Human children 18 – 24 months of age and 3 young chimpanzees interacted in 4 cooperative activities with a human adult partner. The human children successfully participated in cooperative problem-solving activities and social games, whereas the chimpanzees were uninterested in the social games. As an experimental manipulation, in each task the adult partner stopped participating at a specific point during the activity. All children produced at least one communicative attempt to reengage him, perhaps suggesting that they were trying to reinstate a shared goal. No chimpanzee ever made any communicative attempt to reengage the partner. These results are interpreted as evidence for a uniquely human form of cooperative activity involving shared intentionality that emerges in the second year of life. From soon after birth, human infants interact with other persons dyadically in coordinated, turn-taking sequences (Trevarthen, 1979). From about 6 to 9 months of age, infants ’ social interactions become more complex, as they often incorporate outside objects and so become triadic (Tomasello, 1995). Some of these triadic interactions are relatively extended and maintain a turn-taking structure, for example, rolling a ball back and forth or taking turns beating a drum (Gustafson, Green, & West, 1979; Ratner & Bruner, 1978). Most of these early triadic interactionsFsometimes called cooperative gamesFseem to rely on adult scaffolding in fairly ritualized situations, because the introduction of novel toys or a peer partner disrupts them almost totally until 18 months of age (Hay, 1979; Ross, 1982). In a series of longitudinal studies, Eckerman and colleagues have investigated the emergence of young children’s skills in cooperative games of a less ritualized

Two experiments investigated the proclivity of 14-month-old infants (a) to altruistically help others toward individual goals, and (b) to cooperate toward a shared goal. The infants helped another person by handing over objects the other person was unsuccessfully reaching for, but did not help reliably in situations involving more complex goals. When a programmed adult partner interrupted a joint cooperative activity at specific moments, infants sometimes tried to reengage the adult, perhaps indicating that they understood the interdependency of actions toward a shared goal. However, as compared to 18- and 24-month-olds, their skills in behaviorally coordinating their actions with a social partner remained rudimentary. Results are integrated into a model of cooperative activities as they develop over the 2nd year of life. Prosocial behaviors such as helping and cooperation are interesting both cognitively and motivationally: To help someone with a problem, the helper must understand the other’s unachieved goal and possess the altruistic motivation to act on behalf of the other. Whereas in the case of helping, understanding another’s individual goal of action might be sufficient, cooperative activities are based on the formation of a shared goal. That is, two or more persons have to perform interdependent roles directed at a shared goal and possess the motivation to mutually support each other’s action to reach that goal. These kinds of prosocial behaviors are at the core of the human condition. Indeed, humans might act altruistically and cooperate in ways not found in other primates (e.g., Alexander, 1987; Richerson & Boyd, 2005), giving rise to social-cognitive skills such as complex mind reading

Abstract not found

Abstract: We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children’s skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children’s ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.