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23
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control
, 2009
"... Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive con ..."
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Cited by 34 (15 self)
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Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate’s victory. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result and it can be determined in polynomial time on which inputs the agent can succeed is said to be vulnerable to the given type of control. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result, yet in which it is NPhard to recognize the inputs on which the agent can succeed, is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Aside from election systems with an NPhard winner problem, the only systems previously known to be resistant to all the standard control types were highly artificial election systems created by hybridization. This paper studies a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland α, where the parameter α is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates. In every previously studied constructive or destructive
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
, 2008
"... The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find the alternative closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given alternative is known to be hard to compute under either rule. In this paper, we put forward two algorith ..."
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Cited by 23 (10 self)
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The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find the alternative closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given alternative is known to be hard to compute under either rule. In this paper, we put forward two algorithms for approximating the Dodgson score: an LPbased randomized rounding algorithm and a deterministic greedy algorithm, both of which yield an O(log m) approximation ratio, where m is the number of alternatives; we observe that this result is asymptotically optimal, and further prove that our greedy algorithm is optimal up to a factor of 2, unless problems in N P have quasipolynomial time algorithms. Although the greedy algorithm is computationally superior, we argue that
How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
"... We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change their preferences a specified candidate can be made the election’s winner? We study this problem for election systems as v ..."
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Cited by 19 (8 self)
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We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change their preferences a specified candidate can be made the election’s winner? We study this problem for election systems as varied as scoring protocols and Dodgson voting, and in a variety of settings regarding homogeneousvs.nonhomogeneous electorate bribability, boundedsizevs.arbitrarysized candidate sets, weightedvs.unweighted voters, and succinctvs.nonsuccinct input specification. We obtain both polynomialtime bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and indeed our results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the setting. For example, we find settings in which bribery is NPcomplete but manipulation (by voters) is in P, and we find settings in which bribing weighted voters is NPcomplete but bribing voters with individual bribe thresholds is in P. For the broad class of elections (including plurality, Borda, kapproval, and veto) known as scoring protocols, we prove a dichotomy result for bribery of weighted voters: We find a simpletoevaluate condition that classifies every case as either NPcomplete or in P. 1.
Towards a Dichotomy for the Possible Winner Problem in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
, 2010
"... To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This direc ..."
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Cited by 13 (0 self)
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To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This directly leads to the POSSIBLE WINNER problem that asks, given a set of partial votes, whether a distinguished candidate can still become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent examples include plurality, kapproval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NPhardness results for some special cases, we settle the computational complexity for all but one scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted voters, we show that POSSIBLE WINNER is NPcomplete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2, 1,...,1, 0), while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.
FixedParameter Algorithms for Kemeny Rankings
, 2009
"... The computation of Kemeny rankings is central to many applications in the context of rank aggregation. Given a set of permutations (votes) over a set of candidates, one searches for a “consensus permutation” that is “closest” to the given set of permutations. Unfortunately, the problem is NPhard. W ..."
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Cited by 11 (5 self)
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The computation of Kemeny rankings is central to many applications in the context of rank aggregation. Given a set of permutations (votes) over a set of candidates, one searches for a “consensus permutation” that is “closest” to the given set of permutations. Unfortunately, the problem is NPhard. We provide a broad study of the parameterized complexity for computing optimal Kemeny rankings. Beside the three obvious parameters “number of votes”, “number of candidates”, and solution size (called Kemeny score), we consider further structural parameterizations. More specifically, we show that the Kemeny score (and a corresponding Kemeny ranking) of an election can be computed efficiently whenever the average pairwise distance between two input votes is not too large. In other words, Kemeny Score is fixedparameter tractable with respect to the parameter “average pairwise KendallTau distance da”. We describe a fixedparameter algorithm with running time 16 ⌈da ⌉ · poly. Moreover, we extend our studies to the parameters “maximum range ” and “average range ” of positions a candidate takes in the input votes. Whereas Kemeny
Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
"... Abstract. There are different ways for an external agent to influence the outcome of an election. We concentrate on “control ” by adding or deleting candidates of an election. Our main focus is to investigate the parameterized complexity of various control problems for different voting systems. To t ..."
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Cited by 8 (3 self)
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Abstract. There are different ways for an external agent to influence the outcome of an election. We concentrate on “control ” by adding or deleting candidates of an election. Our main focus is to investigate the parameterized complexity of various control problems for different voting systems. To this end, we introduce natural digraph problems that may be of independent interest. They help in determining the parameterized complexity of control for different voting systems including Llull, Copeland, and plurality votings. Devising several parameterized reductions, we provide a parameterized complexity overview of the digraph and control problems with respect to natural parameters. 1
On problem kernels for possible winner determination under the kapproval protocol
, 2009
"... Abstract. The POSSIBLE WINNER problem asks whether some distinguished candidate may become the winner of an election when the given incomplete votes (partial orders) are extended into complete ones (linear orders) in a favorable way. Under the kapproval protocol, for every voter, the best k candida ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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Abstract. The POSSIBLE WINNER problem asks whether some distinguished candidate may become the winner of an election when the given incomplete votes (partial orders) are extended into complete ones (linear orders) in a favorable way. Under the kapproval protocol, for every voter, the best k candidates of his or her preference order get one point. A candidate with maximum total number of points wins. The POSSIBLE WINNER problem for kapproval is NPcomplete even if there are only two votes (and k is part of the input). In addition, it is NPcomplete for every fixed k ∈ {2,..., m − 2} with m denoting the number of candidates if the number of votes is unbounded. We investigate the parameterized complexity with respect to the combined parameter k and “number of incomplete votes ” t, and with respect to the combined parameter k ′: = m − k and t. For both cases, we use kernelization to show fixedparameter tractability. However, we show that whereas there is a polynomialsize problem kernel with respect to (t, k ′), it is very unlikely that there is a polynomialsize kernel for (t, k). We provide additional fixedparameter algorithms for some special cases. 1
Approximability and Inapproximability of Dodgson and Young Elections
, 2007
"... The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find the candidate closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given candidate is known to be hard to compute under both rules. In this paper, we put forward an LPbased rando ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find the candidate closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given candidate is known to be hard to compute under both rules. In this paper, we put forward an LPbased randomized rounding algorithm which yields an O(log m) approximation ratio for the Dodgson score, where m is the number of candidates. Surprisingly, we show that the seemingly simpler Young score is N Phard to approximate by any factor.
On the computation of fully proportional representation
 Journal of AI Research
"... We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the “sum of misrepresentations ” is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NPhard, hence ..."
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Cited by 3 (2 self)
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We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the “sum of misrepresentations ” is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NPhard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, weconsideredminimizing the maximalmisrepresentationintroducingeffectively two new rules. In the general case these “minimax ” versions of classical rules appeared to be still NPhard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixedparameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixedparameter intractability for the number of winners. For singlepeaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomialtime algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NPhard for singlepeaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule. 1.
How Similarity Helps to Efficiently Compute Kemeny Rankings
 PROC. OF 8TH AAMAS
, 2009
"... The computation of Kemeny rankings is central to many applications in the context of rank aggregation. Unfortunately, the problem is NPhard. We show that the Kemeny score (and a corresponding Kemeny ranking) of an election can be computed efficiently whenever the average pairwise distance between t ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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The computation of Kemeny rankings is central to many applications in the context of rank aggregation. Unfortunately, the problem is NPhard. We show that the Kemeny score (and a corresponding Kemeny ranking) of an election can be computed efficiently whenever the average pairwise distance between two input votes is not too large. In other words, Kemeny Score is fixedparameter tractable with respect to the parameter “average pairwise KendallTau distance da”. We describe a fixedparameter algorithm with running time 16 ⌈da ⌉ · poly. Moreover, we extend our studies to the parameters “maximum range ” and “average range ” of positions a candidate takes in the input votes. Whereas Kemeny Score remains fixedparameter tractable with respect to the parameter “maximum range”, it becomes NPcomplete in case of an average range value of two. This excludes fixedparameter tractability with respect to the parameter “average range” unless P=NP.