Abstract. How close are we to a world where every paper on programming languages is accompanied by an electronic appendix with machinechecked proofs? We propose an initial set of benchmarks for measuring progress in this area. Based on the metatheory of System F<:, a typed lambda-calculus with second-order polymorphism, subtyping, and records, these benchmarks embody many aspects of programming languages that are challenging to formalize: variable binding at both the term and type levels, syntactic forms with variable numbers of components (including binders), and proofs demanding complex induction principles. We hope that these benchmarks will help clarify the current state of the art, provide a basis for comparing competing technologies, and motivate further research. 1

Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a general framework for verifying the safety properties of machine-language programs. PCC proofs are usually written in a logic extended with language-specific typing rules. In Foundational Proof-Carrying Code (FPCC), on the other hand, proofs are constructed and verified using strictly the foundations of mathematical logic, with no type-specific axioms. FPCC is more flexible and secure because it is not tied to any particular type system and it has a smaller trusted base. Foundational proofs, however, are much harder to construct. Previous efforts on FPCC all required building sophisticated semantic models for types. In this paper, we present a syntactic approach to FPCC that avoids the difficulties of previous work. Under our new scheme, the foundational proof for a typed machine program simply consists of the typing derivation plus the formalized syntactic soundness proof for the underlying type system. We give a translation from a typed assembly language into FPCC and demonstrate the advantages of our new system via an implementation in the Coq proof assistant. 1.

Machine-checked proofs of properties of programming languages have become a critical need, both for increased confidence in large and complex designs and as a foundation for technologies such as proof-carrying code. However, constructing these proofs remains a black art, involving many choices in the formulation of definitions and theorems that make a huge cumulative difference in the difficulty of carrying out large formal developments. The representation and manipulation of terms with variable binding is a key issue. We propose a novel style for formalizing metatheory, combining locally nameless representation of terms and cofinite quantification of free variable names in inductive definitions of relations on terms (typing, reduction,...). The key technical insight is that our use of cofinite quantification obviates the need for reasoning about equivariance (the fact that free names can be renamed in derivations); in particular, the structural induction principles of relations

We present a programming language, model, and logic appropriate for implementing and reasoning about a memory management system. We then state what is meant by correctness of a copying garbage collector, and employ a variant of the novel separation logics [18, 23] to formally specify partial correctness of Cheney's copying garbage collector [8]. Finally, we prove that our implementation of Cheney's algorithm meets its specification, using the logic we have given, and auxiliary variables [19].

Proof-carrying code (PCC) is a framework for mechanically verifying the safety of machine language programs. A program that is successfully verified by a PCC system is guaranteed to be safe to execute, but this safety guarantee is contingent upon the correctness of various trusted components. For instance, in traditional PCC systems the trusted computing base includes a large set of low-level typing rules. Foundational PCC systems seek to minimize the size of the trusted computing base. In particular, they eliminate the need to trust complex, low-level type systems by providing machine-checkable proofs of type soundness for real machine languages. In this thesis, I demonstrate the use of logical relations for proving the soundness of type systems for mutable state. Specifically, I focus on type systems that ensure the safe allocation, update, and reuse of memory. For each type in the language, I define logical relations that explain the meaning of the type in terms of the oper-ational semantics of the language. Using this model of types, I prove each typing rule as a lemma. The major contribution is a model of System F with general references — that is, mutable cells that can hold values of any closed type including other references, functions, recursive types, and impredicative quantified types. The model is based on ideas from both possible worlds and the indexed model of Appel and McAllester. I show how the model of mutable references is encoded in higher-order logic. I also show how to construct an indexed possible-worlds model for a von Neumann machine. The latter is used in the Princeton Foundational PCC system to prove type safety for a full-fledged low-level typed assembly language. Finally, I present a semantic model for a region calculus that supports type-invariant references as well as memory reuse. iii

This paper reports on the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of CompCert, a compiler from Clight (a large subset of the C programming language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for programming the compiler and for proving its correctness. Such a verified compiler is useful in the context of critical software and its formal verification: the verification of the compiler guarantees that the safety properties proved on the source code hold for the executable compiled code as well. 1.

This article describes the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of a compiler back-end from Cminor (a simple imperative intermediate language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for programming the compiler and for proving its correctness. Such a verified compiler is useful in the context of formal methods applied to the certification of critical software: the verification of the compiler guarantees that the safety properties proved on the source code hold for the executable compiled code as well. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.3.1 [Logics and meanings of programs]: Specifying and verifying and reasoning about programs—Mechanical verification; D.2.4 [Software engineering]: Software/program verification—Correctness proofs, formal methods, reliability; D.3.4 [Programming languages]: Processors—Compilers, optimization

Abstract. We present the Mobile Resource Guarantees framework: a system for ensuring that downloaded programs are free from run-time violations of resource bounds. Certificates are attached to code in the form of efficiently checkable proofs of resource bounds; in contrast to cryptographic certificates of code origin, these are independent of trust networks. A novel programming language with resource constraints encoded in function types is used to streamline the generation of proofs of resource usage. 1

Executing untrusted code while preserving security requires that the code be prevented from modifying memory or executing instructions except as explicitly allowed. Software-based fault isolation (SFI) or “sandboxing” enforces such a policy by rewriting the untrusted code at the instruction level. However, the original sandboxing technique of Wahbe et al. is applicable only to RISC architectures, and most other previous work is either insecure, or has been not described in enough detail to give confidence in its security properties. We present a new sandboxing technique that can be applied to a CISC architecture like the IA-32, and whose application can be checked at load-time to minimize the TCB. We describe an implementation which provides a robust security guarantee and has low runtime overheads (an average of 21 % on the SPECint2000 benchmarks). We evaluate the utility of the technique by applying it to untrusted decompression modules in an archive tool, and its safety by constructing a machine-checked proof that any program approved by the verification algorithm will respect the desired safety property. 1

After a short period of being not much more than a curiosity, the World-Wide Web quickly became an important medium for discussion, commerce, and business. Instead of holding just information that the entire world could see, web pages also became used to access email, financial records, and other personal or proprietary data that was meant to be viewed only by particular individuals or groups. This made it necessary to design mechanisms that would restrict access to web pages. Unfortunately, most current mechanisms are lacking in generality and flexibility---they interoperate poorly and can express only a limited number of security policies.