Previous research has shown that objects that are grouped together in the same category become more similar to each other and that objects that are grouped in different categories become increasingly dissimilar, as measured by similarity ratings and psychophysical discriminations. These ndings are consistent with two theories of the inuence of concept learning on similarity. By a Strategic Judgment Bias account, the categories associated with objects are explicitly used as cues for determining similarity, and objects that are categorized together are judged to be more similar because similarity is not only a function of the objects themselves, but also the objects' category labels. By a Changed Object Description account, category learning alters the description of the objects themselves, emphasizing properties that are relevant for categorization. A new method for distinguishing between these accounts is introduced which measures the difference between the similarity ratings of categorized objects to a neutral object. The results indicate both strategic biases based on category labels and genuine representational change, with the strategic bias affecting mostly objects belonging to different categories and the representational change affecting mostly objects belonging to the same category.

Four experiments explored participants' understanding of the abstract principles goincipl coinci simulatios o coulat adaptive systems. Experiments 1, 2, and 3shoBU better transfero abstract principlesacroc simulatioA that were relatively dissimilar, and that this e#ect was dueto participantswho perfocip relativelypolat o the initialsimulatioB In Experiment 4, participantsshoic better abstract understandingo asimulatio when it was depicted withcohA@CU rather than idealized graphical elements.Homents fo pom perfos.Aq/ the idealizedversio o the simulatio transferred betterto a newsimulatio gomulat by the same abstractioU The results are interpreted in termso cosAq6BP--A between abstract and codAP)U coAP)U@/A o thesimulatio)/ Individualsproi toiv coivid coividual tendto oodAPU abstractioH whenconA)C@ pro)C@qUA o superficial similarities are salient.

Abstract not found

People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion—an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real-time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1–6. Then we show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7–10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of intuitive theories in concepts and cognition.

According to an "external grounding" theory of meaning, a concept's meaning depends on its connection to the external world. By a "conceptual web" account, a concept's meaning depends on its relations to other concepts within the same system. We explore one aspect of meaning, the identification of matching concepts across systems (e.g. people, theories, or cultures). We present a computational algorithm called ABSURDIST (Aligning Between Systems Using Relations Derived Inside Systems for Translation) that uses only within-system similarity relations to find between-system translations. While illustrating the sufficiency of a conceptual web account for translating between systems, simulations of ABSURDIST also indicate powerful synergistic interactions between intrinsic, within-system information and extrinsic information. q 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

The dynamics model, which is based on L. Talmy’s (1988) theory of force dynamics, characterizes causation as a pattern of forces and a position vector. In contrast to counterfactual and probabilistic models, the dynamics model naturally distinguishes between different cause-related concepts and explains the induction of causal relationships from single observations. Support for the model is provided in experiments in which participants categorized 3-D animations of realistically rendered objects with trajectories that were wholly determined by the force vectors entered into a physics simulator. Experiments 1–3 showed that causal judgments are based on several forces, not just one. Experiment 4 demonstrated that people compute the resultant of forces using a qualitative decision rule. Experiments 5 and 6 showed that a dynamics approach extends to the representation of social causation. Implications for the relationship between causation and time are discussed.

To be published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (in press)

of objects

Concepts are interrelated to the extent that the characterization each concept is influenced by the other concepts, and isolated to the extent that the characterization of one concept is independent of other concepts. The relative categorization accuracy of the prototype and caricature of a concept can be used as a measure of concept interrelatedness. The prototype is the central tendency of a concept, whereas a caricature deviates from the concept's central tendency in the direction opposite to the central tendency of other acquired concepts. The prototype is predicted to be relatively well categorized when a concept is relatively independent of other concepts, but the caricature is predicted to be relatively well categorized when a concept is highly related to other concepts. Support for these predictions comes from manipulations of the labels given to simultaneously acquired concepts (Experiment 1) and the order of categories during learning (Experiment 2). 3 Concepts seem to be simultaneously connected to each other and to the external world. On the one hand, concepts seem to gain their meaning by the role that they play within a network of concepts (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Field, 1977). The notion of a "conceptual web" by which concepts all mutually define one another has been highly influential in all of the major fields that comprise cognitive science, including linguistics (Saussure, 1915/1959), computer science (Lenat & Feigenbaum, 1991), psychology (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), and philosophy (Block, 1999). However, there is also dissatisfaction in some quarters with the circularity of this conceptual web account. Researchers have argued that concepts must be grounded in the external world rather than merely related to each other (Harnad, 1990). The British e...

A familiar adage in the philosophy of science is that general hypotheses are better supported by varied evidence than by uniform evidence. Several studies suggest that young children do not respect this principle, and thus su#er from a defect in their inductive methodology. We argue that the diversity principle does not have the normative status that psychologists attribute to it, and should be replaced by a simple rule of probability. We then report experiments designed to detect conformity to the latter rule in children's inductive judgment.