Results 1  10
of
27
Evolutionary Game Theory
, 1995
"... Abstract. Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very def ..."
Abstract

Cited by 642 (9 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very definition of a game and of players ’ preferences, in particular with respect to potential context dependence, interpersonal preference dependence, backward induction and incomplete information.
Dynamic interactive epistemology
, 2004
"... The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various gametheoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive rea ..."
Abstract

Cited by 24 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various gametheoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133– 163] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188–230], and used to analyze rational play in extensive form games. But while the properties of Aumann structures are well understood, without a formal language in which belief and belief revision statements can be expressed, it is unclear exactly what are the properties of these dynamic models. Here we investigate this question by defining such a language. A semantics and syntax are presented, with soundness and completeness theorems linking the two.
Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
, 1999
"... A nonequilibrium model of rational strategic behavior that can be viewed as a refinement of (normal form) rationalizability is developed for both normal form and extensive form games. This solution concept is called a τtheory and is used to analyze the main concerns of the Nash equilibrium refinem ..."
Abstract

Cited by 16 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
A nonequilibrium model of rational strategic behavior that can be viewed as a refinement of (normal form) rationalizability is developed for both normal form and extensive form games. This solution concept is called a τtheory and is used to analyze the main concerns of the Nash equilibrium refinements literature such as dominance, iterative dominance, extensive form rationality, invariance, and backward induction. The relationship between τtheories and dynamic learning is investigated.
Payoff Information and SelfConfirming Equilibrium
, 1999
"... In a selfconfirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of selfconfirming equilibrium in which players use inform ..."
Abstract

Cited by 13 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In a selfconfirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of selfconfirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relationship to other concepts, and show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an epistemic model with independent beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, D84. 2 1.
A Model of BDIAgent in GameTheoretic Framework
, 1997
"... . A model of BDIagent in gametheoretic framework is presented. The desire is represented as agent's goal to achieve a maximum level of utility. A reasoning process based on agent's rational behavior is proposed. This process determines agent's intention. It is also shown how to use the backward ..."
Abstract

Cited by 6 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
. A model of BDIagent in gametheoretic framework is presented. The desire is represented as agent's goal to achieve a maximum level of utility. A reasoning process based on agent's rational behavior is proposed. This process determines agent's intention. It is also shown how to use the backward induction consistently with the assumption of the common knowledge of rationality. 1 Introduction We are going to discuss the following problem: How does a rational agent use its knowledge in decision making ? Since the problem is general, we put it in a gametheoretic framework. In the theory of games, agent's rationality is understood as a way of maximizing the utility of the agent relatively to its knowledge. The knowledge may concern the game that is to be played as well as the agents participating in a play. The main task of the paper is to model BDIagent that is supposed to live in the world of dynamic games. Agent's belief is identified with the knowledge about the game and abo...
Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game
 Games and Economic Behavior
, 2002
"... Traditional game theoretic analysis often proposes the application of backwardinduction and subgameperfection as models of rational behavior in games with perfect information. However, there are many situations in which such application leads to counterintuitive results, casting doubts on the predi ..."
Abstract

Cited by 6 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Traditional game theoretic analysis often proposes the application of backwardinduction and subgameperfection as models of rational behavior in games with perfect information. However, there are many situations in which such application leads to counterintuitive results, casting doubts on the predictive power of the theory itself. The Centipede Game, firstly introduced by Rosenthal (1981), represents one of these critical cases, and experimental evidence has been provided to show how people in laboratory behave in a manner which is significatively different from what the theory expects. In our paper, we construct a dynamic model based on the Centipede Game. Our claim is that the source of these discrepancies between theory and experimental evidence may be explained by appealing to some form of bounded rationality in the players’ reasoning. If this is the case, traditional game theoretical analysis could still accurately predict the players ’ behavior, provided that they are given time enough to correctly perceive the strategic environment in which they operate. To do so, we provide conditions for convergence to the subgameperfect equilibrium outcome for a broad class of continuous time evolutionary dynamics, defined as Aggregate Monotonic Selection dynamics (Samuelson and Zhang (1992)). Moreover, by introducing a drift term in the dynamics, we show how the outcome of this learning process is intrinsically unstable, and how this instability is positively related with the length of the game.
ContextDependent ForwardInduction Reasoning
, 2008
"... This paper studies the case where a game is played in a particular context. The context in uences what beliefs players hold. As such, it may a ect forward induction (FI) reasoning: If players rule out speci c beliefs, they may not be able to rationalize observed behavior. The e ects are not obvious. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 4 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper studies the case where a game is played in a particular context. The context in uences what beliefs players hold. As such, it may a ect forward induction (FI) reasoning: If players rule out speci c beliefs, they may not be able to rationalize observed behavior. The e ects are not obvious. Contextladen FI may allow di erent outcomes than contextfree FI. At the formal level, contextual reasoning is de ned within an epistemic structure. In particular, we represent contextual FI reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR) within an arbitrary type structure. (The concept of RCSBR is due to BattigalliSiniscalchi [2002].) What strategies are consistent with RCSBR (de ned on an arbitrary type structure)? We show that the RCSBR is characterized by a new solution concept we call Extensive Form Best Response Sets (EFBRS's). We go on to study the EFBRS concept in games of interest. In particular, we establish a relationship between EFBRS's and Nash outcomes, in perfectinformation games satisfying a `no ties' condition. We also show how to compute EFBRS's in certain cases of interest.
Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences
 Journal of Economic The– 35
"... We study perfect information bilateral bargaining game with an infinite alternatingoffers procedure, in which we add an assumption of history dependent preference. A player will devalue a share which gives her strictly lower discounted utility than what she was offered in earlier stages of the barg ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study perfect information bilateral bargaining game with an infinite alternatingoffers procedure, in which we add an assumption of history dependent preference. A player will devalue a share which gives her strictly lower discounted utility than what she was offered in earlier stages of the bargaining. Under the strong version of the assumption, we characterize the essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium path, which involves considerable delay and efficiency loss. We give different interpretations of the assumption. The assumption can also be weakened under the interpretation of loss aversion. We provide a sufficient condition under which the feature of the equilibrium from strong assumption remains.
DEDUCTIVE REASONING IN EXTENSIVE GAMES
, 2003
"... We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: ‘caution’, ‘full belief of opponent rationality’, and ‘no extraneous restrictions on beliefs’. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The app ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: ‘caution’, ‘full belief of opponent rationality’, and ‘no extraneous restrictions on beliefs’. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.