Abstract not found

Spatial attention: Visual selection and deployment over space The attentional spotlight and spatial cueing Attentional shifts, splits, and resolution Object-based Selection The visual search paradigm Top-down and bottom-up control of attention Inhibitory mechanisms of attention Invalid cueing Negative priming Inhibition of return Temporal attention: Visual selection and deployment over time Single target search Attentional blink and attentional dwell time Repetition blindness NEURAL MECHANISMS OF SELECTION Single-cell physiological method Event-related potentials Functional imaging: PET and fMRI

When an observer detects a target in a rapid stream of visual stimuli, there is a brief period of time during which the detection of subsequent targets is impaired. In this study, event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded from normal adult observers to determine whether this "attentional blink " reflects a suppression of perceptual processes or an impairment in postperceptual processes. No suppression was observed during the attentional blink interval for ERP components corresponding to sensory processing (the P1 and N1 components) or semantic analysis (the N400 component). However, complete suppression was observed for an ERP component that has been hypothesized to reflect the updating of working memory (the P3 component). Results indicate that the attentional blink reflects an impairment in a postperceptual stage of processing. Over the past several decades, the vast majority of studies of visual attention have examined the operation of attention across space. In the visual search task, for example, a target item must be detected within an array of distractor items that are presented at different locations from the target. In recent

To study the mechanisms underlying covert orienting of attention in visual space, subjects were given advance cues indicating the probable locations of targets that they had to discriminate and localize. Direct peripheral cues (brightening of one of four boxes in peripheral vision) and symbolic central cues (an arrow at the fixation point indicating a probable peripheral box) were compared. Peripheral and central cues are believed to activate different reflexive and voluntary modes of orienting (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980). Experiment 1 showed that the time courses of facilitation and inhibition from peripheral and central cues were characteristic and different. Experiment 2 showed that voluntary orienting in response to symbolic central cues is interrupted by reflexive orienting to random peripheral flashes. Experiment 3 showed that irrelevant peripheral flashes also compete with relevant peripheral cues. The amount of interference varied systematically with the interval between the onset of the relevant cue and of the distracting flash (cue-flash onset asynchrony) and with the cuing condition. Taken together, these effects support a model for spatial attention with distinct but interacting reflexive and voluntary orienting mechanisms.

Early and late selection models of attention disagree about whether visual objects are identified before or after selection, with recent evidence of interference from to-be-ignored stimuli favoring late selection over early selection accounts. However, these tests may not have permitted optimal attentional focusing. In 4 experiments subjects identified an attentionally cued target letter embedded among distractors. Only minimal effects of information appearing in to-be-ignored locations were observed. This striking efficiency of selection provides support for early selection theories and calls into question some late selection theories holding that stimuli throughout the display are immediately and fully identified prior to attentional selection. In order to explain the larger pattern of results across a variety of focused- and divided-attention paradigms, a hybrid model is advanced with a flexible locus for visual selection. Among the most fundamental questions about the func-tional architecture of the human visual information-process-ing system is the locus of selective attention. Of particular importance is whether attentional limitations occur before stimulus identification (as assumed in early selection theories)

Human perceptual and cognitive abilities are limited resources. Attention is the mechanism used to allocate such resources in the most effective way. Current technologies, in addition to allowing fast access to information and people, should be designed to support human attentional processes on which they impose further strain. This paper analyses the issues related to the design of systems capable of such support: Attention Aware Systems. We introduce the research aimed at understanding and modelling human attentional processes, including perceptual and cognitive processes as studied in cognitive psychology, as well as rhetorical, aesthetic, and social aspects related to attentional mechanisms. We analyse current approaches to the design of Attention Aware Systems along three major features: detection of user's current attentional state, detection and evaluation of possible alternative attentional states, strategies for focus switch or maintenance. Finally, we discuss the most promising research direction for the development of systems capable of supporting human attentional mechanisms.

In three experiments, participants' visual span was measured in a comparative visual search task in which they had to detect a local match or mismatch between two displays presented side by side. Experiment 1 manipulated the difficulty of the comparative visual search task by contrasting a mismatch detection task with a substantially more difficult match detection task. In Experiment 2, participants were tested in a single-task condition involving only the visual task and a dual-task condition in which they concurrently performed an auditory task. Finally, in Experiment 3, participants performed two dual-task conditions, which differed in the difficulty of the concurrent auditory task. Both the comparative search task difficulty (Experiment 1) and the divided attention manipulation (Experiments 2 and 3) produced strong effects on visual span size.

A theory is presented that attempts to answer two questions. What visual contents can an observer consciously access at one moment? Answer: only one feature value (e.g., green) per dimension, but those feature values can be associated (as a group) with multiple spatially precise locations (comprising a single labeled Boolean map). How can an observer voluntarily select what to access? Answer: in one of two ways: (a) by selecting one feature value in one dimension (e.g., selecting the color red) or (b) by iteratively combining the output of (a) with a preexisting Boolean map via the Boolean operations of intersection and union. Boolean map theory offers a unified interpretation of a wide variety of visual attention phenomena usually treated in separate literatures. In so doing, it also illuminates the neglected phenomena of attention to structure.

Why is the human brain fundamentally limited when attempting to execute two tasks at the same time or in close succession? Two classical paradigms, psychological refractory period (PRP) and task switching, have independently approached this issue, making significant advances in our understanding of the architecture of cognition. Yet, there is an apparent contradiction between the conclusions derived from these two paradigms. The PRP paradigm, on the one hand, suggests that the simultaneous execution of two tasks is limited solely by a passive structural bottleneck in which the tasks are executed on a first-come, first-served basis. The task-switching paradigm, on the other hand, argues that switching back and forth between task configurations must be actively controlled by a central executive system (the system controlling voluntary, planned, and flexible action). Here we have explicitly designed an experiment mixing the essential ingredients of both paradigms: task uncertainty and task simultaneity. In addition to a central bottleneck, we obtain evidence for active processes of task setting (planning of the appropriate sequence of actions) and task disengaging (suppression of the plan set for the first task in order to proceed with the next one). Our results clarify the chronometric relations between these central components of dual-task processing, and in particular whether they operate serially or in parallel. On this basis, we propose a hierarchical model of cognitive architecture that provides a synthesis of task-switching and PRP paradigms.

Two classes of models have been proposed to explain how redundant information extracted from separate sources comes to activate a single response. Each provides a fundamentally different account of why responses to redundant signals are typically faster than those to either signal alone (the redundant-signals effect). Independent race models assume that a race occurs between perceptual codes on independent channels and that only the winner activates the response. Coactivation models assume that there is some form of energy or activation-strength summation, with information being pooled across channels prior to decision. An intermediate class of models is introduced and a specific exemplar, the interactive race model, is tested in a series of redundant-target detection experiments. In particular, we examine the effects on performance of two types of contingency that have previously been overlooked as sources of task-relevant information. The results reveal that response times are significantly influenced by both interstimulus and stimulus-response contingencies. The interactive race model provides a natural account of these findings as well as several otherwise puzzling results in the divided-attention literature. There is considerable evidence that subjects are capable of dividing their attention among several separate sources of information (e.g., Duncan, 1984; Pashler, 1989; Shaw, 1978;