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136
Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
 AI, IN MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 4, MELTZER AND MICHIE (EDS
, 1969
"... ..."
The ProofTheory and Semantics of Intuitionistic Modal Logic
, 1994
"... Possible world semantics underlies many of the applications of modal logic in computer science and philosophy. The standard theory arises from interpreting the semantic definitions in the ordinary metatheory of informal classical mathematics. If, however, the same semantic definitions are interpret ..."
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Cited by 100 (0 self)
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Possible world semantics underlies many of the applications of modal logic in computer science and philosophy. The standard theory arises from interpreting the semantic definitions in the ordinary metatheory of informal classical mathematics. If, however, the same semantic definitions are interpreted in an intuitionistic metatheory then the induced modal logics no longer satisfy certain intuitionistically invalid principles. This thesis investigates the intuitionistic modal logics that arise in this way. Natural deduction systems for various intuitionistic modal logics are presented. From one point of view, these systems are selfjustifying in that a possible world interpretation of the modalities can be read off directly from the inference rules. A technical justification is given by the faithfulness of translations into intuitionistic firstorder logic. It is also established that, in many cases, the natural deduction systems induce wellknown intuitionistic modal logics, previously given by Hilbertstyle axiomatizations. The main benefit of the natural deduction systems over axiomatizations is their
On sensing and offline interpreting in GOLOG
, 1999
"... GOLOG is a highlevel programming language for the specification of complex actions. It combines the situation calculus with control structures known from conventional programming languages. Given a suitable axiomatization of what the world is like initially and how the primitive actions change the ..."
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Cited by 31 (7 self)
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GOLOG is a highlevel programming language for the specification of complex actions. It combines the situation calculus with control structures known from conventional programming languages. Given a suitable axiomatization of what the world is like initially and how the primitive actions change the world, the GOLOG interpreter derives for each program a corresponding linear sequence of legally executable primitive actions, if one exists. Despite its expressive power, GOLOG's applicability is severely limited because the derivation of a linear sequence of actions requires that the outcome of each action is known beforehand. Sensing actions do not meet this requirement since their outcome can only be determined by executing them and not by reasoning about them. In this paper we extend GOLOG by incorporating sensing actions. Instead of producing a linear sequence of actions, the new interpreter yields a tree of actions. The idea is that a particular path in the tree represents a legal execution of primitive actions conditioned on the possible outcome of sensing actions along the way.
Expressivity and completeness for public update logic via reduction axioms
 Journal of Applied NonClassical Logics
"... ABSTRACT. In this paper, we present several extensions of epistemic logic with update operators modelling public information change. Next to the wellknown public announcement operators, we also study public substitution operators. We prove many of the results regarding expressivity and completeness ..."
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Cited by 30 (6 self)
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ABSTRACT. In this paper, we present several extensions of epistemic logic with update operators modelling public information change. Next to the wellknown public announcement operators, we also study public substitution operators. We prove many of the results regarding expressivity and completeness using socalled reduction axioms. We develop a general method for using reduction axioms and apply it to the logics at hand.
AOL: a logic of acting, sensing, knowing, and only knowing
 Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR
, 1998
"... This work is motivated by the existence of two useful but quite different knowledge representation formalisms, the situation calculus due to McCarthy, and the logic OL of only knowing due to Levesque. In this paper, we propose the logic AOL, which combines both approaches in a clean and natura ..."
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Cited by 30 (12 self)
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This work is motivated by the existence of two useful but quite different knowledge representation formalisms, the situation calculus due to McCarthy, and the logic OL of only knowing due to Levesque. In this paper, we propose the logic AOL, which combines both approaches in a clean and natural way. We present a semantics for AOL which generalizes the semantics of OL to account for actions, and a sound and complete set of axioms for AOL which generalizes the Lin and Reiter foundational axioms of the situation calculus to account for only knowing.
20 Questions on Dialogue Act Taxonomies
 JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS
, 2000
"... There is currently a broad interest in dialogue acts and dialogue act taxonomies, and new uses, taxonomies, and standardization efforts continue to be proposed. This paper presents a discussion of issues that must be addressed in order to facilitate the shared understanding and use of taxonomies. ..."
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Cited by 27 (4 self)
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There is currently a broad interest in dialogue acts and dialogue act taxonomies, and new uses, taxonomies, and standardization efforts continue to be proposed. This paper presents a discussion of issues that must be addressed in order to facilitate the shared understanding and use of taxonomies. The discussion is framed in terms of 20 questions, the answers to which will help make the meanings of taxonomy elements more clear to different communities of users.
Artificial Intelligence, Logic And Formalizing Common Sense
 Philosophical Logic and Artificial Intelligence
, 1990
"... This article discusses the problems and difficulties, the results so far, and some improvements in logic and logical languages that may be required to formalize common sense. Fundamental conceptual advances are almost certainly required. The object of the paper is to get more help for AI from philos ..."
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Cited by 24 (5 self)
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This article discusses the problems and difficulties, the results so far, and some improvements in logic and logical languages that may be required to formalize common sense. Fundamental conceptual advances are almost certainly required. The object of the paper is to get more help for AI from philosophical logicians. Some of the requested help will be mostly philosophical and some will be logical. Likewise the concrete AI approach may fertilize philosophical logic as physics has repeatedly fertilized mathematics.
Steps towards a firstorder logic of explicit and implicit belief
 Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference
, 1986
"... Modelling the beliefs of an agent who lacks logical omniscience has been a major concern recently. While most of the work has concentrated on propositional logics of belief, this paper primarily addresses issues raised by adding quantifiers to such logics. In particular, we are focusing on quantifyi ..."
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Cited by 21 (1 self)
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Modelling the beliefs of an agent who lacks logical omniscience has been a major concern recently. While most of the work has concentrated on propositional logics of belief, this paper primarily addresses issues raised by adding quantifiers to such logics. In particular, we are focusing on quantifying in and the distinction between "knowing what " and "knowing that". After arguing why a model of limited reasoning should preserve this distinction, we show how this can be accomplished by a semantics based on a restricted form of tautological entailment.
Limited Reasoning in FirstOrder Knowledge Bases
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1994
"... In traditional formal approaches to knowledge representation, agents are assumed to believe all the logical consequences of their knowledge bases. As a result, reasoning in the firstorder case becomes undecidable. Since real agents are constrained by resource limitations, it seems appropriate to lo ..."
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Cited by 21 (2 self)
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In traditional formal approaches to knowledge representation, agents are assumed to believe all the logical consequences of their knowledge bases. As a result, reasoning in the firstorder case becomes undecidable. Since real agents are constrained by resource limitations, it seems appropriate to look for weaker forms of reasoning with better computational properties. One way to approach the problem is by modeling belief. Reasoning can then be understood as the question whether a belief follows from believing the sentences in the knowledge base. This paper proposes...