We estimate the equity premium using dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain. Our estimates for 1951 to 2000, 2.55 percent and 4.32 percent, are much lower than the equity premium produced by the average stock return, 7.43 percent. Our evidence suggests that the high average return for 1951 to 2000 is due to a decline in discount rates that produces a large unexpected capital gain. Our main conclusion is that the average stock return of the last halfcentury is a lot higher than expected.

Abstract not found

We investigate the portfolio choices of mean-variance-optimizing investors who use sample evidence to update prior beliefs centered on either risk-based or characteristic-based pricing models. With dogmatic beliefs in such models and an unconstrained ratio of position size to capital, optimal portfolios can differ across models to economically significant degrees. The differences are substantially reduced by modest uncertainty about the models ’ pricing abilities. When the ratio of position size to capital is subject to realistic constraints, the differences in portfolios across models become even less important, nonexistent in some cases.

Stocks can be overpriced when short-sale constraints bind. We study the costs of short-selling equities from 1926 to 1933, using the publicly observable market for borrowing stock. Some stocks are sometimes expensive to short, and it appears that stocks enter the borrowing market when shorting demand is high. We find that stocks that are expensive to short or which enter the borrowing market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. Size-adjusted returns are 1 % to 2 % lower per month for new entrants, and despite high costs it is profitable to short them.

Abstract not found

We investigate the empirical implications of using various measures of payout yield rather than dividend yield for asset pricing models. We find statistically and economically significant predictability in the time series when payout (dividends plus repurchases) and net payout (dividends plus repurchases minus issuances) yields are used instead of the dividend yield. Similarly, we find that payout (net payout) yields contains information about the cross section of expected stock returns exceeding that of dividend yields, and that the high minus low payout yield portfolio is a priced factor. WHILE THE IRRELEVANCE THEOREM of Miller and Modigliani (1961) implies that there is no reason to suspect that dividends play a role in determining equity price levels or equity returns, the theorem is silent on the usefulness of dividends in explaining these variables. It is then, perhaps, not surprising that there is a considerable literature exploiting the properties of dividends and dividend yields to better understand the fundamentals of asset pricing both in the time series and in the cross section. Motivation for the former comes from variations of the Gordon growth model in which dividend yields can be written as the return minus the dividend’s growth rate (see, e.g., Fama and French (1988)), from consumption-based asset pricing models in which the firm’s dividends covary with aggregate consumption (e.g., Lucas (1978) and Shiller (1981)), and so forth. Additional motivation comes from cross-sectional heterogeneity in tax, agency, and asymmetric information considerations (e.g.,

We examine changes in the stock trading behavior and investment performance of 1,607 investors who switch from phone based to online trading during the period 1992 to 1995. We document that young men who are active traders with high incomes and a preference for investing in small growth stocks with high market risk are more likely to switch to online trading. We also find that those who switch to online trading experience unusually strong performance prior to going online, beating the market by more than two percent annually. After going online, they trade more actively, more speculatively, and less profitably than before-- lagging the market by more than three percent annually. A rational response to reductions in market frictions (lower trading costs, improved execution speed, and greater ease of access) does not explain these findings. The increase in trading and reduction in performance of online investors can be explained by overconfidence augmented by self-attribution bias, the illusion of knowledge, and the illusion of control.

The anomalous returns associated with net stock issues, accruals, and momentum are pervasive; they show up in all size groups (micro, small, and big) in cross-section regressions, and they are also strong in sorts, at least in the extremes. The asset growth and profitability anomalies are less robust. There is an asset growth anomaly in average returns on microcaps and small stocks, but it is absent for big stocks. Among profitable firms, higher profitability tends to be associated with abnormally high returns, but there is little evidence that unprofitable firms have unusually low returns.

Estimates of standard performance measures can be improved by using returns on assets not used to dene those measures. Alpha, the intercept in a regression of a fund's return on passive benchmark returns, can be estimated more precisely by using information in returns on non-benchmark passive assets, whether or not one believes those assets are priced by the benchmarks. A fund's Sharpe ratio can be estimated more precisely by using returns on other assets as well as the fund. New estimates of these performance measures for a large universe of equity mutual funds exhibit substantial differences from the usual estimates.

This paper explores the determinants of corporate failure and the pricing of financially distressed stocks whose failure probability, estimated from a dynamic logit model using accounting and market variables, is high. Since 1981, financially distressed stocks have delivered anomalously low returns. They have lower returns but much higher standard deviations, market betas, and loadings on value and small-cap risk factors than stocks with low failure risk. These patterns are more pronounced for stocks with possible informational or arbitrage-related frictions. They are inconsistent with the conjecture that value and size e¤ects are compensation for the risk of financial distress.