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28
Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
 Review of Economic Studies
, 2002
"... We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantitysetting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) following the exemplary firm, and (3) belief learning. Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Courn ..."
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Cited by 45 (4 self)
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We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantitysetting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) following the exemplary firm, and (3) belief learning. Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the CournotNash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments. Each of these treatments is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, dynamic rules, and outcomes.
Modelling communication networks, present and future
 THE CLIFFORD PATTERSON LECTURE
, 1995
"... Modern communication networks are able to respond to randomly uctuating demands and failures by allowing bu ers to ll, by rerouting tra c and by reallocating resources. They are able to do this so well that, in many respects, largescale networks appear as coherent, almost intelligent, organisms. The ..."
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Cited by 21 (0 self)
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Modern communication networks are able to respond to randomly uctuating demands and failures by allowing bu ers to ll, by rerouting tra c and by reallocating resources. They are able to do this so well that, in many respects, largescale networks appear as coherent, almost intelligent, organisms. The design and control of such networks present challenges of a mathematical, engineering and economic nature. In this lecture I describe some of the models that have proved useful in the analysis of stability, statistical sharing and pricing, in systems ranging from the telephone networks of today to the information superhighways of tomorrow.
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
, 2002
"... In a differential information economy with quasilinear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods ..."
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Cited by 12 (4 self)
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In a differential information economy with quasilinear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.
Strongly stable networks
 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 2000
"... We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a componentwise ..."
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a componentwise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a "top convexity" condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be nonanonymousdepending on player labels.
Implications of Ethnic Diversity
"... this paper I argue that neither of these solutions is necessary because the premises on which they are based are false. With a few specific exceptions, ethnic diversity neither increases the risk of civil war, nor reduces economic growth. Multiethnic societies can usually be socially and economical ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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this paper I argue that neither of these solutions is necessary because the premises on which they are based are false. With a few specific exceptions, ethnic diversity neither increases the risk of civil war, nor reduces economic growth. Multiethnic societies can usually be socially and economically fully viable. In Section 2 I set out the current state of knowledge: what is meant by ethnic identity, and why is it thought to be dysfunctional? In Sections 3 and 4 I venture beyond the literature. In Section 3 I investigate how ethnic politics might affect economic performance, deriving predictions from theories of political choice and testing them on global data. In Section 4 I turn to the causes of large scale violence. I investigate how ethnic differentiation might effect civil conflict. Building on new theories of conflict which stress the importance of the budget constraint faced by the rebel organisation, I test three predictions on global data. In Section 5 I draw out some implications for policy. Ethnic diversity is not `guilty as charged. It does not, usually, cause slower growth, and it does not, usually, cause civil war. The international community may need to rethink its current tolerant approach to secession. 2. WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT ARE THE GAPS? How does ethnicity sometimes come to be the basis for social and political identity? Ethnicity as a basis for identity is a social rather than a physiological phenomenon. As a cultural phenomenon ethnicity is nevertheless, highly persistent: people chose to pass on their culture by marrying within their own group (Bisin and Verdier, 2000). However, as a political phenomenon, ethnic identity is considerably more fluid. This is indeed implied by `national building in Europe perceptions of identity changed during t...
AgentBased Simulation
 Comes of Age,’’ ORMS Today
, 2006
"... Economists model economic activity based on fairly standard assumptions about human behavior and decision making. The rationality assumption, in which all economic agents optimize welldefined objectives under complete information, has been the prevalent model in economics since its inception. Optim ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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Economists model economic activity based on fairly standard assumptions about human behavior and decision making. The rationality assumption, in which all economic agents optimize welldefined objectives under complete information, has been the prevalent model in economics since its inception. Optimization formulations also arise in modeling market structures other than perfect competition and in games of strategic interaction. This sets up a close association between models in microeconomics, game theory, and industrial organization on the one hand, and mathematical programming, optimization, and complementarity theory on the other. Many mathematical programming solution techniques are applicable to the formulation and solution of economics models. This talk provides a brief overview of the connections between economics and mathematical programming / equilibrium modeling.
JOINT PRODUCTION GAMES AND SHARE FUNCTIONS
, 2000
"... Player i's payoff in a noncooperative game is generally expressed as a function of the vector of strategies of all players. However, in some games  'simply reducible games'  the payoff of player i is a function of two arguments  the strategy chosen by i, and the sum of the strategies of all playe ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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Player i's payoff in a noncooperative game is generally expressed as a function of the vector of strategies of all players. However, in some games  'simply reducible games'  the payoff of player i is a function of two arguments  the strategy chosen by i, and the sum of the strategies of all players in the game. Cournot oligopoly, public good provision, costand surplussharing, and open access resource exploitation are all simply reducible games. We define
Ordinal Solutions to Bargaining Problems
"... A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with orderpreserving transformations of utility. Shapley (1969) has shown that there exists no ordinal, e#cient, and symmetric solution to twoplayer bargaining problems, and has constructed such a solution to threeplayer problems. He ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with orderpreserving transformations of utility. Shapley (1969) has shown that there exists no ordinal, e#cient, and symmetric solution to twoplayer bargaining problems, and has constructed such a solution to threeplayer problems. Here, Shapley's solution is extended in two directions. First, it is shown how to construct an infinite family of such solutions that includes Shapley's. Second, the family of solutions is constructed for bargaining problems with any number of players greater than two. The construction makes use of gradual bargaining solutions suggested by O'Neill et al. (2001). 1
Utility Theories in Cooperative Games
, 1996
"... Utility theories for the denitions of cooperative games and associated solution concepts are discussed. A game with side payments needs the assumptions of transferable utility and side payments. We discuss the axioms for the transferable utility assumption and also the role of side payments for vari ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Utility theories for the denitions of cooperative games and associated solution concepts are discussed. A game with side payments needs the assumptions of transferable utility and side payments. We discuss the axioms for the transferable utility assumption and also the role of side payments for various solution concepts. We also discuss games without side payments, which do not require the assumptions of transferable utility and side payments. We see how some solution concepts depend upon these assumptions.