Results 1  10
of
109
Spectrum Auctions
, 2001
"... Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries ..."
Abstract

Cited by 314 (15 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
 Journal of Political Economy
, 2000
"... I review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the ‘‘simultaneous ascending auction,’ ’ which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the United States. I analyze some capabilities and limitations of the auction, the roles of various de ..."
Abstract

Cited by 196 (14 self)
 Add to MetaCart
I review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the ‘‘simultaneous ascending auction,’ ’ which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the United States. I analyze some capabilities and limitations of the auction, the roles of various detailed rules, the possibilities for introducing combinatorial bidding, and some considerations in adapting the auction for sales in which revenue, rather than efficiency, is the primary goal. I.
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
 Journal of the ACM
, 2002
"... Abstract. Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard ..."
Abstract

Cited by 186 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms—in particular, their truth revelation properties—assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion. We investigate the impact on such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by approximate ones. Specifically, we look at a particular greedy optimization method. We show that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism. We introduce another scheme that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class of players. We demonstrate the latter property by identifying natural properties for combinatorial auctions and showing that, for our restricted class of players, they imply that truthful strategies are dominant. Those properties have applicability beyond the specific auction studied.
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
 In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’00
, 2000
"... A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore comp ..."
Abstract

Cited by 185 (5 self)
 Add to MetaCart
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore computationally infeasible. However, if the optimal outcome is replaced by the results of a suboptimal algorithm, the resulting mechanism (termed VCGbased) is no longer necessarily truthful. The first part of this paper studies this phenomenon in depth and shows that it is near universal. Specifically, we prove that essentially all reasonable approximations or heuristics for combinatorial auctions as well as a wide class of cost minimization problems yield nontruthful VCGbased mechanisms. We generalize these results for affine maximizers. The second part of this paper proposes a general method for circumventing the above problem. We introduce a modification of VCGbased mechanisms in which the agents are given a chance to improve the output of the underlying algorithm. When the agents behave truthfully, the welfare obtained by the mechanism is at least as good as the one obtained by the algorithm’s output. We provide a strong rationale for truthtelling behavior. Our method satisfies individual rationality as well.
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
, 2000
"... Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auctionbased solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have nonadditive values for resources, such as distributed scheduling and task assignment problems. We introduc ..."
Abstract

Cited by 178 (24 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auctionbased solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have nonadditive values for resources, such as distributed scheduling and task assignment problems. We introduce iBundle, the first iterative combinatorial auction that is optimal for a reasonable agent bidding strategy, in this case myopic bestresponse bidding. Its optimality is proved with a novel connection to primaldual optimization theory. We demonstrate orders of magnitude performance improvements over the only other known optimal combinatorial auction, the Generalized Vickrey Auction.
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in MultiUnit Auctions
, 1998
"... Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. The FCC spectrum auctions and the Treasury debt auctions are examples. With conventional auction designs, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in mul ..."
Abstract

Cited by 130 (13 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. The FCC spectrum auctions and the Treasury debt auctions are examples. With conventional auction designs, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in multiunit auctions. Large bidders reduce demand for additional units and so sometimes lose to smaller bidders with lower values. We demonstrate this inefficiency in several auction settings: flat demand and downwardsloping demand, independent private values and correlated values, and uniform pricing and payyourbid pricing. We also establish that the ranking of the uniformprice and payyourbid auctions is ambiguous. We show how a Vickrey auction avoids this inefficiency and how the Vickrey auction can be implemented with a simultaneous, ascendingbid design (Ausubel 1997). Bidding behavior in the FCC spectrum auctions illustrates the incentives for demand reduction and the associated inefficiency.
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 1999
"... We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not app ..."
Abstract

Cited by 86 (25 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of “core convergence ” result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process.
Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions
 In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC99
, 1999
"... Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for co ..."
Abstract

Cited by 75 (5 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms  in particular, their truth revelation properties  assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion. We investigate the impact on such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by approximate ones. Specifically, we look at a particular greedy optimization method, which has empirically been shown to perform well. We show that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism. We introduce another scheme that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class...
Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions.” Working paper
, 1998
"... The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of biddi ..."
Abstract

Cited by 62 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We examine solutions to mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions.
ATTac2000: An Adaptive Autonomous Bidding Agent
 JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
, 2001
"... The First Trading Agent Competition (TAC) was held from June 22nd to July 8th, 2000. TAC was designed to create a benchmark problem in the complex domain of emarketplaces and to motivate researchers to apply unique approaches to a common task. This article ..."
Abstract

Cited by 57 (14 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The First Trading Agent Competition (TAC) was held from June 22nd to July 8th, 2000. TAC was designed to create a benchmark problem in the complex domain of emarketplaces and to motivate researchers to apply unique approaches to a common task. This article