Results 1  10
of
83
Methods for Task Allocation Via Agent Coalition Formation
, 1998
"... Task execution in multiagent environments may require cooperation among agents. Given a set of agents and a set of tasks which they have to satisfy, we consider situations where each task should be attached to a group of agents that will perform the task. Task allocation to groups of agents is nece ..."
Abstract

Cited by 302 (21 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Task execution in multiagent environments may require cooperation among agents. Given a set of agents and a set of tasks which they have to satisfy, we consider situations where each task should be attached to a group of agents that will perform the task. Task allocation to groups of agents is necessary when tasks cannot be performed by a single agent. However it may also be beneficial when groups perform more efficiently with respect to the single agents' performance. In this paper we present several solutions to the problem of task allocation among autonomous agents, and suggest that the agents form coalitions in order to perform tasks or improve the efficiency of their performance. We present efficient distributed algorithms with low ratio bounds and with low computational complexities. These properties are proven theoretically and supported by simulations and an implementation in an agent system. Our methods are based on both the algorithmic aspects of combinatorics and approximat...
The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus NonMarket Allocation
 In The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PBBSystem, Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st sess
, 1969
"... University. This paper was published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1969. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 118 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
University. This paper was published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1969.
Optimal decentralized flow control of Markovian queueing networks with multiple controllers, part I: the team decision problem, in
 Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. on Data Communication Systons and Their Performance, Rio de
, 1987
"... with multiple controllers ..."
(Show Context)
Coalition formation among autonomous agents: Strategies and complexity
, 1993
"... . Autonomous agents are designed to reach goals that were predefined by their operators. An important way to execute tasks and to maximize payoff is to share resources and to cooperate on task execution by creating coalitions of agents. Such coalitions will take place if, and only if, each member o ..."
Abstract

Cited by 49 (10 self)
 Add to MetaCart
. Autonomous agents are designed to reach goals that were predefined by their operators. An important way to execute tasks and to maximize payoff is to share resources and to cooperate on task execution by creating coalitions of agents. Such coalitions will take place if, and only if, each member of a coalition gains more if he joins the coalition than he could gain before. There are several ways to create such coalitions and to divide the joint payoff among the members. Variance in these methods is due to different environments, different settings in a specific environment, and different approaches to a specific environment with specific settings. In this paper we focus on the cooperative (superadditive) environment, and suggest two different algorithms for coalition formation and payoff distribution in this environment. We also deal with the complexity of both computation and communication of each algorithm, and we try to give designers some basic tools for developing agents for th...
An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games
 Int. Journal of Game Theory
, 1999
"... version remanie: le 8/10/98 An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, ..."
Abstract

Cited by 49 (32 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
version remanie: le 8/10/98 An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, we give an expression of the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indices in terms of pseudoBoolean functions. 1
Bidding for the surplus: A noncooperative approach to the Shapley value
, 2000
"... We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zeromonotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanis ..."
Abstract

Cited by 48 (12 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zeromonotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the superadditive cover of the environment. Keywords: Shapley value, Implementation, Simple mechanism, Coalition formation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72 3 1. Introduction The Shapley value has long been a central solution concept in cooperative game theory. It was introduced in Shapley [24] and was seen as a reasonable way of distributing ...
Equivalent representations of set functions
 Mathematics of Operations Research
, 2000
"... Revised version This paper introduces four alternative representations of a set function: the Möbius transformation, the coMöbius transformation, and the interactions between elements of any subset of a given set as extensions of Shapley and Banzhaf values. The links between the five equivalent rep ..."
Abstract

Cited by 23 (18 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Revised version This paper introduces four alternative representations of a set function: the Möbius transformation, the coMöbius transformation, and the interactions between elements of any subset of a given set as extensions of Shapley and Banzhaf values. The links between the five equivalent representations of a set function are emphasized in this presentation.
The Möbius transform on symmetric ordered structures and its application to capacities on finite sets
, 2007
"... ..."
Cooperative games on antimatroids
 Tilburg University
, 2000
"... The aim of this paper is to introduce cooperative games with a feasible coalition system which is called antimatroid. These combinatorial structures generalize the permission structures, which have nice economical applications. With this goal, we …rst characterize the approaches from a permission st ..."
Abstract

Cited by 10 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
The aim of this paper is to introduce cooperative games with a feasible coalition system which is called antimatroid. These combinatorial structures generalize the permission structures, which have nice economical applications. With this goal, we …rst characterize the approaches from a permission structure with special classes of antimatroids. Next, we use the concept of interior operator in an antimatroid and we de…ne the restricted game taking into account the limited possibilities of cooperation determined by the antimatroid. These games extend the restricted games obtained by permission structures. Finally, we provide a computational method to obtain the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game, by using the worths of the original game.
SHAPLEY VALUE
, 2007
"... The Shapley value is an a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multiperson game. Introduced by Lloyd S. Shapley in 1953, it has become a central solution concept in cooperative game theory. The Shapley value has been applied to economic, political, and other models. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 9 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The Shapley value is an a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multiperson game. Introduced by Lloyd S. Shapley in 1953, it has become a central solution concept in cooperative game theory. The Shapley value has been applied to economic, political, and other models.