Abstract not found

Human perceptual and cognitive abilities are limited resources. Attention is the mechanism used to allocate such resources in the most effective way. Current technologies, in addition to allowing fast access to information and people, should be designed to support human attentional processes on which they impose further strain. This paper analyses the issues related to the design of systems capable of such support: Attention Aware Systems. We introduce the research aimed at understanding and modelling human attentional processes, including perceptual and cognitive processes as studied in cognitive psychology, as well as rhetorical, aesthetic, and social aspects related to attentional mechanisms. We analyse current approaches to the design of Attention Aware Systems along three major features: detection of user's current attentional state, detection and evaluation of possible alternative attentional states, strategies for focus switch or maintenance. Finally, we discuss the most promising research direction for the development of systems capable of supporting human attentional mechanisms.

Human and non-human primates excel at visual recognition tasks. The primate visual system exhibits a strong degree of selectivity while at the same time being robust to changes in the input image. We have developed a quantitative theory to account for the computations performed by the feedforward path in the ventral stream of the primate visual cortex. Here we review recent predictions by a model instantiating the theory about physiological observations in higher visual areas. We also show that the model can perform recognition tasks on datasets of complex natural images at a level comparable to psychophysical measurements on human observers during rapid categorization tasks. In sum, the evidence suggests that the theory may provide a framework to explain the first 100–150 ms of visual object recognition. The model also constitutes a vivid example of how computational models can interact with experimental observations in order to advance our understanding of a complex phenomenon. We conclude by suggesting a number of open questions, predictions, and specific experiments for visual physiology and psychophysics.

Re-finding, a common Web task, is difficult when previously viewed information is modified, moved, or removed. For example, if a person finds a good result using the query “breast cancer treatments”, she expects to be able to use the same query to locate the same result again. While re-finding could be supported by caching the original list, caching precludes the discovery of new information, such as, in this case, new treatment options. People often use search engines to simultaneously find and re-find information. The Re:Search Engine is designed to support both behaviors in dynamic environments like the Web by preserving only the memorable aspects of a result list. A study of result list memory shows that people forget a lot. The Re:Search Engine takes advantage of these memory lapses to include new results where old results have been forgotten.

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.

Abstract — Video visualization is a computation process that extracts meaningful information from original video data sets and conveys the extracted information to users in appropriate visual representations. This paper presents a broad treatment of the subject, following a typical research pipeline involving concept formulation, system development, a path-finding user study, and a field trial with real application data. In particular, we have conducted a fundamental study on the visualization of motion events in videos. We have, for the first time, deployed flow visualization techniques in video visualization. We have compared the effectiveness of different abstract visual representations of videos. We have conducted a user study to examine whether users are able to learn to recognize visual signatures of motions, and to assist in the evaluation of different visualization techniques. We have applied our understanding and the developed techniques to a set of application video clips. Our study has demonstrated that video visualization is both technically feasible and cost-effective. It has provided the first set of evidence confirming that ordinary users can be accustomed to the visual features depicted in video visualizations, and can learn to recognize visual signatures of a variety of motion events. Index Terms—Video visualization, volume visualization, flow visualization, human factors, user study, visual signatures, video processing, optical flow, GPU rendering. 1

The potential use of non-visual warning signals to present spatial information to car drivers has been successfully demonstrated in several recent studies (Ho & Spence, submitted, in preparation; Ho, Tan, & Spence, submitted). Among the three types of spatial warning signals investigated (namely auditory, visual, and vibrotactile), spatial vibrotactile cues were found to be particularly effective in directing a driver’s visual spatial attention to potentially dangerous events on the road. We conducted the present study in order to examine the factors governing the relative effectiveness of auditory, visual, and vibrotactile warning signals. The speeded discrimination of warning signals presented in the various different modalities was investigated in order to explore whether the differences found in our previous research were a result of the relative speed with which people can detect warning signals presented in a given modality, or whether they were attributable to differences in the efficacy with which people can relate the warning signal to the subsequent visually-specified target driving events. 1

Using a simple change detection task involving vertical and horizontal stimuli, I. M. Thornton and D. Fernandez-Duque (2000) showed that the implicit detection of a change in the orientation of an item influences performance in a subsequent orientation judgment task. However, S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) were not able to replicate this finding after correcting for confounds and thus attributed Thornton and Fernandez-Duque’s results to methodological artifacts. Because Mitroff et al.’s failure to replicate might in turn have stemmed from several methodological differences between their study and those of Thornton and Fernandez-Duque (2000) and Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2003), the current authors set out to conduct a further replication in which they corrected all known methodological biases identified so far. The results suggest that implicit change detection indeed occurs: People’s conscious decisions about the orientation of an item appear to be influenced by previous undetected changes in the orientation of other items in the display. Implications of this finding in light of current theories of visual awareness are discussed.

Modern learning environments would greatly benefit from a better management of two apparently conflicting goals. On the one hand, in order to support autonomous, self paced, and discovery oriented learning, learners must be offered access to a large amount of information and tools. On the other hand the quantity and variety of the information and tools provided should not overwhelm learners who should instead be guided in the access, use, experimentation, and synthesis of the available resources. We propose that a shift of focus from information presentation to attention guidance in system design may allow reconciling the conflict between increased informational need and the limited human cognitive capabilities. On the basis of findings in cognitive psychology and pedagogy, we present some of the issues that should be taken into consideration for the design of systems capable of such guidance and we propose how these may be integrated in the architecture of an attention aware learning management system.

Objective: This study investigates the effect of cognitive load on guidance of visual attention. Background: Previous studies have shown that cognitive load can undermine driving performance, particularly drivers’ability to detect safety-critical events. Cognitive load combined with the loss of exogenous cues, which can occur when the driver briefly glances away from the roadway, may be particularly detrimental. Method: In each of two experiments, twelve participants engaged in an auditory task while performing a change detection task. A change blindness paradigm was implemented to mask exogenous cues by periodically blanking the screen in a driving simulator while a change occurred. Performance measures included participants ’ sensitivity to vehicle changes and confidence in detecting them. Results: Cognitive load uniformly diminished participants’sensitivity and confidence, independent of safety relevance or lack of exogenous cues. Periodic blanking, which simulated glances away from the roadway, undermined change detection to a greater degree than did cognitive load; however, drivers ’ confidence in their ability to detect changes was diminished more by cognitive load than by periodic blanking. Conclusion: Cognitive load and short glances away from the road are additive in their tendency to increase the likelihood of drivers missing safety-critical events. Application: This study demonstrates the need to consider the combined consequence of cognitive load and brief glances away from the road in the design of emerging in-vehicle devices and the need to provide drivers with better feedback regarding these consequences.