Distributed computer architectures labeled “peer-to-peer ” are designed for the sharing of computer resources (content, storage, CPU cycles) by direct exchange, rather than requiring the intermediation or support of a centralized server or authority. Peer-to-peer architectures are characterized by their ability to adapt to failures and

this paper was to answer the question, "How robust are P2P search networks?" A good proportion of the paper first addresses the supporting question, "How do P2P search networks work?" This foundation is important given the pace and breadth of research. Where it is available, we emphasize work on robustness and flush out promising lines of investigation

Existing studies on BitTorrent systems are single-torrent based, while more than 85 % of all peers participate in multiple torrents according to our trace analysis. In addition, these studies are not sufficiently insightful and accurate even for single-torrent models, due to some unrealistic assumptions. Our analysis of representative Bit-Torrent traffic provides several new findings regarding the limitations of BitTorrent systems: (1) Due to the exponentially decreasing peer arrival rate in reality, service availability in such systems becomes poor quickly, after which it is difficult for the file to be located and downloaded. (2) Client performance in the BitTorrentlike systems is unstable, and fluctuates widely with the peer population. (3) Existing systems could provide unfair services to peers, where peers with high downloading speed tend to download more and upload less. In this paper, we study these limitations on torrent evolution in realistic environments. Motivated by the analysis and modeling results, we further build a graph based multi-torrent model to study inter-torrent collaboration. Our model quantitatively provides strong motivation for inter-torrent collaboration instead of directly stimulating seeds to stay longer. We also discuss a system design to show the feasibility of multi-torrent collaboration. 1

Presence-sharing is an emerging platform for mobile applications, but presence-privacy remains a challenge. Privacy controls must be flexible enough to allow sharing between both trusted social relations and untrusted strangers. In this paper, we present a system called SmokeScreen that provides flexible and power-efficient mechanisms for privacy management. Broadcasting clique signals, which can only be interpreted by other trusted users, enables sharing between social relations; broadcasting opaque identifiers (OIDs), which can only be resolved to an identity by a trusted broker, enables sharing between strangers. Computing these messages is power-efficient since they can be precomputed with acceptable storage costs. In evaluating these mechanisms we first analyzed traces from an actual presence-sharing application. Four months of traces provide evidence of anonymous snooping, even among trusted users. We have also implemented our mechanisms on two devices and found the power demands of clique signals and OIDs to be reasonable. A mobile phone running our software can operate for several days on a single charge.

Abstract—Wireless Community Networks (WCNs) are wide-area wireless networks whose nodes are owned and managed by volunteers. We focus on the provision of free Internet access to mobile users through WCN-controlled wireless LAN access points (APs). We rely on reciprocity: a person participates in the WCN and provides free Internet access to mobile users in order to enjoy the same benefit when mobile. Our reciprocity scheme is compatible with the distinctive structure of WCNs: it does not require registration with authorities, relying only on uncertified free identities (public-private key pairs). Users sign digital receipts when they consume service. The receipts form a receipt graph, which is used as input to a reciprocity algorithm that identifies contributing users using network flow techniques. Simulations show that this algorithm can sustain reciprocal cooperation. We have implemented our algorithm to run on common WCN equipment, namely the Linksys WRT54GS AP. I.

A model of providing service in a P2P network is analyzed. It is shown that by adding a scrip system, a mechanism that admits a reasonable Nash equilibrium that reduces free riding can be obtained. The effect of varying the total amount of money (scrip) in the system on efficiency (i.e., social welfare) is analyzed, and it is shown that by maintaining the appropriate ratio between the total amount of money and the number of agents, efficiency is maximized. The work has implications for many online systems, not only P2P networks but also a wide variety of online forums for which scrip systems are popular, but formal analyses have been lacking.

Abstract — We formulate a peer-to-peer filesharing system as an exchange economy: a price is associated with each file, and users exchange files only when they can afford it. This formulation solves the free-riding problem, since uploading files is a necessary condition for being able to download. However, we do not explicitly introduce a currency; users must upload files in order to earn a budget for downloading. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and dynamic stability of the competitive equilibrium, which is always guaranteed to be Pareto efficient. In addition, a novel aspect of our approach is an allocation mechanism for clearing the market out of equilibrium. We analyze this mechanism when users can anticipate how their actions affect the allocation mechanism (price anticipating behavior). For this regime we characterize the Nash equilibria that will occur, and show that as the number of users increases, the Nash equilibrium rates become approximately Pareto efficient. I.

Peer-to-peer systems have been proposed for a wide variety of applications, including file-sharing, web caching, distributed computation, cooperative backup, and onion routing. An important motivation for such systems is self-scaling. That is, increased participation increases the capacity of the system. Unfortunately, this property is at risk from selfish participants. The decentralized nature of peer-to-peer systems makes accounting difficult. We show that e-cash can be a practical solution to the desire for accountability in peerto-peer systems while maintaining their ability to self-scale. No less important, e-cash is a natural fit for peer-to-peer systems that attempt to provide (or preserve) privacy for their participants. We show that e-cash can be used to provide accountability without compromising the existing privacy goals of a peer-to-peer system. We show how e-cash can be practically applied to a file sharing application. Our approach includes a set of novel cryptographic protocols that mitigate the computational and communication costs of anonymous e-cash transactions, and system design choices that further reduce overhead and distribute load. We conclude that provably secure, anonymous, and scalable peer-to-peer systems are within reach.

In this paper we model and study the performance of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing systems in terms of their ‘service capacity’. We identify two regimes of interest: the transient and stationary regimes. We show that in both regimes, the performance of P2P systems exhibits a favorable scaling with the offered load. P2P systems achieve this by efficiently leveraging the service capacity of other peers, who possibly are concurrently downloading the same file. Therefore to improve the performance, it is important to design mechanisms to give peers incentives for sharing/cooperation. One approach is to introduce mechanisms for resource allocation that are ‘fair’, such that a peer’s performance improves with his contributions. We find that some intuitive ‘fairness ’ notions may unexpectedly lead to ‘unfair’ allocations, which do not provide the right incentives for peers. Thus, implementation of P2P systems may want to compromise the degree of ‘fairness ’ in favor of maintaining system robustness and reducing overheads.

P2P systems that rely on the voluntary contribution of bandwidth by the individual peers may suffer from freeriding. To address this problem, mechanisms enforcing fairness in bandwidth sharing have been designed, usually by limiting the download bandwidth to the available upload bandwidth. As in real environments the latter is much smaller than the former, these mechanisms severely affect the download performance of most peers. In this paper we propose a system called 2Fast, which solves this problem while preserving the fairness of bandwidth sharing. In 2Fast, we form groups of peers that collaborate in downloading a file on behalf of a single group member, which can thus use its full download bandwidth. A peer in our system can use its currently idle bandwidth to help other peers in their ongoing downloads, and get in return help during its own downloads. We assess the performance of 2Fast analytically and experimentally, the latter in both real and simulated environments. We find that in realistic bandwidth limit settings, 2Fast improves the download speed by up to a factor of 3.5 in comparison to state-of-the-art P2P download protocols. 1.