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26
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning
- Psychological Bulletin
, 1996
"... Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations refle ..."
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Cited by 172 (3 self)
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Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is "rule based " because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The systems serve complementary functions and can simultaneously generate different solutions to a reasoning problem. The rule-based system can suppress the associative system but not completely inhibit it. The article reviews evidence in favor of the distinction and its characterization. One of the oldest conundrums in psychology is whether people are best conceived as parallel processors of information who operate along diffuse associative links or as analysts who operate by deliberate and sequential manipulation of internal representations. Are inferences drawn through a network of learned associative pathways or through application of a kind of "psychologic"
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection
- 67 – 215535 Deliverable 4.1
, 1994
"... Human reasoning in hypothesis-testing tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed in t ..."
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Cited by 110 (5 self)
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Human reasoning in hypothesis-testing tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed in the light of a Bayesian model of optimal data selection in inductive hypothesis testing. The model provides a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) of the selection task that fits well with people's performance on both abstract and thematic versions of the task. The model suggests that reasoning in these tasks may be rational rather than subject to systematic bias. Over the past 30 years, results in the psychology of reasoning have raised doubts about human rationality. The assumption of human rationality has a long history. Aristotle took the capacity for rational thought to be the defining characteristic of human beings, the capacity that separated us from the animals. Descartes regarded the ability to use language and to reason as the hallmarks of the mental that separated it from the merely physical. Many contemporary philosophers of mind also appeal to a basic principle of rationality in accounting for everyday, folk psychological explanation whereby we explain each other's behavior in terms of our beliefs and desires (Cherniak, 1986; Cohen, 1981; Davidson, 1984; Dennett, 1987; but see Stich, 1990). These philosophers, both ancient and modern, share a common view of rationality: To be rational is to reason according to rules (Brown, 1989). Logic and mathematics provide the normative rules that tell us how we should reason. Rationality therefore seems to demand that the human cognitive system embodies the rules of logic and mathematics. However, results in the psychology of reasoning appear to show that people do not reason according to these rules. In both deductive (Evans, 1982, 1989;
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
- Review of General Psychology
, 1998
"... Confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand. The author reviews evidence of such a bias in a variety of guises and gives examples ..."
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Cited by 50 (0 self)
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Confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand. The author reviews evidence of such a bias in a variety of guises and gives examples of its operation in several practical contexts. Possible explanations are considered, and the question of its utility or disutility is discussed. When men wish to construct or support a theory, how they torture facts into their service! (Mackay, 1852/ 1932, p. 552) Confirmation bias is perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning. (Evans, 1989, p. 41) If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human reasoning that deserves attention above all others, the confirmation bias would have to be among the candidates for consideration. Many have written about this bias, and it appears to be sufficiently strong and pervasive that one is led to wonder whether the bias, by itself, might account for a significant fraction of the disputes, altercations, and misunderstandings that occur among individuals, groups, and nations. Confirmation bias has been used in the psychological literature to refer to a variety of phenomena. Here I take the term to represent a generic concept that subsumes several more specific ideas that connote the inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question.
Domain-Specific Reasoning: Social Contracts, Cheating, and Perspective Change
, 1992
"... What counts as human rationality: reasoning processes that embody content-independent formal theories, such as propositional logic, or reasoning processes that are well designed for solving important adaptive problems? Most theories of human reasoning have been based on content-independent formal r ..."
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Cited by 43 (0 self)
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What counts as human rationality: reasoning processes that embody content-independent formal theories, such as propositional logic, or reasoning processes that are well designed for solving important adaptive problems? Most theories of human reasoning have been based on content-independent formal rationality, whereas adaptive reasoning, ecological or evolutionary, has been little explored. We elaborate and test an evolutionary approach, Cosmides’ (1989) social contract theory, using the Wason selection task. In the first part, we disentangle the theoretical concept of a “social contract” from that of a “cheater-detection algorithm.” We demonstrate that the fact that a rule is perceived as a social contract—or a conditional permission or obligation, as Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed—is not sufficient to elicit Cosmides’ striking results, which we replicated. The crucial issue is not semantic (the meaning of the rule), but pragmatic: whether a person is cued into the perspective of a party who can be cheated. In the second part, we distinguish between social contracts with bilateral and unilateral cheating options. Perspective change in contracts with bilateral cheating options turns P & not-Q responses into not-P & Q responses. The results strongly support social contract theory, contradict availability theory, and cannot be accounted for by pragmatic reasoning schema theory, which lacks the pragmatic concepts of perspectives and cheating detection.
Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference
- Psychological Review
, 2002
"... The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal a ..."
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Cited by 26 (4 self)
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The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals. You reason about conditional relations because much of your knowledge is conditional. If you get caught speeding, then you pay a fine. If you have an operation, then you need time to recuperate. If you have money in the bank, then you can cash a check. Conditional reasoning is a central part of thinking, yet people do not always reason correctly. The lawyer Jan Schlictmann in a celebrated trial (see Harr, 1995, pp. 361–362) elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE):
The Transfer of Scientific Principles Using Concrete and Idealized Simulations
- THE JOURNAL OF THE LEARNING SCIENCES
, 2005
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A Little Logic Goes a Long Way: Basing Experiment on Semantic Theory in the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning
, 2002
"... this paper is to show that this misunderstanding of the nature of logic by these and other prominent programs of research into human reasoning, has led to an impoverishment of empirical investigation into what subjects are doing in the selection task and to a wholly unnecessary and damaging rift bet ..."
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Cited by 16 (5 self)
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this paper is to show that this misunderstanding of the nature of logic by these and other prominent programs of research into human reasoning, has led to an impoverishment of empirical investigation into what subjects are doing in the selection task and to a wholly unnecessary and damaging rift between logically based cognitive theories of natural language interpretation on the one hand, and psychological experimentation on reasoning on the other. We will show that when empirical exploration is based on an informed understanding of logically based cognitive theory, the evidence strongly suggests a nearly opposite evolutionary account of the relation between the emergence of human communication capacities and economic exchange, and that logical semantics already has accounts of context senstivity to o#er far in advance of mental models theory's new creations
Context Effects on Problem Solving
- In: Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum
, 1996
"... Context effects on problem solving demonstrated so far in the literature are the result of systematic manipulation of some supposedly irrelevant to the solution elements of the problem description. Little attention has been paid to the role of casual entities in the environment which are not part of ..."
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Cited by 12 (9 self)
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Context effects on problem solving demonstrated so far in the literature are the result of systematic manipulation of some supposedly irrelevant to the solution elements of the problem description. Little attention has been paid to the role of casual entities in the environment which are not part of the problem description, but which might influence the problem solving process. The main purpose of the current paper is to avoid this limitation and to study the context effects (if any) caused by such accidental elements from the problem solver's environment and in this way to test the predictions made by the dynamic theory of context and its implementation in the DUAL cognitive architecture. Two experiments have been performed. In Experiment I the entities whose influence is being tested are part of the illustrations accompanying the target problem descriptions and therefore they belong to the core of the context, while in Experiment II the tested entities are part of the illustrations a...
Inept reasoners or pragmatic virtuosos? Relevance and the deontic selection task
- COGNITION
, 2001
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Perspective Effects in Non-Deontic Versions of the Wason Selection Task
, 2000
"... Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts; i.e., problem contexts that invo ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts; i.e., problem contexts that involve social duty, like permissions and obligations. In three experiments, we demonstrate perspective effects in non-deontic contexts, including a context much like the original one employed by Wason (1966, 1968). We suggest that perspective effects arise whenever the task uses a rule that can be interpreted biconditionally and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples that match the predicted choice sets. This view is consistent with domain-general theories but not with domain-specific theories of deontic reasoning, e.g., pragmatic reasoning schemas and social contract theory, that cannot explain perspective effects in non-deontic contexts.

