Learning from experience, the cyclical interplay of thinking and doing, is increasingly important as organizations struggle to cope with rapidly changing environments and more complex and interdependent sets of knowledge. This paper confronts two central issues for organizational learning: (1) how is local learning (by individuals or small groups) integrated into collective learning by organizations? and (2) what are the differences between learning practices that focus on control, elimination of surprises, and single-loop incremental “fixing ” of problems with those that focus on deep or radical learning, double-loop challenging of assumptions, and discovery of new opportunities? We articulate these relationships through an analysis of learning practices in high-hazard organizations, specifically, problem investigation teams that examine the most serious and troubling events and trends in nuclear power plants and chemical plants. Our analysis suggests a four-stage model of organizational learning reflecting different approaches to control and learning. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE IN HIGH-HAZARD ORGANIZATIONS 1

This report on the U.S. automobile manufacturing industry concentrates on the Big 3 firms (Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors) and discusses the condition of the industry, product and production strategies, the importance of the supply chain, distribution and retailing, and conclusions and possible future directions. It suggests that, although the U.S. industry (and the Big 3 in particular) has made tremendous progress in the past 15 years, new challenges are clear as the global market, technology, and industry structure continue to evolve. For example, the fastest growing markets are in countries that are developing an auto industry of their own. And as the report makes clear, best practice is easily transferred to emerging producers. New technologies are also being introduced, often in response to the challenges posed by environmental and safety regulations. In addition, the major producers are experiencing structural pressures as suppliers produce a larger fraction of the finished product's value, and well-financed and independent organizations threaten the traditional distribution networks on which producers rely to sell their products. Graham R. Mitchell