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23
The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science
 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
, 1997
"... The dynamical hypothesis is the claim that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. It stands opposed to the dominant computational hypothesis, the claim that cognitive agents are digital computers. This target article articulates the dynamical hypothesis and defends it as an open empirical alternati ..."
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The dynamical hypothesis is the claim that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. It stands opposed to the dominant computational hypothesis, the claim that cognitive agents are digital computers. This target article articulates the dynamical hypothesis and defends it as an open empirical alternative to the computational hypothesis. Carrying out these objectives requires extensive clarification of the conceptual terrain, with particular focus on the relation of dynamical systems to computers. Key words cognition, systems, dynamical systems, computers, computational systems, computability, modeling, time. Long Abstract The heart of the dominant computational approach in cognitive science is the hypothesis that cognitive agents are digital computers; the heart of the alternative dynamical approach is the hypothesis that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate the dynamical hypothesis and to defend it as an empirical alternative to the compu...
Linguistic cues in the acquisition of number words
, 1997
"... Previous research has shown that children go through a stage in which they know that the number words each refer to a distinct numerosity, yet do not know which numerosity each number word picks out (Wynn, 1992). How do children attain this level of knowledge? We explore the possibility that particu ..."
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Previous research has shown that children go through a stage in which they know that the number words each refer to a distinct numerosity, yet do not know which numerosity each number word picks out (Wynn, 1992). How do children attain this level of knowledge? We explore the possibility that particular properties of how number words are used within sentences inform children of the semantic class to which they belong. An analysis of transcripts of the spontaneous speech of three one and twoyearold children and their parents (from the CHILDES database; MacWhinney & Snow, 1990) suggests that the relevant cues are available as input in parents ’ speech to children, and that children generally honour these properties of number words in their own speech. Implications of this proposal for word learning more generally are discussed.
Interpreting the Quantum
, 1997
"... This paper is a commentary on the foundational significance of the CliftonBubHalvorson theorem characterizing quantum theory in terms of three informationtheoretic constraints. I argue that: (1) a quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of informa ..."
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This paper is a commentary on the foundational significance of the CliftonBubHalvorson theorem characterizing quantum theory in terms of three informationtheoretic constraints. I argue that: (1) a quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles, (2) given the informationtheoretic constraints, any mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of the measuring instruments that reveal these phenomena must be empirically equivalent to a quantum theory, and (3) assuming the informationtheoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world, no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at the fundamental level then becomes the representation and manipulation of information.
Reflections on Skolem's Paradox
"... In 1922, Thoraf Skolem published a paper titled "Some remarks on Axiomatized Set Theory". The paper presents a new proof of... This dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the first half of this project  i.e., the half which tries to expose an initial tension between Cantor's theorem and the Lö ..."
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Cited by 4 (2 self)
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In 1922, Thoraf Skolem published a paper titled "Some remarks on Axiomatized Set Theory". The paper presents a new proof of... This dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the first half of this project  i.e., the half which tries to expose an initial tension between Cantor's theorem and the LöwenheimSkolem theorem. I argue that, even on quite naive understandings of set theory and model theory, there is no such tension. Hence, Skolem's Paradox is not a genuine paradox, and there is very little reason to worry about (or even to investigate) the more extreme consequences that are supposed to follow from this paradox. The heart of my...
Similarity in Programs
"... Abstract. An overview of the concept of program similarity is presented. It divides similarity into two types—syntactic and semantic— and provides a review of eight categories of methods that may be used to measure program similarity. A summary of some applications of these methods is included. The ..."
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Abstract. An overview of the concept of program similarity is presented. It divides similarity into two types—syntactic and semantic— and provides a review of eight categories of methods that may be used to measure program similarity. A summary of some applications of these methods is included. The paper is intended to be a starting point for a more comprehensive analysis of the subject of similarity in programs, which is critical to understand if progress is to be made in fields such as clone detection.
How applied mathematics became pure
 Review of Symbolic Logic
"... Abstract. This paper traces the evolution of thinking on how mathematics relates to the world— from the ancients, through the beginnings of mathematized science in Galileo and Newton, to the rise of pure mathematics in the nineteenth century. The goal is to better understand the role of mathematics ..."
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Abstract. This paper traces the evolution of thinking on how mathematics relates to the world— from the ancients, through the beginnings of mathematized science in Galileo and Newton, to the rise of pure mathematics in the nineteenth century. The goal is to better understand the role of mathematics in contemporary science. My goal here is to explore the relationship between pure and applied mathematics and then, eventually, to draw a few morals for both. In particular, I hope to show that this relationship has not been static, that the historical rise of pure mathematics has coincided with a gradual shift in our understanding of how mathematics works in application to the world. In some circles today, it is held that historical developments of this sort simply represent changes in fashion, or in social arrangements, governments, power structures, or some such thing, but I resist the full force of this way of thinking, clinging to the old school notion that we have gradually learned more about the world over time, that our opinions on these matters have improved, and that seeing how we reached the point we now occupy may help us avoid falling back into old philosophies that are now no longer viable. In that spirit, it seems to me that once we focus on the general question of how mathematics relates to science, one
The Mathematician as a Formalist
 in Truth in Mathematics (H.G. Dales and
, 1998
"... Introduction The existence of this meeting bears testimony to the anodyne remark that there is a continuing debate about what it means to say of a statement in mathematics that it is `true'. This debate began at least 2500 years ago, and will presumably continue at least well into the next millenni ..."
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Introduction The existence of this meeting bears testimony to the anodyne remark that there is a continuing debate about what it means to say of a statement in mathematics that it is `true'. This debate began at least 2500 years ago, and will presumably continue at least well into the next millennium; it would be implausible and perhaps presumptuous to suppose that even the union of the talented and distinguished speakers that have been assembled here in Mussomeli will approach any solution to the problem, or even arrive at a consensus of what a solution would amount to. In the end, it falls to the philosophers, with their professional expertise and training, to carry forward the debate and to move us to a fuller understanding of this subtle and elusive matter. Indeed, we are hearing at this meeting a variety of contributions to the debate from different philosophical points of view; also, there is a good number of recent published contributions to the debate (see (Maddy 1990)
2010a, “Evolution without Naturalism
 Studies in Philosophy of Religion
"... Does evolutionary theory have implications about the existence of supernatural entities? This question concerns the logical relationships that hold between the theory of evolution and different bits of metaphysics. There is a distinct question that I also want to address; it is epistemological in ch ..."
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Does evolutionary theory have implications about the existence of supernatural entities? This question concerns the logical relationships that hold between the theory of evolution and different bits of metaphysics. There is a distinct question that I also want to address; it is epistemological in character. Does the evidence we have for evolutionary theory also provide evidence concerning the existence of supernatural entities? An affirmative answer to the logical question would entail an affirmative answer to the epistemological question if the principle in confirmation theory that Hempel (1965, p. 31) called the special consequence condition were true: The special consequence condition: If an observation report confirms a hypothesis H, then it also confirms every consequence of H. According to this principle, if evolutionary theory has metaphysical implications, then whatever confirms evolutionary theory also must confirm those metaphysical implications. But the special consequence is false. Here‟s a simple example that illustrates why. You are playing poker and would dearly like to know whether the card you are about to be dealt will be the Jack of Hearts. The dealer is a bit careless and so you catch a glimpse of the card on top of the deck before it is dealt to you. You see that it is red. The fact that it is red confirms the hypothesis that the card is the Jack of Hearts, and the hypothesis that it is the Jack of Hearts entails that the card will be a Jack. However, the fact that the card is red does not confirm the hypothesis that the card will be a Jack. 2 Bayesians gloss these facts by understanding confirmation in terms of probability raising: The Bayesian theory of confirmation: O confirms H if and only if Pr(H│O)> Pr(H). The general reason why Bayesianism is incompatible with the special consequence
WHITHER MATHEMATICS?
, 2004
"... whither10.tex We describe three successive crises faced by mathematicians during the twentieth century, and their implications for the nature of mathematics. 1 ..."
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whither10.tex We describe three successive crises faced by mathematicians during the twentieth century, and their implications for the nature of mathematics. 1