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Computing Quantifier Scope
, 1997
"... This paper provides a preliminary account of this sort ..."
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This paper provides a preliminary account of this sort
Local Holism
 in Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2116 – CONTEXT 2001
, 2001
"... . This paper is devoted to discuss a general tendency in contextualism which is known as "radical contextualism". In the first part I state the well known paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to share any mean ..."
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. This paper is devoted to discuss a general tendency in contextualism which is known as "radical contextualism". In the first part I state the well known paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to share any meaning. In the second part I present the different answers to this paradox, from atomism to different forms of holism. In the third part I give a criticism of the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein as a supporter of global holism. I stress some similarities between Wittgenstein's thought and Multi Context theories in artificial inteligence. In the last part I give some argument against a rigid interpretation of "local holism": I claim the need to give restrictions to local holim and to develop a study of the connections between "default" properties and high level rules which are studied in MultiContext theories. 1 The paradox of semantic holism The work of Wittgenstein is apparently c...
THE CONCEPT OF A SET
, 905
"... Abstract. Metaphysical interpretations of set theory are either inconsistent or incoherent. The uses of sets in mathematics actually involve three distinct kinds of collections (surveyable, definite, and heuristic), which are governed by three different kinds of logic (classical, intuitionistic, and ..."
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Abstract. Metaphysical interpretations of set theory are either inconsistent or incoherent. The uses of sets in mathematics actually involve three distinct kinds of collections (surveyable, definite, and heuristic), which are governed by three different kinds of logic (classical, intuitionistic, and minimal). A foundational system incorporating this analysis and based on the principles of mathematical conceptualism [8] accords better with actual mathematical practice than ZermeloFraenkel set theory does. 1. Metaphysical interpretations 1.1. Sets in ordinary language. Elementary introductions to set theory tend to give the impression that the concept of a set is trivial, something with which we are already thoroughly familiar from everyday life. We may be told that such things as a flock of birds, a deck of cards, or a pair of apples are examples of sets. This immediately seems strange because sets in the mathematical sense are supposed to be abstract objects not existing in space and time, whereas it is hard to believe that a simple assertion about, say, a flock of birds carries any significant
Epistemic truth and excluded middle*
"... Abstract: Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemi ..."
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Abstract: Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution. Part I The Problem §1. The epistemic conception of truth. The epistemic conception of truth can be formulated in many ways. But the basic idea is that truth is explained in terms of epistemic notions, like experience, argument, proof, knowledge, etc. One way of formulating this idea is by saying that truth and knowability coincide, i.e. for every statement S
Simplifying Process Model Abstraction: Techniques for Generating Model Names
, 2013
"... The increased adoption of business process management approaches, tools and practices, has led organizations to accumulate large collections of business process models. These collections can easily include hundred to thousand models, especially in the context of multinational corporations or as a re ..."
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The increased adoption of business process management approaches, tools and practices, has led organizations to accumulate large collections of business process models. These collections can easily include hundred to thousand models, especially in the context of multinational corporations or as a result of organizational mergers and acquisitions. A concrete problem is thus how to maintain these large repositories in such a way that their complexity does not hamper their practical usefulness as a means to describe and communicate business operations. This paper proposes a technique to automatically infer suitable names for business process models and fragments thereof. This technique is useful for model abstraction scenarios, as for instance when userspecific views of a repository are required, or as part of a refactoring initiative aimed to simplify the repository’s complexity. The technique is grounded in an adaptation of the theory of meaning to the realm of business process models. We implemented the technique in a prototype tool and conducted an extensive evaluation using three process model collections from practice and a case study involving process modelers with different experience.
Conditional Excluded Middle in Systems of Consequential Implication
"... It is natural to ask under what conditions negating a conditional is equivalent to negating its consequent. Given a bivalent background logic, this is equivalent to asking about the conjunction of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM, opposite conditionals are not both false) and Weak Boethius ’ Thesis ..."
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It is natural to ask under what conditions negating a conditional is equivalent to negating its consequent. Given a bivalent background logic, this is equivalent to asking about the conjunction of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM, opposite conditionals are not both false) and Weak Boethius ’ Thesis (WBT, opposite conditionals are not both true). In the system CI.0 of consequential implication, which is intertranslatable with the modal logic KT, WBT is a theorem, so it is natural to ask which instances of CEM are derivable. We also investigate the systems CIw and CI of consequential implication, corresponding to the modal logics K and KD respectively, with occasional remarks about stronger systems. While unrestricted CEM produces modal collapse in all these systems, CEM restricted to contingent formulas yields the Alt2 axiom (semantically, each world can see at most two worlds), which corresponds to the symmetry of consequential implication. It is proved that in all the main systems considered, a given instance of CEM is derivable if and only if the result of replacing consequential implication by the material biconditional in one or other of its disjuncts is provable. Several related results are also proved. The methods of
Wittgenstein, Locality and Rules
 IN A. COLIVA AND E. PICARDI (EDS), WITTGENSTEIN TODAY. PADOVA: IL POLIGRAFO
, 2002
"... This paper tries to give some substance to local holism, a picture that seems to fit Wittgenstein's analysis of the working of language. In the first part I state the wellknown paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to ..."
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This paper tries to give some substance to local holism, a picture that seems to fit Wittgenstein's analysis of the working of language. In the first part I state the wellknown paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to share any meaning. In the second part I present the different answers to this paradox, from atomism to different forms of holism. In the third part I give a criticism of the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein as a supporter of global holism. As an alternative lecture I will suggest some lines of Wittgenstein's thought leading towards a definition of local holism. Eventually I will show connections with ideas developed in Multi Context theories in artificial intelligence, which help to show a possible direction of inquiry about restrictions on locality.
Truth, Falsity and Borderline Cases *
"... Introduction. According to the principle of bivalence, truth and falsity are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive options for a statement. It is either true or false, and not both, even in a borderline case. That highly controversial claim is central to the epistemic theory of vagueness, which ..."
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Introduction. According to the principle of bivalence, truth and falsity are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive options for a statement. It is either true or false, and not both, even in a borderline case. That highly controversial claim is central to the epistemic theory of vagueness, which holds that borderline cases are distinguished by a special kind of obstacle to knowing the truthvalue of the statement. But this paper is not a defence of the epistemic theory. If bivalence holds, it presumably does