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An introduction to substructural logics
, 2000
"... Abstract: This is a history of relevant and substructural logics, written for the Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Logic, edited by Dov Gabbay and John Woods. 1 1 ..."
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Cited by 138 (16 self)
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Abstract: This is a history of relevant and substructural logics, written for the Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Logic, edited by Dov Gabbay and John Woods. 1 1
Continuity and the Logic of Perception by
"... following observation: If we imagine a chessboard with alternate blue and red squares, then this is something in which the individual red and blue areas allow themselves to be distinguished from each other in juxtaposition, and something similar holds also if we imagine each of the squares divided ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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following observation: If we imagine a chessboard with alternate blue and red squares, then this is something in which the individual red and blue areas allow themselves to be distinguished from each other in juxtaposition, and something similar holds also if we imagine each of the squares divided into four smaller squares also alternating between these two colours. If, however, we were to continue with such divisions until we had exceeded the boundary of noticeability for the individual small squares which result, then it would no longer be possible to apprehend the individual red and blue areas in their respective positions. But would we then see nothing at all? Not in the least; rather we would see the whole chessboard as violet, i.e. apprehend it as something that participates simultaneously in red and blue. In this paper I will describe a simple and natural framework—a logic of perception—in which this “simultaneous participation ” or superposition of
Is Quantum Logic a Logic
 Handbook of Quantum Logic and Quantum Structures, volume Quantum Logic
, 2008
"... Is a Quantum Logic a Logic? [1] in which they strengthen a previous negative ..."
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Is a Quantum Logic a Logic? [1] in which they strengthen a previous negative
Losing Your Marbles in
, 1999
"... Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the wavefunction collapse theory of GRW (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [1986]) can only solve the problem of wavefunction tails at the expense of predicting that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. More specifically, Lewis argues tha ..."
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Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the wavefunction collapse theory of GRW (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [1986]) can only solve the problem of wavefunction tails at the expense of predicting that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. More specifically, Lewis argues that the GRW theory must violate the enumeration principle: that ‘if marble 1 is in the box and marble 2 is in the box and so on through marble n, then all n marbles are in the box ’ ([1997], p. 321). Ghirardi and Bassi ([1999]) have replied that it is meaningless to say that the enumeration principle is violated because the wavefunction Lewis uses to exhibit the violation cannot persist, according to the GRW theory, for more than a split second ([1999], p. 709). On the contrary, we argue that Lewis’s argument survives Ghirardi and Bassi’s criticism unscathed. We then go on to show that, while the enumeration principle can fail in the GRW theory, the theory itself guarantees that the principle can never be empirically falsified, leaving the applicability of arithmetical reasoning to both micro and macroscopic objects intact.