Results 1  10
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269
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
 In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’00
, 2000
"... A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore comp ..."
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Cited by 188 (5 self)
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A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore computationally infeasible. However, if the optimal outcome is replaced by the results of a suboptimal algorithm, the resulting mechanism (termed VCGbased) is no longer necessarily truthful. The first part of this paper studies this phenomenon in depth and shows that it is near universal. Specifically, we prove that essentially all reasonable approximations or heuristics for combinatorial auctions as well as a wide class of cost minimization problems yield nontruthful VCGbased mechanisms. We generalize these results for affine maximizers. The second part of this paper proposes a general method for circumventing the above problem. We introduce a modification of VCGbased mechanisms in which the agents are given a chance to improve the output of the underlying algorithm. When the agents behave truthfully, the welfare obtained by the mechanism is at least as good as the one obtained by the algorithm’s output. We provide a strong rationale for truthtelling behavior. Our method satisfies individual rationality as well.
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complementfree bidders
 In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in the number of items m and in the number of bidders n, even though the “input size ” is exponential in m. The first algori ..."
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Cited by 94 (22 self)
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We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in the number of items m and in the number of bidders n, even though the “input size ” is exponential in m. The first algorithm provides an O(log m) approximation. The second algorithm provides an O ( √ m) approximation in the weaker model of value oracles. This algorithm is also incentive compatible. The third algorithm provides an improved 2approximation for the more restricted case of “XOS bidders”, a class which strictly contains submodular bidders. We also prove lower bounds on the possible approximations achievable for these classes of bidders. These bounds are not tight and we leave the gaps as open problems. 1
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
 IN STOC
, 2006
"... We design two computationallyefficient incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentivecompatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion o ..."
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Cited by 82 (15 self)
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We design two computationallyefficient incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentivecompatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an O(pm)approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations  this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an O(log2 m) approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations that includes all submodular bidders. This improves over the best previously obtained incentivecompatible mechanism for this class which only provides an O(pm)approximation.
Issues in multiagent resource allocation
 INFORMATICA
, 2006
"... The allocation of resources within a system of autonomous agents, that not only have preferences over alternative allocations of resources but also actively participate in computing an allocation, is an exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Science and Economics. This paper is a sur ..."
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Cited by 69 (17 self)
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The allocation of resources within a system of autonomous agents, that not only have preferences over alternative allocations of resources but also actively participate in computing an allocation, is an exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Science and Economics. This paper is a survey of some of the most salient issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation. In particular, we review various languages to represent the preferences of agents over alternative allocations of resources as well as different measures of social welfare to assess the overall quality of an allocation. We also discuss pertinent issues regarding allocation procedures and present important complexity results. Our presentation of theoretical issues is complemented by a discussion of software packages for the simulation of agentbased market places. We also introduce four major application areas for Multiagent Resource Allocation, namely industrial procurement, sharing of satellite resources, manufacturing control, and grid computing.
ApproximatelyStrategyproof and Tractable MultiUnit Auctions
, 2004
"... We present an approximatelyefficient and approximatelystrategyproof auction mechanism for a singlegood multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginaldecreasing piecewise constant curves and quantitybased side constraints. We develop a fully polynomialtime approximation sch ..."
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Cited by 54 (11 self)
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We present an approximatelyefficient and approximatelystrategyproof auction mechanism for a singlegood multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginaldecreasing piecewise constant curves and quantitybased side constraints. We develop a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme for the multiunit allocation problem, which computes a approximation in worstcase time , given bids each with a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a VickreyClarke Groves mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of ! . The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is bounded by 429416716 " is the total surplus in the efficient outcome.
On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects
, 2005
"... We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primaldual algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficientallocation problem for this setting. The auction assigns personalized prices to bundles, and asks bidders to report their preferred bundles in each round. ..."
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Cited by 44 (4 self)
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We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primaldual algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficientallocation problem for this setting. The auction assigns personalized prices to bundles, and asks bidders to report their preferred bundles in each round. A bidder’s prices are increased when he belongs to a “minimally undersupplied ” set of bidders. This concept generalizes the notion of “overdemanded” sets of objects introduced by Demange et al. (1986) for the onetoone assignment problem. Under a submodularity condition, the auction implements the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves outcome; we show that this type of condition is somewhat necessary to do so. When classifying the ascendingauction literature in terms of their underlying algorithms, our auction fills a gap in that literature. We relate our results to various ascending auctions in the literature.
A short introduction to computational social choice
 Proc. 33rd Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
, 2007
"... ..."