Results 1  10
of
46
NonMalleable Cryptography
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 2000
"... The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 483 (21 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. The same concept makes sense in the contexts of string commitment and zeroknowledge proofs of possession of knowledge. Nonmalleable schemes for each of these three problems are presented. The schemes do not assume a trusted center; a user need not know anything about the number or identity of other system users. Our cryptosystem is the first proven to be secure against a strong type of chosen ciphertext attack proposed by Rackoff and Simon, in which the attacker knows the ciphertext she wishes to break and can query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext other than the target.
ChosenCiphertext Security from IdentityBased Encryption. Adv
 in Cryptology — Eurocrypt 2004, LNCS
, 2004
"... We propose simple and efficient CCAsecure publickey encryption schemes (i.e., schemes secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks) based on any identitybased encryption (IBE) scheme. Our constructions have ramifications of both theoretical and practical interest. First, our schemes give a n ..."
Abstract

Cited by 244 (13 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
We propose simple and efficient CCAsecure publickey encryption schemes (i.e., schemes secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks) based on any identitybased encryption (IBE) scheme. Our constructions have ramifications of both theoretical and practical interest. First, our schemes give a new paradigm for achieving CCAsecurity; this paradigm avoids “proofs of wellformedness ” that have been shown to underlie previous constructions. Second, instantiating our construction using known IBE constructions we obtain CCAsecure encryption schemes whose performance is competitive with the most efficient CCAsecure schemes to date. Our techniques extend naturally to give an efficient method for securing also IBE schemes (even hierarchical ones) against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks. Coupled with previous work, this gives the first efficient constructions of CCAsecure IBE schemes. 1
MerkleDamg˚ard Revisited: How to Construct a Hash Function
 Advances in Cryptology, Crypto 2005
"... The most common way of constructing a hash function (e.g., SHA1) is to iterate a compression function on the input message. The compression function is usually designed from scratch or made out of a blockcipher. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion for hashfunctions, stronger than col ..."
Abstract

Cited by 89 (8 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
The most common way of constructing a hash function (e.g., SHA1) is to iterate a compression function on the input message. The compression function is usually designed from scratch or made out of a blockcipher. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion for hashfunctions, stronger than collisionresistance. Under this notion, the arbitrary length hash function H must behave as a random oracle when the fixedlength building block is viewed as a random oracle or an ideal blockcipher. The key property is that if a particular construction meets this definition, then any cryptosystem proven secure assuming H is a random oracle remains secure if one plugs in this construction (still assuming that the underlying fixedlength primitive is ideal). In this paper, we show that the current design principle behind hash functions such as SHA1 and MD5 — the (strengthened) MerkleDamg˚ard transformation — does not satisfy this security notion. We provide several constructions that provably satisfy this notion; those new constructions introduce minimal changes to the plain MerkleDamg˚ard construction and are easily implementable in practice.
Improved Efficiency for CCASecure Cryptosystems Built Using IdentityBased Encryption
, 2004
"... Recently, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz showed a general method for constructing CCAsecure encryption schemes from identitybased encryption schemes in the standard model. We improve the efficiency of their construction, and show two specific instantiations of our resulting scheme which offer the most ..."
Abstract

Cited by 83 (8 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Recently, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz showed a general method for constructing CCAsecure encryption schemes from identitybased encryption schemes in the standard model. We improve the efficiency of their construction, and show two specific instantiations of our resulting scheme which offer the most efficient encryption (and, in one case, key generation) of any CCAsecure encryption scheme to date.
Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and other Signature Schemes
, 2002
"... The Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) designed by Bellare and Rogaway is a signature scheme provably secure against chosen message attacks in the random oracle model, whose security can be tightly related to the security of RSA. We derive a new security proof for PSS in which a much shorter r ..."
Abstract

Cited by 58 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) designed by Bellare and Rogaway is a signature scheme provably secure against chosen message attacks in the random oracle model, whose security can be tightly related to the security of RSA. We derive a new security proof for PSS in which a much shorter random salt is used to achieve the same security level, namely we show that log 2 qsig bits suce, where qsig is the number of signature queries made by the attacker. When PSS is used with message recovery, a better bandwidth is obtained because longer messages can now be recovered. In this paper, we also introduce a new technique for proving that the security proof of a signature scheme is optimal. In particular, we show that the size of the random salt that we have obtained for PSS is optimal: if less than log 2 qsig bits are used, then PSS is still provably secure but it cannot have a tight security proof.
Passwordauthenticated key exchange based on RSA
, 2000
"... Abstract. There have been many proposals in recent years for passwordauthenticated key exchange protocols.Many of these have been shown to be insecure, and the only ones that seemed likely to be proven secure (against active adversaries who may attempt to perform offline dictionary attacks against ..."
Abstract

Cited by 51 (9 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract. There have been many proposals in recent years for passwordauthenticated key exchange protocols.Many of these have been shown to be insecure, and the only ones that seemed likely to be proven secure (against active adversaries who may attempt to perform offline dictionary attacks against the password) were based on the DiffieHellman problem.In fact, some protocols based on DiffieHellman have been recently proven secure in the randomoracle model.We examine how to design a provablysecure passwordauthenticated key exchange protocol based on RSA.We first look at the OKE and protectedOKE protocols (both RSAbased) and show that they are insecure.Then we show how to modify the OKE protocol to obtain a passwordauthenticated key exchange protocol that can be proven secure (in the random oracle model). The resulting protocol is very practical; in fact the basic protocol requires about the same amount of computation as the DiffieHellmanbased protocols or the wellknown ssh protocol.
Sequential aggregate signatures and multisignatures without random oracles
 In EUROCRYPT, 2006. (Cited on
, 2006
"... Abstract. We present the first aggregate signature, the first multisignature, and the first verifiably encrypted signature provably secure without random oracles. Our constructions derive from a novel application of a recent signature scheme due to Waters. Signatures in our aggregate signature schem ..."
Abstract

Cited by 45 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract. We present the first aggregate signature, the first multisignature, and the first verifiably encrypted signature provably secure without random oracles. Our constructions derive from a novel application of a recent signature scheme due to Waters. Signatures in our aggregate signature scheme are sequentially constructed, but knowledge of the order in which messages were signed is not necessary for verification. The aggregate signatures obtained are shorter than Lysyanskaya et al. sequential aggregates and can be verified more efficiently than Boneh et al. aggregates. We also consider applications to secure routing and proxy signatures. 1
Discretelogbased signatures may not be equivalent to discrete log
 ASIACRYPT 2005, LNCS 3788
, 2005
"... Abstract. We provide evidence that the unforgeability of several discretelog based signatures like Schnorr signatures cannot be equivalent to the discrete log problem in the standard model. This contradicts in nature wellknown proofs standing in weakened proof methodologies, in particular proofs e ..."
Abstract

Cited by 27 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract. We provide evidence that the unforgeability of several discretelog based signatures like Schnorr signatures cannot be equivalent to the discrete log problem in the standard model. This contradicts in nature wellknown proofs standing in weakened proof methodologies, in particular proofs employing various formulations of the Forking Lemma in the random oracle Model. Our impossibility proofs apply to many discretelogbased signatures like ElGamal signatures and their extensions, DSA, ECDSA and KCDSA as well as standard generalizations of these, and even RSAbased signatures like GQ. We stress that our work sheds more light on the provable (in)security of popular signature schemes but does not explicitly lead to actual attacks on these. 1
Universal Padding Schemes for RSA
 Proc. Crypto’02, LNCS
, 2002
"... Abstract. A common practice to encrypt with RSA is to first apply a padding scheme to the message and then to exponentiate the result with the public exponent; an example of this is OAEP. Similarly, the usual way of signing with RSA is to apply some padding scheme and then to exponentiate the result ..."
Abstract

Cited by 22 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. A common practice to encrypt with RSA is to first apply a padding scheme to the message and then to exponentiate the result with the public exponent; an example of this is OAEP. Similarly, the usual way of signing with RSA is to apply some padding scheme and then to exponentiate the result with the private exponent, as for example in PSS. Usually, the RSA modulus used for encrypting is different from the one used for signing. The goal of this paper is to simplify this common setting. First, we show that PSS can also be used for encryption, and gives an encryption scheme semantically secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks, in the random oracle model. As a result, PSS can be used indifferently for encryption or signature. Moreover, we show that PSS allows to safely use the same RSA keypairs for both encryption and signature, in a concurrent manner. More generally, we show that using PSS the same set of keys can be used for both encryption and signature for any trapdoor partialdomain oneway permutation. The practical consequences of our result are important: PKIs and publickey implementations can be significantly simplified. Keywords: Probabilistic Signature Scheme, Provable Security. 1