At a time of increased social usage of net and collaborative applications a robust and detailed theory of social presence could contribute to our understanding of social behavior in mediated environments, allow researchers to predict and measure differences among media interfaces, and guide the design of new social environments and interfaces. A broader theory of social presence can guide more valid and reliable measures. The article reviews, classifies, and critiques existing theories and measures of social presence. A set of criteria and scope conditions is proposed to help remedy limitations in past theories and measures and to provide a contribution to a more robust theory and measure of social presence. Keywords: Human-computer interaction, computer-mediated communication, nonverbal communication, new media, communication technology, virtual reality

How does an individual use the knowledge acquired through self exploration as a manipulable model through which to understand others and benefit from their knowledge? How can developmental and social learning be combined for their mutual benefit? In this paper we review a hierarchical architecture (HAMMER) which allows a principled way for combining knowledge through exploration and knowledge from others, through the creation and use of multiple inverse and forward models. We describe how Bayesian Belief Networks can be used to learn the association between a robot’s motor commands and sensory consequences (forward models), and how the inverse association can be used for imitation. Inverse models created through self exploration, as well as those from observing others can coexist and compete in a principled unified framework, that utilises the simulation theory of mind approach to mentally rehearse and understand the actions of others. 1.

this paper is to show that this misunderstanding of the nature of logic by these and other prominent programs of research into human reasoning, has led to an impoverishment of empirical investigation into what subjects are doing in the selection task and to a wholly unnecessary and damaging rift between logically based cognitive theories of natural language interpretation on the one hand, and psychological experimentation on reasoning on the other. We will show that when empirical exploration is based on an informed understanding of logically based cognitive theory, the evidence strongly suggests a nearly opposite evolutionary account of the relation between the emergence of human communication capacities and economic exchange, and that logical semantics already has accounts of context senstivity to o#er far in advance of mental models theory's new creations

An implemented AI reasoning system called ATT-Meta is sketched. It addresses not only AI issues but also ones that are salient in psychology, philosophy, cognitive linguistics, discourse pragmatics and other disciplines. These issues include the Simulation-Theory/Theory-Theory debate and Fauconnier and Turner's notion of conceptual blending. The system performs metaphor-based reasoning and reasoning about mental states of agents; in particular, it performs metaphor-based reasoning about mental states. Although it relies on built-in knowledge of specific conceptual metaphors, it is flexible in allowing novel discourse manifestations of those metaphors. The metaphorical reasoning and mental-state reasoning facilities are fully integrated into a general framework for uncertain reasoning. A special result of the overall approach is that it enables a unified handling of certain apparently separate discourse phenomena: chained metaphor, personification metaphor, and reports of agents' own metaphorical thoughts.

We present and evaluate an approach to the reasoning needed to handle a broad class of metaphorical ut-terances, and a computer program (ATT-Meta) partially implementing and further specifying that approach. The approach emanates from artificial intelligence but is offered also for consideration by cognitive scien-tists generally. The utterances of interest are ones that (a) rest on conceptual metaphors that are familiar to the understander but (b) transcend the mappings in the conceptual metaphors by using concepts not han-dled by the mappings. Our approach advocates possibly-extensive inferencing in the terms of the source (vehicle) domains of the conceptual metaphors, while avoiding as far as possible the extension of the map-pings to deal with the concepts they do not handle. The general approach is similar in flavor to those of a small number of other metaphor researchers, but we provide a more extensive analysis, additional principles and a more thorough-going implementation. The approach contains a number of “view-neutral mapping adjuncts, ” which are default mapping principles that enable important source-domain aspects to be mapped to the target domain, independently of which specific metaphorical views are in play. Many discussions of metaphor appear to assume that such mapping actions occur, but rarely address them systematically and explicitly. In addition, in the approach, a conceptual metaphor can consist not only of a between-domain mapping but also of special, ancillary assumptions that serve to enrich the source domain with specific de-tails needed by the metaphors. The implemented system supports ancillary assumptions but currently only has a preliminary handling of view-neutral mapping adjuncts. 2 1

In this paper I will present and defend an analysis of (a sample of) the English modal auxiliary verbs using a relevance-theoretic semantic and pragmatic framework. I will start by discussing previous analyses of modality in English with an eye to explaining how a cluster of related meanings- epistemic, root, and other- is expressed by the same set of lexical items. I will then go on to develop a unitary semantic approach to the English toodais, treating them as (mostly) incomplete propositional operators. After defending the details of my semantic account, I will show how the proposed semantics can give rise to the range of root interpretations modal verbs can receive in context. Epistemic interpretations require some further theoretical machinery, which will make crucial use of the notion of metarepresentation. Finally, I will sketch the differences between natural-language interpretations of modal operators and their alethic/logical uses.

The mechanism by which humans perceive others differs greatly from how humans perceive inanimate objects. Unlike inanimate objects, humans have the distinct property of being “like me ” in the eyes of the observer. This allows us to use the same systems that process knowledge about self-performed actions, self-conceived thoughts, and self-experienced emotions to understand actions, thoughts, and emotions in others. The authors propose that internal simulation mechanisms, such as the mirror neuron system, are necessary for normal development of recognition, imitation, theory of mind, empathy, and language. Additionally, the authors suggest that dysfunctional simulation mechanisms may underlie the social and communicative deficits seen in individuals with autism spectrum disorders.

To be published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (in press)

This paper outlines the foundation of a definition and measurement for the concept social presence. Justification for such a line of research lies in the ever-increasing use of social presence technologies and expansion of the social interactions across the Internet. A definition of social presence, based upon past literature and theory, describes several levels and dimensions of social presence by which the concept can be operationalized. Specifically, Level 1: co-presence is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for the sense of social presence. Level 2: the Subjective level, attempts to measure the psycho-behavioral accessibility of another interactant. Finally, Level 3: the Intersubjective level, assesses within and cross-interactant symmetry. The purposeful direction of this research and measurement construction is to enable researchers and designers to compare various mediated interactions as well as further theoretical inquiry. 2 1.

Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that