actually gets done, especially how people involve each other in their work. In particular, a model of practice reveals how people accomplish a collaboration through multiple and alternative means of communication, such as meetings, computer tools, and written documents. Choices of what and how to communicate are dependent upon social beliefs and behaviors---what people know about each other's activities, intentions, and capabilities and their understanding of the norms of the group. As a result, Brahms models can help human---computer system designers to understand how tasks and information actually flow between people and machines, what work is required to synchronize individual contributions, and how tools hinder or help this process. In particular, workflow diagrams generated by Brahms are the emergent product of local interactions between agents and representational artifacts, not pre-ordained, end-to-end p

In this paper, we describe Kimura, an augmented office environment to support conorion multitasking practices. Previous systems, such as Rooms, limit users by constraining the interaction to the desktop monitor. In Kimura, we leverage interactive projected peripheral displays to support the perusal, manipulation and awareness of background activities. Furthermore, each activity is represented by a montage comprised of images from current and past interaction on the desktop. These montages help remind the user of past actions, and serve as a springboard for ambient context-aware reminders and notifications.

This article proposes a theoretical framework for external representation based problem solving. The Tic-Tac-Toe and its isomorphs are used to illustrate the procedures of the framework as a methodology and test the predictions of the framework as a functional model. Experimental results show that the behavior in the Tic-Tac-Toe is determined by the directly available information in external and internal representations in terms of perceptual and cognitive biases, regardless of whether the biases are consistent with, inconsistent with, or irrelevant to the task. It is shown that external representations are not merely inputs and stimuli to the internal mind and that they have much more important functions than mere memory aids. A representational determinism is suggested--the form of a representation determines

We present a method whereby a robot can learn to recognize places with high accuracy, in spite of perceptual aliasing (different places appear the same) and image variability (the same place appears differently). The first step in learning place recognition restricts attention to distinctive states identified by the map-learning algorithm, and eliminates image variability by unsupervised learning of clusters of similar sensory images. The clusters define views associated with distinctive states, often increasing perceptual aliasing. The second step eliminates perceptual aliasing by building a causal/topological map and using history information gathered during exploration to disambiguate distinctive states. The third step uses the labeled images for supervised learning of direct associations from sensory images to distinctive states. We evaluate the method using a physical mobile robot in two environments, showing high recognition rates in spite of large amounts of perceptual aliasing.

When on the move, cognitive resources are reserved partly for passively monitoring and reacting to contexts and events, and partly for actively constructing them. The Resource Competition Framework (RCF), building on the Multiple Resources Theory, explains how psychosocial tasks typical of mobile situations compete for cognitive resources and then suggests that this leads to the depletion of resources for task interaction and eventually results in the breakdown of fluent interaction. RCF predictions were tested in a semi-naturalistic field study measuring attention during the performance of assigned Web search tasks on mobile phone while moving through nine varied but typical urban situations. Notably, we discovered up to eight-fold differentials between micro-level measurements of attentional resource fragmentation, for example from spans of over 16 seconds in a laboratory condition dropping to bursts of just a few seconds in difficult mobile situations. By calibrating perceptual sampling, reducing resource usage for tasks of secondary importance, and resisting the impulse to switch tasks before finalization, participants compensated for the resource depletion. The findings are compared to previous studies in office contexts. The work is valuable in many areas of HCI dealing with mobility. ACM Classification Keywords: H5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): Miscellaneous

Abstract: We have considered the role of workplace studies from the CSCW literature which are intended to inform system design and implementation. We present a critique of these studies, categorised according to which phase of the design process they most inform, and discuss the tensions between providing explanatory accounts and usable design recommendations, the pressures on fieldworkers to provide both, the purposes different approaches serve, and the transition from fieldwork to system design.

The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: 1) cognition is situated; 2) cognition is time-pressured; 3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; 4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; 5) cognition is for action; 6) off-line cognition is body-based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.

People working collaboratively must establish and maintain awareness of one another's intentions, actions and results. Notification systems typically support awareness of the presence, tasks and actions of collaborators, but they do not adequately support awareness of persistent and complex activities. We analysed awareness breakdowns in use of our Virtual School system---stemming from problems related to the collaborative situation, group, task and tool support---to motivate the concept of activity awareness. Activity a areness builds on prior conceptions of social and action a areness, but emphasizes the importance of activity context factors like planning and coordination. This ork suggests design strategies for notification systems to better support collaborative activity.

This paper examines the theoretical and practical problems that arise from attempts to develop formal characterisations and explanations of many work activities; in particular, collaborative activities. We argue that even seemingly discrete individual activities occur in, and frequently draw upon a complex network of factors: individual, social and organisational. Similarly, organisational and social constraints and practices impact upon individual, cognitive processes and the realisation of these in specific tasks. Any adequate characterisation of work activities therefore requires the analysis and synthesis of information from these, traditionally separate sources. We argue that existing frameworks, emanating separately from the respective disciplines (cognitive, social and organisational) do not present an adequate means of studying the dynamics of collaborative activity in situ. An alternative framework, advocated in this paper, is distributed cognition. Its theoretical basis is outlined together with examples of applied studies of computer-mediated work activities in different organisational settings. 1.

Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the boundaries of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words ‘just