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61
Bayesian Model Averaging for Linear Regression Models
 Journal of the American Statistical Association
, 1997
"... We consider the problem of accounting for model uncertainty in linear regression models. Conditioning on a single selected model ignores model uncertainty, and thus leads to the underestimation of uncertainty when making inferences about quantities of interest. A Bayesian solution to this problem in ..."
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Cited by 184 (13 self)
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We consider the problem of accounting for model uncertainty in linear regression models. Conditioning on a single selected model ignores model uncertainty, and thus leads to the underestimation of uncertainty when making inferences about quantities of interest. A Bayesian solution to this problem involves averaging over all possible models (i.e., combinations of predictors) when making inferences about quantities of
Samurai accountant: A theory of auditing and plunder
 Review of Economic Studies
, 1987
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at. ..."
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Cited by 56 (1 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.
Model Selection and Accounting for Model Uncertainty in Linear Regression Models
, 1993
"... We consider the problems of variable selection and accounting for model uncertainty in linear regression models. Conditioning on a single selected model ignores model uncertainty, and thus leads to the underestimation of uncertainty when making inferences about quantities of interest. The complete B ..."
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Cited by 47 (6 self)
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We consider the problems of variable selection and accounting for model uncertainty in linear regression models. Conditioning on a single selected model ignores model uncertainty, and thus leads to the underestimation of uncertainty when making inferences about quantities of interest. The complete Bayesian solution to this problem involves averaging over all possible models when making inferences about quantities of interest. This approach is often not practical. In this paper we offer two alternative approaches. First we describe a Bayesian model selection algorithm called "Occam's "Window" which involves averaging over a reduced set of models. Second, we describe a Markov chain Monte Carlo approach which directly approximates the exact solution. Both these model averaging procedures provide better predictive performance than any single model which might reasonably have been selected. In the extreme case where there are many candidate predictors but there is no relationship between any of them and the response, standard variable selection procedures often choose some subset of variables that yields a high R² and a highly significant overall F value. We refer to this unfortunate phenomenon as "Freedman's Paradox" (Freedman, 1983). In this situation, Occam's vVindow usually indicates the null model as the only one to be considered, or else a small number of models including the null model, thus largely resolving the paradox.
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence
, 1999
"... African American motorists in the United States are more likely than white motorists to have their cars searched by police checking for illegal drugs and other contraband. The courts are faced with the task of deciding on the basis of trafficstop data whether police are basing their decisions to st ..."
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Cited by 46 (1 self)
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African American motorists in the United States are more likely than white motorists to have their cars searched by police checking for illegal drugs and other contraband. The courts are faced with the task of deciding on the basis of trafficstop data whether police are basing their decisions to stop cars on the race of the driver. We develop a model of law enforcement for a population with two racial types who also differ along other dimensions relevant to criminal behavior. We discuss why a simple test commonly applied by the courts is inadequate when the econometrician observes only a subset of the characteristics observed by the policemen. Next, we show how to construct a test for whether di¤erential treatment is motivated purely out of e¢ciency grounds, i.e. to maximize the number of arrests, or re‡ects racial prejudice. The test is valid even when the set of characteristics observed by the policemen are only partially observable by the econometrician. We apply the tests for discrimination to traffic stop data from Maryland. Finally, we present a
Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
 J. Law Econ., Apr.1992
"... Some of the costs of enforcing laws are fixed " in the sense that they do not depend on the number of individuals who commit harmful actswhile other costs are "variable"they rise with the number of such individuals. This article analyzes the effects of fixed and variable enforcement costs on t ..."
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Cited by 18 (3 self)
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Some of the costs of enforcing laws are fixed " in the sense that they do not depend on the number of individuals who commit harmful actswhile other costs are "variable"they rise with the number of such individuals. This article analyzes the effects of fixed and variable enforcement costs on the optimal fine and the optimal probability of detection. It is shown that the optimal fine rises to reflect variable enforcement costs; that the optimal fine is not directly affected by fixed enforcement costs; and that the optimal probability depends on both types of enforcement costs.
The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence,” July 2009. Unpublished manuscript
"... Using administrative, longitudinal data on felony arrests in Florida, we exploit the discontinuous increase in the punitiveness of criminal sanctions at 18 to estimate the deterrence effect of incarceration. Our analysis suggests a 2 percent decline in the logodds of offending at 18, with standard ..."
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Cited by 12 (4 self)
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Using administrative, longitudinal data on felony arrests in Florida, we exploit the discontinuous increase in the punitiveness of criminal sanctions at 18 to estimate the deterrence effect of incarceration. Our analysis suggests a 2 percent decline in the logodds of offending at 18, with standard errors ruling out declines of 11 percent or more. We interpret these magnitudes using a stochastic dynamic extension of Becker’s (1968) model of criminal behavior. Calibrating the model to match key empirical moments, we conclude that deterrence elasticities with respect to sentence lengths are no more negative than0.13 for young offenders.
Law enforcement under incomplete law: Theory and evidence from financial market regulation, Working Paper, www.ssrn.com
, 2002
"... ..."
Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America
 J.L., A. Kartacheva and L. Quesada (2000), “Contract Renegotiations and Concessions in the Latin America and Caribbean Region: An Economic Análisis and Empirical Implications”, The World
"... We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic ..."
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Cited by 9 (1 self)
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We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Then we use a data set of nearly 1000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000, covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport and water, to test these predictions. Finally, we derive some policy implications of our theoretical and empirical work.
THE ECONOMIC WAY OF LOOKING AT LIFE*
, 1992
"... My research uses the economic approach to analyze social issues that range beyond those usually considered by economists. This lecture will describe the approach, and illustrate it with examples drawn from past and current work. Unlike Marxian analysis, the economic approach I refer to does not assu ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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My research uses the economic approach to analyze social issues that range beyond those usually considered by economists. This lecture will describe the approach, and illustrate it with examples drawn from past and current work. Unlike Marxian analysis, the economic approach I refer to does not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or gain. It is a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self interest. Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences. The analysis assumes that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic. Their behavior is forwardlooking, and it is also consistent over time. In particular, they try as best they can to anticipate the uncertain consequences of their actions. Forwardlooking behavior, however, may still be rooted in the
Monitoring of pollution regulation: Do local conditions matter
 Journal of Regulatory Economics
, 1998
"... Our thanks to Louis Trottier for his technical assistance, PierreYves Cremieux and David Wheeler for helpful advice and comments. Usual disclaimers apply. ..."
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Cited by 7 (4 self)
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Our thanks to Louis Trottier for his technical assistance, PierreYves Cremieux and David Wheeler for helpful advice and comments. Usual disclaimers apply.