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Multiagent soft constraint aggregation via sequential voting
"... We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the ca ..."
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We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the candidates via soft constraints. We consider a sequential procedure that chooses one candidate by asking the agents to vote on one variable at a time. While some properties of this procedure have been already studied, here we focus on independence of irrelevant alternatives, nondictatorship, and strategyproofness. Also, we perform an experimental study that shows that the proposed sequential procedure yields a considerable saving in time with respect to a nonsequential approach, while the winners satisfy the agents just as well, independently of the variable ordering and of the presence of coalitions of agents. 1
Decision making with multiple objectives using GAI networks
 Artif. Intell
, 2011
"... case 169, 4 place jussieu ..."
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Computational voting theory: Gametheoretic and combinatorial aspects
, 2011
"... For at least two thousand years, voting has been used as one of the most effective ways to aggregate people’s ordinal preferences. In the last 50 years, the rapid development of Computer Science has revolutionize every aspect of the world, including voting. This motivates us to study (1) conceptuall ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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For at least two thousand years, voting has been used as one of the most effective ways to aggregate people’s ordinal preferences. In the last 50 years, the rapid development of Computer Science has revolutionize every aspect of the world, including voting. This motivates us to study (1) conceptually, how computational thinking changes the traditional theory of voting, and (2) methodologically, how to better use voting for preference/information aggregation with the help of Computer Science. My Ph.D. work seeks to investigate and foster the interplay between Computer Science and Voting Theory. In this thesis, I will discuss two specific research directions pursued in my Ph.D. work, one for each question asked above. The first focuses on investigating how computational thinking affects the gametheoretic aspects of voting. More precisely, I will discuss the rationale and possibility of using computational complexity to protect voting from a type of strategic behavior of the voters, called manipulation. The second studies a voting setting called Combinatorial Voting, where the set of alternatives is exponentially large and has a combinatorial
A dichotomy theorem on the existence of efficient or neutral sequential voting correspondences
 In Boutilier [2009
"... Sequential voting rules and correspondences provide a way for agents to make group decisions when the set of available options has a multiissue structure. One important question about sequential voting rules (correspondences) is whether they satisfy two crucial criteria, namely neutrality and effic ..."
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Cited by 5 (3 self)
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Sequential voting rules and correspondences provide a way for agents to make group decisions when the set of available options has a multiissue structure. One important question about sequential voting rules (correspondences) is whether they satisfy two crucial criteria, namely neutrality and efficiency. Recently, Benoit and Kornhauser established an important result about seatbyseat voting rules (which are a special case of sequential voting rules): they proved that if the multiissue domain satisfies some properties, then the only seatbyseat rules being either efficient or neutral are dictatorships. However, there are still some cases not covered by their results, including a very important and interesting case—voting correspondences. In this paper, we extend the impossibility theorems by Benoit and Kornhauser to voting correspondences, and obtain a dichotomy theorem on the existence of efficient or neutral sequential (seatbyseat) voting rules and correspondences. Therefore, the question of whether sequential (seatbyseat) voting rules (correspondences) can be efficient or neutral is now completely answered. 1
Choquet optimization using gai networks for multiagent/multicriteria decisionmaking
 In Proceedings of the International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT’09
"... Abstract. This paper is devoted to preferencebased recommendation or configuration in the context of multiagent (or multicriteria) decision making. More precisely, we study the use of decomposable utility functions in the search for Choquetoptimal solutions on combinatorial domains. We consider pr ..."
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Abstract. This paper is devoted to preferencebased recommendation or configuration in the context of multiagent (or multicriteria) decision making. More precisely, we study the use of decomposable utility functions in the search for Choquetoptimal solutions on combinatorial domains. We consider problems where the alternatives (feasible solutions) are represented as elements of a product set of finite domains and evaluated according to different points of view (agents or criteria) leading to different objectives. Assuming that objectives take the form of GAIutility functions over attributes, we investigate the use of GAI networks to determine efficiently an element maximizing an overall utility function defined by a Choquet integral.
M best solutions over Graphical Models
 In CRAGS10 Workshop
, 2010
"... Abstract. Bucket elimination is an algorithmic framework that generalizes dynamic programming to accommodate many problemsolving and reasoning tasks. In particular, it can be used for any combinatorial optimization task such as finding most probable configurations in a Bayesian network. In this pap ..."
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Abstract. Bucket elimination is an algorithmic framework that generalizes dynamic programming to accommodate many problemsolving and reasoning tasks. In particular, it can be used for any combinatorial optimization task such as finding most probable configurations in a Bayesian network. In this paper we present a new algorithm elimmopt, extending bucket elimination for the task of finding m best solutions for an optimization task for any value of m. We formulate our algorithm using general notion of combination and marginalization operators and show that our approach is sound. We provide complexity analysis and compare it with related work. Potential extension to the minibucket framework and its impact on heuristicsearch for mbest are discussed.
Graphical representation of ordinal preferences: Languages and applications
 In ICCS
, 2010
"... The specification of a decision making problem includes the agent’s preferences on the available alternatives. The choice of a model of preferences (e.g., utility functions or binary relations) does not say how preferences should be represented (or specified). A naive idea would consist in writing t ..."
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The specification of a decision making problem includes the agent’s preferences on the available alternatives. The choice of a model of preferences (e.g., utility functions or binary relations) does not say how preferences should be represented (or specified). A naive idea would consist in writing them explicitly, simply by enumerating all possible
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"... Abstract We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences o ..."
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Abstract We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the candidates via soft constraints. We consider a sequential procedure that chooses one candidate by asking the agents to vote on one variable at a time. While some properties of this procedure have been already studied, here we focus on independence to irrelevant alternatives, nondictatorship, and strategy proofneess. Also, we perform an experimental study that shows that the proposed sequential procedure yields a considerable saving in time with respect to a nonsequential approach, while returning candidates that satisfy the agents just as well, independently of the variable ordering and of the presence of coalitions of agents.
Proceedings of the TwentySecond International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence MultiAgent Soft Constraint Aggregation via Sequential Voting
"... We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the ca ..."
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We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the candidates via soft constraints. We consider a sequential procedure that chooses one candidate by asking the agents to vote on one variable at a time. While some properties of this procedure have been already studied, here we focus on independence of irrelevant alternatives, nondictatorship, and strategyproofness. Also, we perform an experimental study that shows that the proposed sequential procedure yields a considerable saving in time with respect to a nonsequential approach, while the winners satisfy the agents just as well, independently of the variable ordering and of the presence of coalitions of agents. 1
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Mathematical Social Sciences
"... journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Sequential composition of voting rules in multiissue domainsI ..."
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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Sequential composition of voting rules in multiissue domainsI