Results 1 -
2 of
2
The Octagon Abstract Domain
"... ... domain for static analysis by abstract interpretation. It extends a former numerical abstract domain based on Difference-Bound Matrices and allows us to represent invariants of the form (±x ± y ≤ c), where x and y are program variables and c is a real constant. We focus on giving an efficient re ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 173 (18 self)
- Add to MetaCart
... domain for static analysis by abstract interpretation. It extends a former numerical abstract domain based on Difference-Bound Matrices and allows us to represent invariants of the form (±x ± y ≤ c), where x and y are program variables and c is a real constant. We focus on giving an efficient representation based on Difference-Bound Matrices—O(n²) memory cost, where n is the number of variables—and graph-based algorithms for all common abstract operators—O(n³) time cost. This includes a normal form algorithm to test equivalence of representation and a widening operator to compute least fixpoint approximations.
Install-time vaccination of Windows executables to defend against stack smashing attacks
- In Proceedings of the IFIP International Information Security Conference
, 2004
"... Abstract—Stack smashing is still one of the most popular techniques for computer system attack. In this work, we present an antistack-smashing defense technique for Microsoft Windows systems. Our approach works at install-time, and does not rely on having access to the source-code: The user decides ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 5 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Stack smashing is still one of the most popular techniques for computer system attack. In this work, we present an antistack-smashing defense technique for Microsoft Windows systems. Our approach works at install-time, and does not rely on having access to the source-code: The user decides when and which executables to vaccinate. Our technique consists of instrumenting a given executable with a mechanism to detect stack smashing attacks. We developed a prototype implementing our technique and verified that it successfully defends against actual exploit code. We then extended our prototype to vaccinate DLLs, multithreaded applications, and DLLs used by multithreaded applications, which present significant additional complications. We present promising performance results measured on SPEC2000 benchmarks: Vaccinated executables were no more than 8 percent slower than their unvaccinated originals. Index Terms—Computer security, buffer overflow, instrumentation.

