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32
Code Red Worm Propagation Modeling and Analysis
, 2002
"... activities to model and analyze Internet worm propagation. In this paper we provide a careful analysis of Code Red propagation by accounting for two factors: one is the dynamic countermeasures taken by ISPs and users; the other is the slowed down worm infection rate because Code Red rampant propagat ..."
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Cited by 180 (13 self)
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activities to model and analyze Internet worm propagation. In this paper we provide a careful analysis of Code Red propagation by accounting for two factors: one is the dynamic countermeasures taken by ISPs and users; the other is the slowed down worm infection rate because Code Red rampant propagation caused congestion and troubles to some routers. Based on the classical epidemic Kermack-Mckendrick model, we derive a general Internet worm model called the twofactor worm model. Simulations and numerical solutions of the two-factor worm model match the observed data of Code Red worm better than previous models do. This model leads to a better understanding and prediction of the scale and speed of Internet worm spreading.
Computer Immunology
- Communications of the ACM
, 1996
"... Natural immune systems protect animals from dangerous foreign pathogens, including bacteria, viruses, parasites, and toxins. Their role in the body is analogous to that of computer security systems in computing. Although there are many differences between living organisms and computer systems, this ..."
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Cited by 152 (7 self)
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Natural immune systems protect animals from dangerous foreign pathogens, including bacteria, viruses, parasites, and toxins. Their role in the body is analogous to that of computer security systems in computing. Although there are many differences between living organisms and computer systems, this article argues that the similarities are compelling and could point the way to improved computer security. Improvements can be achieved by designing computer immune systems that have some of the important properties illustrated by natural immune systems. These include multi-layered protection, highly distributed detection and memory systems, diversity of detection ability across individuals, inexact matching strategies, and sensitivity to most new foreign patterns. We first give an overview of how the immune system relates to computer security. We then illustrate these ideas with two examples.
Monitoring and Early Warning for Internet Worms
- In Proceedings of 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’03
, 2003
"... After the Code Red incident in 2001 and the SQL Slammer in January 2003, it is clear that a simple self-propagating worm can quickly spread across the Internet, infects most vulnerable computers before people can take e#ective countermeasures. The fast spreading nature of worms calls for a worm moni ..."
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Cited by 131 (16 self)
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After the Code Red incident in 2001 and the SQL Slammer in January 2003, it is clear that a simple self-propagating worm can quickly spread across the Internet, infects most vulnerable computers before people can take e#ective countermeasures. The fast spreading nature of worms calls for a worm monitoring and early warning system. In this paper, we propose e#ective algorithms for early detection of the presence of a worm and the corresponding monitoring system. Based on epidemic model and observation data from the monitoring system, by using the idea of "detecting the trend, not the rate" of monitored illegitimated scan tra#c, we propose to use a Kalman filter to detect a worm's propagation at its early stage in real-time. In addition, we can effectively predict the overall vulnerable population size, and correct the bias in the observed number of infected hosts. Our simulation experiments for Code Red and SQL Slammer show that with observation data from a small fraction of IP addresses, we can detect the presence of a worm when it infects only 1% to 2% of the vulnerable computers on the Internet.
A Biologically Inspired Immune System for Computers
- In Artificial Life IV: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems
, 1994
"... Computer viruses are the first and only form of artificial life to have had a measurable impact on society. Currently, they are a relatively manageable nuisance. However, two alarming trends are likely to make computer viruses a much greater threat. First, the rate at which new viruses are being wri ..."
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Cited by 90 (0 self)
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Computer viruses are the first and only form of artificial life to have had a measurable impact on society. Currently, they are a relatively manageable nuisance. However, two alarming trends are likely to make computer viruses a much greater threat. First, the rate at which new viruses are being written is high, and accelerating. Second, the trend towards increasing interconnectivity and interoperability among computers will enable computer viruses and worms to spread much more rapidly than they do today. To address these problems, we have designed an immune system for computers and computer networks that takes much of its inspiration from nature. Like the vertebrate immune system, our system develops antibodies to previously unencountered computer viruses or worms and remembers them so as to recognize and respond to them more quickly in the future. We are careful to minimize the risk of an auto-immune response, in which the immune system mistakenly identifies legitimate software as being undesirable. We also employ nature's technique of fighting self-replication with self-replication which our theoretical studies have shown to be highly effective. Many components of the proposed immune system are already being used to automate computer virus analysis in our laboratory, and we anticipate that this technology will gradually be incorporated into IBM's commercial anti-virus product during the next year or two.
HoneyStat: Local Worm Detection Using Honepots
- in Proceedings of the 7 th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID
, 2004
"... Abstract. Worm detection systems have traditionally used global strategies and focused on scan rates. The noise associated with this approach requires statistical techniques and large data sets (e.g., monitored machines) to avoid false positives. Worm detection techniques for smaller local networks ..."
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Cited by 63 (4 self)
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Abstract. Worm detection systems have traditionally used global strategies and focused on scan rates. The noise associated with this approach requires statistical techniques and large data sets (e.g., monitored machines) to avoid false positives. Worm detection techniques for smaller local networks have not been fully explored. We consider how local networks can provide early detection and compliment global monitoring strategies. We describe HoneyStat, which uses modified honeypots to generate a highly accurate alert stream with low false positive rates. Unlike traditional honeypots, HoneyStat nodes are minimal, script-driven and cover a large IP space. The HoneyStat nodes generate three classes of alerts: memory alerts (based on buffer overflow detection and process management), disk write alerts (such as writes to registry keys and critical files) and network alerts. Data collection is automated, and once an alert is issued, a time segment of previous traffic to the node is analyzed. A logit analysis determines what previous network activity explains the current honeypot alert. The result can indicate whether an automated or worm attack is present. We demonstrate HoneyStat’s improvements over previous worm detection techniques. First, using trace files from worm attacks on small networks, we demonstrate how it detects zero day worms. Second, we show how it detects multi vector worms that use combinations of ports to attack. Third, the alerts from HoneyStat provide more information than traditional IDS alerts, such as binary signatures, attack vectors, and attack rates. We also use extensive (year long) trace files to show how the logit analysis produces very low false positive rates. 1
Worm Propagation Modeling and Analysis under Dynamic Quarantine Defense
, 2003
"... Due to the fast spreading nature and great damage of Internet worms, it is necessary to implement automatic mitigation, such as dynamic quarantine, on computer networks. Enlightened by the methods used in epidemic disease control in the real world, we present a dynamic quarantine method based on the ..."
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Cited by 57 (9 self)
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Due to the fast spreading nature and great damage of Internet worms, it is necessary to implement automatic mitigation, such as dynamic quarantine, on computer networks. Enlightened by the methods used in epidemic disease control in the real world, we present a dynamic quarantine method based on the principle "assume guilty before proven innocent " --- we quarantine a host whenever its behavior looks suspicious by blocking tra#c on its anomaly port. Then we will release the quarantine after a short time, even if the host has not been inspected by security sta#s yet. We present mathematical analysis of three worm propagation models under this dynamic quarantine method. The analysis shows that the dynamic quarantine can reduce a worm's propagation speed, which can give us precious time to fight against a worm before it is too late. Furthermore, the dynamic quarantine will raise a worm's epidemic threshold, thus it will reduce the chance for a worm to spread out. The simulation results verify our analysis and demonstrate the e#ectiveness of the dynamic quarantine defense.
Routing worm: A fast, selective attack worm based on IP address information
, 2003
"... Most well-known Internet worms, such as Code Red, Slammer, and Blaster, infected vulnerable computers by scanning the entire Internet IPv4 space. In this paper, we present a new scan-based worm called “routing worm”, which can use information provided by BGP routing tables to reduce its scanning spa ..."
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Cited by 31 (4 self)
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Most well-known Internet worms, such as Code Red, Slammer, and Blaster, infected vulnerable computers by scanning the entire Internet IPv4 space. In this paper, we present a new scan-based worm called “routing worm”, which can use information provided by BGP routing tables to reduce its scanning space without ignoring any potential vulnerable computer. In this way, a routing worm can propagate twice to more than three times faster than a traditional worm. In addition, the geographic information of allocated IP addresses, especially BGP routing prefixes, enables a routing worm to conduct fine-grained selective attacks: hackers or terrorists can selectively impose heavy damage to vulnerable computers in a specific country, an Internet Service Provider, or an Autonomous System, without much collateral damage done to others. Routing worms can be easily implemented by attackers and they could cause considerable damage to our Internet. Since routing worms are scan-based worms, we believe that an effective way to defend against them and all other scan-based worms is to upgrade IPv4 to IPv6 — the vast address space of IPv6 ( 2 64 IP addresses for a single subnetwork) can prevent a worm from spreading through scanning. I.
Inoculation Strategies for Victims of Viruses and the Sum-of-Squares Partition Problem
- PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL ACM-SIAM SYMPOSIUM ON DISCRETE ALGORITHMS
, 2005
"... We propose a simple game for modeling containment of the spread of viruses in a graph of n nodes. Each node must choose to either install anti-virus software at some known cost C, or risk infection and a loss L if a virus that starts at a random initial point in the graph can reach it without being ..."
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Cited by 30 (2 self)
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We propose a simple game for modeling containment of the spread of viruses in a graph of n nodes. Each node must choose to either install anti-virus software at some known cost C, or risk infection and a loss L if a virus that starts at a random initial point in the graph can reach it without being stopped by some intermediate node. The goal of individual nodes is to minimize their individual expected cost. We prove many game theoretic properties of the model, including an easily applied characterization of Nash equilibria, culminating in our showing that allowing selfish users to choose Nash equilibrium strategies is highly undesirable, because the price of anarchy is an unacceptable Θ(n) in the worst case. This shows in particular that a centralized solution can give a much better total cost than an equilibrium solution. Though it is NP-hard to compute such a social optimum, we show that the problem can be reduced to a previously unconsidered combinatorial problem that we call the sum-of-squares partition problem. Using a greedy algorithm based on sparse cuts, we show that this problem can be approximated to within a factor of O(log² n), giving the same approximation ratio for the inoculation game.
Email Worm Modeling and Defense
, 2004
"... Email worms constitute one of the major Internet security problems. In this paper, we present an email worm model that accounts for the behaviors of email users by considering email checking time and the probability of opening email attachments. Email worms spread over a logical network defined by e ..."
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Cited by 29 (3 self)
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Email worms constitute one of the major Internet security problems. In this paper, we present an email worm model that accounts for the behaviors of email users by considering email checking time and the probability of opening email attachments. Email worms spread over a logical network defined by email address relationship, which plays an important role in determining the spreading dynamics of an email worm. Our observations suggest that the node degrees of an email network are heavy-tailed distributed. We compare email worm propagation on three topologies: power law, small world and random graph topologies; and then study how the topology affects immunization defense on email worms. The impact of the power law topology on the spread of email worms is mixed: email worms spread more quickly on a power law topology than on a small world topology or a random graph topology, but immunization defense is more effective on a power law topology than on the other two.
Monitoring and Early Detection for Internet Worms
- IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
"... After several Internet-scale worm incidents in recent years, it is clear that a simple self-propagating worm can quickly spread across the Internet and cause severe damage to our society. Facing this great security threat, we must build an early detection system to detect the presence of a worm as q ..."
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Cited by 27 (1 self)
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After several Internet-scale worm incidents in recent years, it is clear that a simple self-propagating worm can quickly spread across the Internet and cause severe damage to our society. Facing this great security threat, we must build an early detection system to detect the presence of a worm as quickly as possible in order to give people enough time for counteractions. In this paper, we first present an Internet worm monitoring system. Then based on the idea of "detecting the trend, not the burst" of monitored illegitimate traffic, we present a non-threshold based "trend detection" methodology to detect a worm at its early stage by using Kalman filter estimation. In addition, for uniform scan worms such as Code Red and Slammer, we can effectively predict the overall vulnerable population size, and estimate accurately how many computers are really infected in the global Internet based on the biased monitored data. For monitoring of non-uniform scan worms such as Blaster, we show that the address space covered by a monitoring system should be as distributed as possible.

