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13
ApproximatelyStrategyproof and Tractable MultiUnit Auctions
, 2004
"... We present an approximatelyefficient and approximatelystrategyproof auction mechanism for a singlegood multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginaldecreasing piecewise constant curves and quantitybased side constraints. We develop a fully polynomialtime approximation sch ..."
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Cited by 56 (11 self)
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We present an approximatelyefficient and approximatelystrategyproof auction mechanism for a singlegood multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginaldecreasing piecewise constant curves and quantitybased side constraints. We develop a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme for the multiunit allocation problem, which computes a approximation in worstcase time , given bids each with a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a VickreyClarke Groves mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of ! . The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is bounded by 429416716 " is the total surplus in the efficient outcome.
Five AI Challenges in Strategyproof Computing
, 2003
"... Computational systems are now distributed by default, and designed, owned and used by multiple selfinterested parties. In the face of this growing system complexity, we need a unifying design paradigm, that supports continued innovation and competition while promoting easy deployment, operati ..."
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Cited by 4 (3 self)
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Computational systems are now distributed by default, and designed, owned and used by multiple selfinterested parties. In the face of this growing system complexity, we need a unifying design paradigm, that supports continued innovation and competition while promoting easy deployment, operation, and use. Focusing on the central problem of resource allocationthe arbitration of shared resources among the competing demands of userswe introduce a paradigm of strategyproof computing, a vision in which individual users can treat other resources as their own. We layout the benefits of strategyproof computing, and identify five AI challenges in making this vision a reality.
Fair Package Assignment
, 2008
"... We consider the problem of fair allocation in the package assignment model, where a set of indivisible items, held by single seller, must be efficiently allocated to agents with quasilinear utilities. A fair assignment is one that is efficient and envyfree. We consider a model where bidders have su ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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We consider the problem of fair allocation in the package assignment model, where a set of indivisible items, held by single seller, must be efficiently allocated to agents with quasilinear utilities. A fair assignment is one that is efficient and envyfree. We consider a model where bidders have superadditive valuations, meaning that items are pure complements. Our central result is that core outcomes are fair and even coalitionfair over this domain, while fair distributions may not even exist for general valuations. Of relevance to auction design, we also establish that the core is equivalent to the set of anonymousprice competitive equilibria, and that superadditive valuations are a maximal domain that guarantees the existence of anonymousprice competitive equilibrium. Our results are analogs of core equivalence results for linear prices in the standard assignment model, and for nonlinear, nonanonymous prices in the package assignment model with general valuations. 1.
Calculation And Analysis Of Nash Equilibria Of VickreyBased Payment Rules for . . .
, 2003
"... ..."
Overcoming Rational Manipulation in Distributed Mechanism Implementations
, 2003
"... Distributed systems are increasingly made up of nodes governed by disparate selfinterested parties. These parties ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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Distributed systems are increasingly made up of nodes governed by disparate selfinterested parties. These parties
A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges
 In ECWeb 2002
"... Abstract. Electronic Exchanges are doublesided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an oneshot exchange that collec ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Abstract. Electronic Exchanges are doublesided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an oneshot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budgetbalanced. Budgetbalance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budgetbalance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the addedvalue concept of game theory. 1
JID:YJCSS AID:2485 /FLA [m3G; v 1.51; Prn:12/04/2011; 13:31] P.1 (113) Journal of Computer and System Sciences •• • (••••) •••–•••
"... www.elsevier.com/locate/jcss Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities ✩ ..."
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www.elsevier.com/locate/jcss Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities ✩
Yootopia!
"... mechanisms for group decision making, prediction, and payment infrastructure. The currency (scrip system) is called Yootles and underlies (but is orthogonal to) the group decision and prediction mechanisms. We present an array of currencyagnostic decision mechanisms for small groups, describing new ..."
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mechanisms for group decision making, prediction, and payment infrastructure. The currency (scrip system) is called Yootles and underlies (but is orthogonal to) the group decision and prediction mechanisms. We present an array of currencyagnostic decision mechanisms for small groups, describing new and existing mechanisms for (1) choosing among a short list of options, (2) choosing among an effectively innumerable list of options, as in meeting scheduling, (3) allocating shared goods and responsibilities, (4) public good provision, and (5) bilateral trade. We list desirable mechanism properties and describe the tradeoffs that the mechanisms make among them. Finally, we describe a small step towards synthesis of group decisions and group prediction: an interface for friendly wagers.
Choosing Samples to Compute HeuristicStrategy Nash
 In Fifth Workshop on AgentMediated Electronic Commerce
, 2003
"... Auctions define games of incomplete information for which it is often too hard to compute the exact BayesianNash equilibrium. Instead, the infinite strategy space is often populated with heuristic strategies, such as myopic bestresponse to prices. Given these heuristic strategies, it can be usef ..."
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Auctions define games of incomplete information for which it is often too hard to compute the exact BayesianNash equilibrium. Instead, the infinite strategy space is often populated with heuristic strategies, such as myopic bestresponse to prices. Given these heuristic strategies, it can be useful to evaluate the strategies and the auction design by computing a Nash equilibrium across the restricted strategy space. First, it is necessary to compute the expected payoff for each heuristic strategy profile. This step involves sampling the auction and averaging over multiple simulations, and its cost can dominate the cost of computing the equilibrium given a payoff matrix. In this paper, we propose two information theoretic approaches to determine the next sample through an interleaving of equilibrium calculations and payoff refinement. Initial experiments demonstrate that both methods reduce error in the computed Nash equilibrium as samples are performed at faster rates than naive uniform sampling. The second, faster method, has a lower metadeliberation cost and better scaling properties. We discuss how our sampling methodology could be used within experimental mechanism design.
Open Mechanism Design: Ensuring and Verifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms in Open Environments
"... iv ing between multiple parties encompasses and expands on much of the thinking that underlies agentmediated ecommerce and ondemand computing systems. The role of the infrastructure in an open setting – as it applies to resource allocation mechanisms – is to ensure or verify the property of strat ..."
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iv ing between multiple parties encompasses and expands on much of the thinking that underlies agentmediated ecommerce and ondemand computing systems. The role of the infrastructure in an open setting – as it applies to resource allocation mechanisms – is to ensure or verify the property of strategyproofness, namely, whether a selfinterested agent can maximize her utility by simply reporting information about her preferences for different resource allocation truthfully. I present two approaches, with the role of the infrastructure slightly different in each. The first approach considers passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms, while the second approach considers active enforcement of strategyproofness in decentralized auctions for dynamic resource allocation. I present monotonic resource estimation and pricing algorithms that can be used to ensure strategyproofness of a mechanism and empirical results from simulations using data collected from the Crimson Grid. Contents