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pdominance and Belief potential
 Econometrica
, 1995
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Cited by 37 (7 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
Reasoning about knowledge and probability: preliminary report
 Proc. Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge
, 1988
"... Abstract: We provide a model for reasoning about knowledge anti probability together. We a.llow explicit mention of probabilities in formulas, so that our language has formulas tha.t essentia.lly say "a.ccording to agent i, formula. (p holds with probability a.t least o~. " The la ..."
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Cited by 12 (7 self)
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Abstract: We provide a model for reasoning about knowledge anti probability together. We a.llow explicit mention of probabilities in formulas, so that our language has formulas tha.t essentia.lly say &quot;a.ccording to agent i, formula. (p holds with probability a.t least o~. &quot; The language is powerfid enough to allow reasoning a~bout higherorder probabilities, as well as allowing explicit comparisons of the probabilities an agent places on distinct events. We present a general framework for interpreting such formulas, a.nd consider various properties that might hold of the interrelationship between agents ' subjective probability spaces at different states. We provide a. complete a.xiomatiza.tion for rea.soning about knowledge a.nd probability, prove a. small model property, and obtain decision procedures. We then consider the effects of adding common knowledge and a. probabilistic va.ria.nt of common knowledge to the language.
The Domain Of Description: A Systemic, Action Oriented Approach to Modelling
, 1991
"... This paper explains modelling as a goaldirected activity in the domain of description, i.e. as a symbolmanipulating activity. A guiding distinction throughout this paper is the differentiation between ontic knowledge (know that) and conductive knowledge (know how). It is claimed that an adequate ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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This paper explains modelling as a goaldirected activity in the domain of description, i.e. as a symbolmanipulating activity. A guiding distinction throughout this paper is the differentiation between ontic knowledge (know that) and conductive knowledge (know how). It is claimed that an adequate modelling framework should facilitate the coherent description of both types of knowledge and their interaction during reasoning, e.g. behavior analysis. Part A of the paper introduces a set of systemtheoretical concepts and their formalization. This concepts serve as the basis for the ontic domain. Part B is an approach to formalize the conductive domain. The concept of a region is introduced to combine the descriptions of ontic and conductive knowledge of a domain. A reasoning system is described that serves as the basic mechanism for the operationalization of conductive descriptions. Part C describes a set of basic regions on which other, more specific ones can be build.
INFORMATION THEORETIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN OF AN INTELLIGENT MACHINE
"... A fundamental problem any design for an intelligent machine must address is the following: How will the machine, immersed in a physical environment whose number of states is orders of magnitude kger than its own number of internal (information theoretic, or “mental”) states, select which external st ..."
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A fundamental problem any design for an intelligent machine must address is the following: How will the machine, immersed in a physical environment whose number of states is orders of magnitude kger than its own number of internal (information theoretic, or “mental”) states, select which external states will cause modification ' of its own internal state? This paper elaborates on this problem, as it applies to manmade intelligent machines, in terms of an informal information theoretic model, one primarily concerned with what is to be done, rather than how. We argue that current models of automated control for a robot do not address this problem, primarily because so much emphasis is placed on modelbased logical inference. A proposed solution framework is offered to the sensory selection problem based on an information thtorctic definition of event. The resulting architectural paradigm is then applied to what we call eventdriven hierarchical control. “substances are rwt the units of things and events are not their motion, but events are the units of things and what is described as a material object is just a feature of events. ” ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD 1.
A Twodimensional Modal Logic for Knowledge Representation in Asynchronous MultiAgent Systems
"... Abstract This paper introduces a twodimensional modal logic to represent agents’ knowledge in distributed environments. The agent’s knowledge was formally defined in [5], where modal logic was used to model knowledge in synchronous distributed messagepassing systems. The logic we present here can p ..."
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Abstract This paper introduces a twodimensional modal logic to represent agents’ knowledge in distributed environments. The agent’s knowledge was formally defined in [5], where modal logic was used to model knowledge in synchronous distributed messagepassing systems. The logic we present here can properly describe the properties of the agent’s knowledge in asynchronous environments. An axiomatic system to describe such kind of knowledge is also presented.
ARTICLE NO. 0075 Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade
, 1993
"... This paper shows that if rationality is not common knowledge, the notrade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet’s notion of common pbelief and show that when traders entertain doubts about the rationality of other traders, arbitrarily large volumes of trade as we ..."
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This paper shows that if rationality is not common knowledge, the notrade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet’s notion of common pbelief and show that when traders entertain doubts about the rationality of other traders, arbitrarily large volumes of trade as well as rationality may be common pbelief for a large p. Furthermore, rationality and trade may simultaneously be known to arbitrary large