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A First Glance at Non-Restrictiveness
, 1999
"... Maddy's notion of restrictiveness has many problematic aspects, one of them being that it is almost impossible to show that a theory is not restrictive. In this note the author addresses a crucial question of Martin Goldstern and shows some positive aspects of Maddy's notion. ..."
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Maddy's notion of restrictiveness has many problematic aspects, one of them being that it is almost impossible to show that a theory is not restrictive. In this note the author addresses a crucial question of Martin Goldstern and shows some positive aspects of Maddy's notion.
VISUALIZATION OF ORDINALS ∗
"... We describe the pictorial representations of infinite ordinals used in teaching set theory, and discuss a possible use in naturalistic foundations of mathematics. 1 ..."
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We describe the pictorial representations of infinite ordinals used in teaching set theory, and discuss a possible use in naturalistic foundations of mathematics. 1
Large Cardinals and Determinacy
, 2011
"... The developments of set theory in 1960’s led to an era of independence in which many of the central questions were shown to be unresolvable on the basis of the standard system of mathematics, ZFC. This is true of statements from areas as diverse as analysis (“Are all projective sets Lebesgue measura ..."
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The developments of set theory in 1960’s led to an era of independence in which many of the central questions were shown to be unresolvable on the basis of the standard system of mathematics, ZFC. This is true of statements from areas as diverse as analysis (“Are all projective sets Lebesgue measurable?”), cardinal arithmetic (“Does Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis hold?”), combinatorics(“DoesSuslin’sHypotheseshold?”), andgrouptheory (“Is there a Whitehead group?”). These developments gave rise to two conflicting positions. The first position—which we shall call pluralism—maintains that the independence results largely undermine the enterprise of set theory as an objective enterprise. On this view, although there are practical reasons that one might give in favour of one set of axioms over another—say, that it is more useful for a given task—, there are no theoretical reasons that can be given; and, moreover, this either implies or is a consequence of the fact—depending on the variant of the view, in particular, whether it places realism before reason,

