharing the same network, but different end users place different values on their perceived network performance. This has led to a surge of interest in congestion pricing, where
Algorithms, Games, and the Internet
 In STOC
, 2001
"... If the Internet is the next great subject for Theoretical Computer Science to model and illuminate mathematically, then Game Theory, and Mathematical Economics more generally, are likely to prove useful tools. In this talk I survey some opportunities and challenges in this important frontier. 1. ..."
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Cited by 135 (0 self)
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If the Internet is the next great subject for Theoretical Computer Science to model and illuminate mathematically, then Game Theory, and Mathematical Economics more generally, are likely to prove useful tools. In this talk I survey some opportunities and challenges in this important frontier. 1.
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
, 2002
"... Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. ..."
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Cited by 130 (10 self)
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Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions.
Competitive auctions and digital goods
 In Proc. 12th Symp. on Discrete Alg
, 2001
"... Abstract We study a class of single round, sealed bid auctions for items in unlimited supply such as digital goods. We focus on auctions that are truthful and competitive. Truthful auctions encourage bidders to bid their utility; competitive auctions yield revenue within a constant factor of the rev ..."
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Cited by 126 (27 self)
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Abstract We study a class of single round, sealed bid auctions for items in unlimited supply such as digital goods. We focus on auctions that are truthful and competitive. Truthful auctions encourage bidders to bid their utility; competitive auctions yield revenue within a constant factor of the revenue for optimal fixed pricing. We show that for any truthful auction, even a multiprice auction, the expected revenue does not exceed that for optimal fixed pricing. We also give a bound on how far the revenue for optimal fixed pricing can be from the total market utility. We show that several randomized auctions are truthful and competitive under certain assumptions, and that no truthful deterministic auction is competitive. We present simulation results which confirm that our auctions compare favorably to fixed pricing. Some of our results extend to bounded supply markets, for which we also get truthful and competitive auctions.
Trust in MultiAgent Systems
 THE KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING REVIEW
, 2004
"... Trust is a fundamental concern in largescale open distributed systems. It lies at the core of all interactions between the entities that have to operate in such uncertain and constantly changing environments. Given this complexity, these components, and the ensuing system, are increasingly being ..."
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Cited by 120 (16 self)
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Trust is a fundamental concern in largescale open distributed systems. It lies at the core of all interactions between the entities that have to operate in such uncertain and constantly changing environments. Given this complexity, these components, and the ensuing system, are increasingly being conceptualised, designed, and built using agentbased techniques and, to this end, this paper examines the specific role of trust in multiagent systems. In particular,